

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 22 September 2016 from the Chair of the  
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution  
1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan addressed to the President of  
the Security Council**

I have the honour to refer to my previous letter dated 28 December 2015, by which I transmitted the final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of its resolution 2200 (2015).

Following consultations among the members of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, I should be grateful if the present letter and the final report were issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rafael Darío **Ramírez Carreño**  
Chair

Security Council Committee established pursuant to  
resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan



**Letter dated 4 December 2015 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan**

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Panel, prepared in accordance with resolution 2200 (2015).

*(Signed)* Abhai Kumar **Srivastav**

Coordinator/expert (finance)

Panel of Experts on the Sudan established  
pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)

*(Signed)* Dakshinie Ruwanthika **Gunaratne**

Expert (international humanitarian law)

*(Signed)* Issa **Maraut**

Expert (regional)

*(Signed)* Guido **Potters**

Expert (aviation)

*(Signed)* Adrian **Wilkinson**

Expert (arms)

## **Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)**

### *Summary*

Following its appointment on 12 March 2015, the Panel of Experts on the Sudan spent some six months investigating the situation on the ground in Darfur between May and November 2015. Members travelled widely to determine whether the relevant resolutions of the Security Council were being implemented and to identify and investigate violations.

In general, the Panel welcomes the improved cooperation by the Government of the Sudan, which has indicated a willingness to provide more information to the Panel. Nevertheless, the level of detail is often insufficient to allow the Panel to independently corroborate or verify the information. The new system for obtaining Darfur travel permits now works well, but the Government continues to maintain a policy of initially issuing only single-entry visas.

The Panel encountered three access denials by the local authorities that constrained its investigations. The Government is also denying the Panel access to a government official implicated in its investigations, thus denying that individual an opportunity to reply.

### **Progress in reducing violations of the arms embargo**

The Panel identified the presence in Darfur of small arms ammunition manufactured after 2005, which had not been reported under previous mandates, but it could not identify the supply chain. The transfer of the ammunition into Darfur is certainly a violation of the arms embargo by entities that have yet to be identified.

It is certain that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) violated the arms embargo by entering Darfur, on or about 23 April 2015, with a significant quantity of weapons and ammunition of all types. It is also certain that South Sudan violated the sanctions regime by failing to take the measures necessary to prevent technical training of JEM in South Sudan and by failing to prevent JEM from transferring weapons into Darfur.

Clear evidence was obtained of the current possession by the Sudanese Air Force of cluster munitions. It is certain that at least four RBK-500 cluster bombs were deployed on the weapon loading area at the Nyala forward operating base of the Air Force.

The Panel finds it almost certain that a Typhoon armoured personnel carrier has been deployed to Darfur for the first time by the Government and has identified the supply chain in that regard. The United Arab Emirates has not provided the Panel with evidence that it fully complied with the requirement under paragraph 10 of resolution 1945 (2010) to ensure that appropriate end-use certification was in place.

The Panel identified the sale of intrusion software with an electronic intelligence capability to the Government and determined that it was classifiable as military equipment. The supplier of the equipment, Hacking Team, certainly obstructed the work of the Panel, thus failing to comply with resolution 2200 (2015).

### **Offensive military overflights, including aerial bombardments, and aviation assets**

During its current mandate, the Panel observed a decrease in the number of reported air strikes. The Panel finds that An-26 aircraft based in El Fasher made aerial bombardment flights during the mandate and almost certainly were responsible for most air strikes.

The Panel identified a reduction in the number of Sudanese Air Force air assets present in Darfur during its current mandate. In April 2015, two MiG-29 aircraft were temporarily based in Nyala, coinciding with the JEM campaign into South Darfur from South Sudan. Su-25 aircraft, ever present in Darfur since 2008, have not been seen since at least June 2015. Mi-24 helicopters never previously seen in Darfur were identified by the Panel in Darfur in the second half of 2015. These are all violations of the arms embargo because the aircraft are routinely transferred into Darfur without the prior approval of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan.

An investigation into the procurement chain for An-26 aircraft, used as improvised bombers by the Sudanese Air Force, identified that the Sudan had acquired three such aircraft between 2009 and 2010. A private company used invalid end-user documentation and supplied the ex-military aircraft to a Sudanese front company.

The Panel has seen a drastic rise in the number of government supply flights, which were almost certainly used to provide logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces in Darfur. The number of traditional Sudanese Air Force supply flights to the Sudanese Armed Forces has declined.

### **Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights**

The Panel conducted investigations into targeted attacks against the civilian population and civilian objects, the indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas and sexual violence committed during the conflict. Responsibility for the violations is attributed to the Government. The Panel continued to investigate the attack on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur in Kabkabiya on 24 May 2014 (see [S/2015/31](#)).

The Panel also investigated the recruitment of child soldiers and their use in Darfur, violations in relation to persons deprived of their liberty, including those hors de combat and civilians, and violations of international humanitarian law relating to the protection of civilians from the effects of conflict attributed to non-signatory armed groups.

The Panel identifies the certain involvement of the Sudanese Air Force, the Rapid Support Forces and proxy forces of the Rapid Support Forces and JEM in international humanitarian law violations.

### **Financing of armed groups**

The Panel is certain that a particular armed group controls the Jebel Amir artisanal gold mines and imposes illegal levies. The Panel is almost certain that the group has the potential to earn \$54 million per year from levies imposed on prospectors and support businesses (\$28 million), direct prospecting of mines (\$17 million) and illegal export of the mined gold (\$9 million). The Panel is almost certain that other armed groups, which impose illegal levies on prospectors, also control most artisanal mines in Darfur.

From trade data analysis, the Panel finds that around 48,000 kg of gold from Darfur was potentially smuggled from the Sudan to the United Arab Emirates from 2010 to 2014. Such an export level equates to an additional income of \$123 million to the armed groups in Darfur over the period.

The Panel is certain that the artisanal gold mined at Jebel Amir is conflict affected, as defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and is part of the gold purchased by the Central Bank of the Sudan from gold mines in Darfur. The Panel considers that the effective implementation of the Regional Certification Mechanism of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region by the Government at the earliest possible opportunity will assist in obstructing this easy and substantial supply of finance currently available to the armed groups in Darfur.

### **Implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze**

A new instance of almost-certain non-compliance with the travel ban by Egypt has been identified in respect of travel by Sheikh Musa Hilal Abdallah Alnsiem to that country.

The Panel is certain that an entity controlled by Sheikh Musa Hilal derives a substantial revenue stream from illicit levies on gold mining at Jebel Amir. Such levies equate to the creation of new assets. The Panel finds that, by not freezing such assets in accordance with paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 1591 (2005), the Government is certainly violating the asset-freeze measure.

### **Political process and progress towards removing impediments to the peace process**

The overall causes of the conflict and the structural factors of the violence have not changed. The population of Darfur remains fatigued and frustrated. The implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur continues to progress rather slowly, mainly owing to internal tensions within the Darfur Regional Authority. While the Operation Decisive Summer 2 security initiative has certainly weakened the military capability of the non-signatory armed groups, their leaders remain key political actors on the international scene.

The official opening ceremony of the National Dialogue, in Khartoum on 10 October 2015, changed nothing about the underlying situation. The absence of the African Union and the Chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, with a boycott by the civil opposition bloc and non-signatory armed groups, was not helpful to constructive progress. The participation of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, who provided near-unconditional support to the Government's management of the Dialogue, illustrates the split between the League and the African Union.

The inclusive peace process resumed with the opening of negotiations in Addis Ababa on 19 November 2015 between the Government and non-signatory armed groups, with the exception of the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahed Mohamed Nour. The protagonists' positions, however, remain opposed. On 23 November 2015, the Chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel stated that, in response to the calls by the delegations of the rebels to give all parties more time to consult, the negotiations had had to be suspended.

Chad has continued its engagement at the regional level. The visit by the President of Uganda to Khartoum on 15 September 2015 reflected a process of rapprochement, in particular with regard to the issue of South Sudan. While Darfur remains vulnerable to the impact of radical activities in Libya, the Panel has no reliable evidence of any infiltration of radical elements from Libya that could affect its stability and security.

The regional environment appears structurally unfavourable to the non-signatory armed groups, which have now effectively lost the traditional support of neighbouring States (Chad, Uganda and the two countries affected by internal conflict: Libya and South Sudan).

The year 2015 has witnessed a welcome increase in the support of the international community for an inclusive national dialogue, in line with the fourth preambular paragraph of resolution 2200 (2015).

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## Annexes\*

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\* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.



## I. Introduction

1. The Panel of Experts on the Sudan was established by the Security Council by its resolution 1591 (2005). The Panel's mandate has since been extended, most recently in resolution 2200 (2015). Full details of the Panel's mandate and its methodology are found in annex 1.<sup>1</sup>
2. In its resolution 2200 (2015), the Security Council requested the Panel to provide a final report with its findings and recommendations no later than 15 January 2016. The present report has been prepared in response to that request.
3. On 12 March 2015, the Secretary-General appointed the following experts to serve on the Panel: Abhai Srivastav (India, Coordinator and finance expert), Dakshinie Ruwanthika Gunaratne (Sri Lanka, international humanitarian law expert), Issa Maraut (France, regional expert), Guido Potters (Netherlands, aviation expert) and Adrian Wilkinson (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, arms expert) (see [S/2015/180](#)). The Panel wishes to acknowledge the support of Mohamed Mouti (Switzerland, language consultant).

## II. Programme of work

4. The priorities and objectives of the Panel were to focus on following up on developments in Darfur, combined with extensive analysis of the information and material collected. The Panel adopted a programme of work that was aimed at achieving a significant investment of time on the ground in the Sudan, in particular in Darfur, and planned an effective presence of some six months, divided into three periods. All Panel members were, or will be, present at various times throughout the following periods:
  - (a) 8 May to 25 July 2015;
  - (b) 7 September to 15 November 2015;
  - (c) 19 January to 5 February 2016.
5. The Panel is also prepared to travel to Darfur at short notice outside those planned dates, should that be required by a developing situation on the ground pertinent to its mandate.
6. The detailed dates and locations of the Panel's travel are found in annex 2. When not travelling, the Panel members carried out their investigations and analysis from their home bases.
7. To maintain impartiality and the same degree of contact with the main parties to the conflict (the Government and the non-signatory armed groups), the Panel met two components of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) at locations outside the Sudan: the Sudanese Liberation Movement led by Minni Arkou Minnawi (SLM/MM)

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<sup>1</sup> Terminology relating to the probability of an event uses a qualitative statement to reflect an associated probability or confidence percentage (certain, > 99 per cent; almost certain, 90-98 per cent; highly probable or highly likely, 75-89 per cent; probable or likely, 55-74 per cent). The term awarded is based on a subjective assessment of the quality of the quantitative and qualitative evidence that the Panel has seen and/or to which it has had access.

and the Justice and Equality Movement led by Jibril Ibrahim (JEM). The panel met all the signatory armed groups in Khartoum.

### **III. Operating environment and cooperation**

#### **A. Government of the Sudan**

8. The national focal point, Major General Moustafa Ibrahim Muhammad Abood, has continued to effectively support the Panel's administrative requests. An official meeting between him, the government coordination committee and the members of the Panel was held on 2 July 2015. Routine meetings between him and various Panel members were held throughout the reporting period. The Government's response to the Panel's requests for information has slightly improved, with more data being supplied during the current mandate than in the previous two years. Nevertheless, much of the information lacked the detail necessary for the Panel to be able to independently corroborate or verify it. The national focal point also specifically requested the Panel to remain fair while dealing with purported violations by the Government and to avoid reflecting anti-government bias in its reports.

9. After a delay in the issuance of the first set of visas for the Panel in April 2015, which the Government stated was due to other priorities during the election period, visas were issued in good time for the remainder of the year. Similarly, the Government dealt with visa extension applications smoothly. It continues to maintain a policy of initially issuing only single-entry visas.

10. The system for the issuance of travel permits to Darfur changed in 2015, which caused a delay in obtaining a permit during the Panel's first visit to the Sudan. The new system has subsequently settled down and appears to be effective, with permits being issued on average a week after application.

11. The national focal point and the National Intelligence and Security Service provided access to the Panel to some children after their capture or surrender during the Nakhara<sup>2</sup> attack on 26 April 2015. The Panel was able to conduct confidential bilateral interviews with five randomly selected young people. Brigadier General Hamza, of the national focal point's office, also helped the Panel to obtain age verification for some of those young people within a very short time.

12. In its final report for 2014 (S/2015/31), the Panel attributed responsibility for the attack of 24 May 2014 against African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) peacekeepers in Kabkabiya, North Darfur, to an individual. On 21 May 2015, the national focal point and the government coordination committee informed the Panel that it would not be allowed access to that individual. The inability of the Panel to meet the individual has an adverse impact on the Panel's ability to gather information, including biometrics, and thus the denial of access by the Government constitutes non-compliance with paragraph 22 of resolution 2200 (2015). On 23 September 2014, the Government provided a written response in which it outlined the extent of the individual's participation and mitigating factors. According to the Panel's methodology, the statement by the Government does not replace a

<sup>2</sup> The engagement between the Rapid Support Forces and JEM that took place between Goz Dango and Nakhara. As is the case with all mobile battles, it is commonly referred to by a single place name.

response to an opportunity to reply given to the specific individual (see annex 3), but was considered by the Panel nonetheless. The Panel's request for identification information from the Government for the individual on 7 March 2015 was refused by the Government, which stated, in a letter dated 23 September 2015, that "no cooperation is possible on providing any personal data likely to be used in issuing individual sanctions against Sudanese nationals knowing that individual sanctions violate human rights as stipulated by international conventions and the country's constitution". Further findings by the Panel are contained in a confidential annex to the present report.

13. The Panel was denied access to areas of Darfur. In June and October 2015, it requested access to the Golo, Rokero and Guildo areas in the Jebel Marra mountains. The Government denied access, citing security concerns. On 19 October 2015, the Panel was denied access by military intelligence to Hashaba, North Darfur. In addition, the Panel was denied access to the area of Kass by the local National Intelligence and Security Service office on 20 October 2015, despite having advance clearance from the national focal point in Khartoum. On 22 October 2015, the Panel met the Governor of South Darfur and the head of the South Darfur office of the National Intelligence and Security Service, at their request. They informed the Panel that they were directly responsible for the denial of access on coordination and security grounds. The denials of access constitute non-compliance with paragraph 21 of resolution 2200 (2015).

## **B. United Nations system**

14. UNAMID and other United Nations country team agencies remain fully supportive of the Panel's work. The Panel has consistently had direct access to UNAMID officials in Khartoum and Darfur to exchange information and expertise, in addition to regular direct access to country team officials. The cooperation between the Panel, UNAMID and the country team remains excellent.

## **C. Member States**

15. The Panel initiated several requests for information on specific issues in official communications to Member States and also to private entities, including reminders for information requested in 2015. The Panel notes that such requests do not necessarily imply that the Governments in question, or their nationals, have been involved in violating the sanctions regime. The Panel highlights that just under 50 per cent of requests to Member States for information resulted in a response during its current mandate. A summary of the Panel's correspondence is provided in annex 4.

## **IV. Conflict dynamics**

16. Operation Decisive Summer 2, initiated by the Rapid Support Forces, and sometimes supported by the regular Sudanese Armed Forces, had a significant impact on the conflict dynamics in Darfur during the first seven months of 2015.

17. Direct armed violence initiated by the Rapid Support Forces against the non-signatory armed groups is at virtually the same level as that during the same

period in 2014. From 1 January to 30 September 2015, there were 54 reported armed attacks initiated by the Rapid Support Forces against the groups (see annexes 5 and 6). The operational activity by the Rapid Support Forces has been concentrated mainly in Central and North Darfur (see annex 6) with the strategic intent of containing the deployment of the groups while simultaneously conducting “fix-and-destroy” operations against known group bases.

18. Operation Decisive Summer 2 was a success for the Rapid Support Forces and almost certainly resulted in a significant degradation of the operational capability and freedom of movement of the non-signatory armed groups. An indicator of its impact is the fact that the groups initiated only 18 reported armed attacks against government security forces throughout the period from 1 January to 30 September 2015, a reduction of 64 per cent over the same period in 2014 (see annex 7). Of the attacks, only two were skirmishes of any real significance: an attack by the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahed Mohamed Nour (SLA/AW) against a Rapid Support Forces position near Rokoro,<sup>3,4</sup> on 15 March 2015 and an attack by the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) against the Rapid Support Forces near Jumeiza<sup>5</sup> on 2 May 2015. A further indicator is the quantity of equipment seized by, or surrendered to, the Government during the period (see annex 8). This includes the equipment captured from JEM during the battle at Nakhara on 26 April 2015 (see paras. 51-53).

19. Direct armed violence initiated by the Sudanese Armed Forces against the non-signatory armed groups decreased slightly compared with the same period in 2014, given that the Rapid Support Forces took the operational lead during Operation Decisive Summer 2. From 1 January to 30 September 2015, there were only seven reported armed attacks initiated solely by the Sudanese Armed Forces against the groups (see annex 9), an increase of 20 per cent over the same period in 2014. Overall armed violence initiated by the Sudanese Armed Forces fell by 13 per cent compared with the same period in 2014, with many of the incidents relating to operations against organized crime or attributed to the actions of rogue officers or soldiers acting without authority.

20. One UNAMID peacekeeper was killed and 13 were injured as a result of armed violence during the reporting period (12 March to 30 October 2015). During the second quarter of 2015, armed violence, mainly armed robbery, against UNAMID individuals and property increased by more than 400 per cent compared with the same period in 2014. The third quarter (1 July to 30 September 2015) saw armed violence fall to historical levels (see annex 10).

21. For the first three quarters of 2015, the Panel identified that tribal armed violence had fallen by 15 per cent compared with the same period in 2014. Many of the incidents were small-scale armed clashes, but the potential for localized, high-intensity conflict between some tribes remains constant, with significant casualties occasionally being reported (see annex 11).

<sup>3</sup> While UNAMID has two databases of more than 8,000 geographical locations in Darfur, the mission often reports using different names for locations, including names not in geodatabases. Similarity in spellings makes it difficult to determine exactly which location is being referred to. Geodata are thus included as footnotes where locations have been confirmed. Geodata for major towns are not included, given that these locations are well known to all.

<sup>4</sup> N 11°35'13", E 24°26'05".

<sup>5</sup> In the area of Kutum (N 14°12'23", E 24°39'00").

22. Compared with the same period in 2014, there has been a small increase (4.8 per cent) in reported armed violence by unidentifiable groups, or other militia, where it has not been possible to positively attribute the responsibility for a particular act of armed violence (see annex 12). Nevertheless, there was a surge of this type of armed violence in the first quarter of 2015, but the levels subsequently declined compared with the previous second and third quarter records. Some 15 per cent of the militia attacks to date in 2015 have been against government personnel or targets.

23. Criminal activities in which armed violence was used are endemic. The level is increasing each year (see annex 13).

## **V. Progress towards reducing violations of the arms embargo**

24. Pursuant to paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004), expanded by paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005) and strengthened by paragraphs 8 to 10 of resolution 1945 (2010), as updated by paragraph 4 of resolution 2035 (2012), the Panel continues to focus on monitoring and investigation activities to identify whether there have been violations of the arms embargo by the Government, Member States, non-signatory armed groups or other entities.

### **A. Small arms and light weapons**

#### **Violations of sanctions**

25. Since 12 February 2015, the Panel has obtained physical evidence of,<sup>6</sup> or identified from imagery provided by a confidential source, the presence in Darfur of small arms and light weapon ammunition from other countries manufactured after the imposition of the arms embargo (see table 1).

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<sup>6</sup> Weapons surrendered to the UNAMID team site at Mellit on 19 March 2015 by three border guards and ammunition recovered by a Nigerian (NIBATT44) patrol after the incident in Kass on 23 and 24 April 2015.

Table 1  
**Small arms ammunition (foreign manufacture) violations identified by the Panel, 2015**

<i>Calibre</i>	<i>Markings</i>	<i>Year of manufacture</i>	<i>Consistent with manufacturer<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>First mentioned in Panel report</i>	<i>Date and location</i>
7.62 x 39 mm	71 06	2006	Unknown factory, China	2010	19 March, Mellit
7.62 x 39 mm	811 06	2006	Unknown factory, China	2013	23 April, Kass
7.62 x 39 mm	811 07	2007	Unknown factory, China	2008	19 March, Mellit
7.62 x 54 mm rimmed	71 06	2006	Unknown factory, China	2010	15 February, Forno <sup>b</sup>
12.7 x 108 mm	11 07	2007	Factory 11, China	2009	15 February, Kroun <sup>c</sup>
12.7 x 108 mm	41 07	2007	Factory 41, China	2009	15 February, Kroun
12.7 x 108 mm	41 08	2008	Factory 41, China	2009	15 February, Kroun
12.7 x 108 mm	41 09	2009	Factory 41, China	2010	15 February, Kroun
14.5 x 114 mm	41 09	2009	Factory 41, China	New	15 February, Forno

<sup>a</sup> The markings, materials and design are consistent with this particular manufacturer. The similarities are such that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is highly probable that the ammunition can be attributed to this particular manufacturer.

<sup>b</sup> Near N 14°22'41", E 24°26'26".

<sup>c</sup> Some 5 km south of Golo (N 13°07'42", E 24°16'53").

26. The transfers into Darfur of these particular batches of small arms ammunition, without the prior approval of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, are certainly violations of the arms embargo (resolution 1556 (2004), para. 7, and resolution 1591 (2005), para. 7) by perpetrators who have yet to be identified. The Panel has initiated tracing requests for the ammunition and investigations continue.

#### **Indigenous production and supply capability for small arms ammunition**

27. The level of logistic resupply required to sustain armed operations by all belligerents at the current level of conflict intensity remains unchanged; the predominant requirement continues to be for small arms and light weapon ammunition of less than 20 mm calibre. The supply chain for such ammunition, including ammunition imported into the Sudan from other Member States, remains within the national borders of the Sudan and hence under the full and effective control of the national authorities. The situation is the same as that reported in paragraphs 32, 38 and 39 of the Panel's final report for 2013 ([S/2014/87](#)) and paragraphs 84 and 88 to 96 of its final report for 2014 ([S/2015/31](#)).


### Weapon losses by the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

28. The Government has contended that the loss by UNAMID of weapons to armed groups is a significant means of supply to such groups.<sup>7</sup> On 29 October 2014, the Government supplied the Panel with a detailed list of UNAMID asset losses, which, although mainly covering vehicles, included weapons. The Panel has investigated the issue and identified a declared loss by UNAMID of 175 weapons from March 2010 to April 2015 (see annex 14).

29. From open sources, the Panel identified a total of 497 government weapon losses over a period of 2.5 years (see fig. I).<sup>8</sup>

Figure I

**Comparison of confirmed UNAMID weapon losses with “identified” government weapon losses, 2013-2015<sup>9</sup>**



<sup>7</sup> See “Sudan, AU and UN weigh exit of UNAMID from Darfur”, Xinhua.net, 16 February 2015, available from [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2015-02/16/c\\_134001400.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2015-02/16/c_134001400.htm), and Khalid Abdelaziz and Louis Charbonneau, “Question marks hang over flawed Darfur peacekeeping force”, Reuters, 11 March 2015, available from <http://news.yahoo.com/marks-hang-over-flawed-darfur-peacekeeping-force-104344727.html>.

<sup>8</sup> The Panel was unable to include data from before 2013 because this was before the establishment of Panel databases for this type of issue.

<sup>9</sup> Mortars and cannons are not included, given that UNAMID has not lost such weapons.

30. The Panel notes that the government weapon losses “identified” from open sources over the period exceed those of UNAMID by almost a factor of five and that the actual government losses are, highly probably, greater than the open-source data collated and analysed by the Panel.<sup>10</sup>

31. The Panel finds that, although unhelpful, the number of weapons lost by UNAMID to armed groups over the past few years is certainly significantly less than those lost by the Government in Darfur. Such losses are almost certainly neither a reliable nor major source of weapons for armed groups and certainly include a significant proportion of weapons (e.g. the R4 rifle) that use ammunition for which the armed groups certainly have no sustainable resupply capability.

## **B. Field deployment of cluster munitions<sup>11</sup>**

32. Analysis of imagery of the Sudanese Air Force forward operating base at Nyala has identified that cluster munitions were almost certainly deployed to the aircraft weapon loading area between 12 and 16 April 2015. The Panel is certain that at least four RBK-500 cluster bombs were present in the weapon loading area in late June 2015.

33. Although the Sudan is not a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, it has previously denied either possessing or using cluster munitions. In April 2012, a representative of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva stated that “Sudan is not a producing country and does not own stockpiles, and did not use it before, neither in the far past, nor the near one. So any accusations to my country in this field are groundless”.<sup>12</sup>

34. The presence of cluster munitions in an operational aircraft weapon loading area supports the findings of the United Nations Mine Action Service, in an unreferenced report dated April 2015, of the recent use of such munitions by the Sudanese Air Force. The United Nations Mine Action Service has information that at least two RBK-500 cluster bombs were dropped in the area of Karigiyati<sup>13</sup> in June or July 2014.

## **C. Typhoon armoured vehicles**

35. On 1 June 2015, the Panel identified<sup>14</sup> what was almost certainly a Typhoon 4 x 4-type armoured vehicle<sup>15</sup> in Nyala. The Panel has investigated the supply chain and

<sup>10</sup> The data are based on claims of weapons seized from government forces by all non-signatory armed groups after armed skirmishes, but do not include detailed information on the weapons seized.

<sup>11</sup> See also the Panel’s interim report of 31 July 2013 (unpublished), para. 37, and [S/2015/378](#), para. 50.

<sup>12</sup> See [www.clusterconvention.org/files/2012/04/Sudan\\_Wrap-up.pdf](http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2012/04/Sudan_Wrap-up.pdf). A similar statement was made by the representative of the Sudan at the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, held in Dubrovnik, Croatia, from 7 to 11 September 2015.

<sup>13</sup> N 12°57’59”, E 25°22’57”.

<sup>14</sup> Both the arms and aviation experts visually identified the vehicle. The atmospheric conditions in the area at that time precluded the taking of imagery.

<sup>15</sup> See [www.armored-cars.com/vehicle.php?vid=2](http://www.armored-cars.com/vehicle.php?vid=2).



is certain that Streit Armoured Protection Cars FZE<sup>16</sup> of the United Arab Emirates manufactured the armoured vehicles. Streit supplied them to a broker, Kamaz International Trading FZE,<sup>17</sup> under an invoice dated 9 July 2012 (see annex 15, appendices 1 and 2). The commercial invoice from Kamaz for customs purposes of 4 July 2012 (see annex 15, appendix 3) was, unusually, also for the same sum of 6 million dirhams that it had paid Streit. The Panel has not seen the final invoice from Kamaz to the Government, notwithstanding its requests to Kamaz to be supplied with full documentation concerning the transfer.

36. The Executive Office of the United Arab Emirates Committee for Goods and Materials Subjected to Export and Import Control<sup>18</sup> initially granted export authority to Streit on 8 April 2012 (see annex 15, appendix 4),<sup>19</sup> which was superseded by authority granted to Kamaz on 3 July 2012 (see annex 15, appendix 5).

37. The end-use certification for the shipment is not transparent. The Panel has repeatedly requested the Government of the United Arab Emirates, Streit, Kamaz and the Wadi Al-Neel Clearing and Forwarding Company<sup>20</sup> to supply the end-use certificate.

38. In a letter dated 16 October 2014 (see annex 15, appendix 6), Kamaz clearly stated that it had not issued an end-user certificate for the vehicles in question. This is, however, contrary to the evidence in the possession of the Panel, supplied by Streit, which clearly shows a certificate, signed by Kamaz, stating that the armoured vehicles were for the sole use of Kamaz (see annex 15, appendix 7).

39. The armoured vehicles were shipped to Port Sudan from the Hamriah port in Dubai on 20 July 2012 on board the *Shaker 1* (International Maritime Organization number 7929102). The shipping was arranged by Wadi Al-Neel.<sup>21</sup>

40. The Panel finds:

(a) That Streit supplied the armoured vehicles to Kamaz on the basis of an end-user certificate that it would almost certainly have known did not reflect the true end user of the vehicles;

(b) That the armoured vehicles were highly probably supplied to the Government of the Sudan by Kamaz without the Government of the United Arab Emirates having ensured that appropriate end-use certification was in place stating that the vehicles would not be used in Darfur, thus contravening paragraph 10 of resolution 1945 (2010);

<sup>16</sup> PO Box 54513, Technology Park, Free Trade Zone, Ra's al-Khaymah, United Arab Emirates ([www.armored-cars.com](http://www.armored-cars.com)).

<sup>17</sup> PO Box 54609, Ra's al-Khaymah, United Arab Emirates ([www.kamazexport.com](http://www.kamazexport.com)).

<sup>18</sup> The export authority of the United Arab Emirates.

<sup>19</sup> This is unusual in that it states that the country of origin is Japan.

<sup>20</sup> PO Box 912, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates.

<sup>21</sup> There is an ongoing business relationship between Wadi Al-Neel and the Government, demonstrated by the use of the *Shaker 1* and the company to ship all the military equipment for the Military Industry Corporation of the Sudan display at the International Defence Exhibition and Conference held in Abu Dhabi from 22 to 26 February 2015 and the routine visits of the *Shaker 1* to Port Sudan from the Gulf region. Information supplied by a confidential source.

(c) That the Government of the United Arab Emirates, Kamaz and Wadi Al-Neel certainly obstructed the work of the Panel by consistently and deliberately failing to provide the specific information at their disposal, as requested by the Panel, and thus failed to comply with paragraph 22 of resolution 2200 (2015);

(d) That the Government has submitted no exemption requests to the Committee for the deployment to Darfur of Typhoon armoured vehicles, thereby certainly violating the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council in paragraph 7 of its resolution 1556 (2004), read with paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005).

## **D. Electronic intelligence remote control software system**

41. In February 2014, through Privacy International, the Panel became aware of a report by a University of Toronto research programme, the Citizen Lab,<sup>22</sup> which suggested that the Government had procured the Galileo Remote Control System, a type of intrusion software, from Hacking Team S.r.l. of Italy.

42. The Panel notes that article 2 (1) of European Council Regulation No. 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items states that the term “dual-use items” is to mean items, including software and technology, which can be used for both civil and military purposes.

43. The Panel also notes that the Galileo Remote Control System could certainly be used by the Government to obtain intelligence to support military operations in Darfur. As such, it has significant military utility, and thus a military use, and could be considered to be military equipment under paragraph 7 of resolution 1556 (2004), read with paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005). In that case, it would also be subject to the end-user documentation requirement contained in paragraph 10 of resolution 1945 (2010).

44. Hacking Team stated, as conveyed in a letter dated 16 January 2015 from the Permanent Mission of Italy to the Panel, that the company did not consider the Remote Control System to be “a weapon” until the entry into force of European Commission Delegated Regulation No. 1382/2014 of 22 October 2014 amending Council Regulation number 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfers, brokering and transit of dual-use goods.<sup>23</sup> Its rationale was that the Remote Control System only then fell under the category of “intrusion software”, and thus as dual-use military equipment, within the new regulation. The Panel does not accept that rationale and further notes that it found it difficult to obtain accurate information from Hacking Team (see annex 16).

45. The Panel finds:

(a) That the Galileo Remote Control System, given that it has a clear military electronic intelligence capability, military utility and military use, falls within the category of “military equipment” pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1556 (2004), read with paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005);

<sup>22</sup> See <https://citizenlab.org/2014/02/mapping-hacking-teams-untraceable-spyware/>.

<sup>23</sup> The Galileo Remote Control System is certainly classified as “intrusion software” using the definitions in that document.

(b) That Hacking Team certainly obstructed the work of the Panel by consistently and deliberately failing to provide the specific information at its disposal, as requested by the Panel, and thus failed to comply with paragraph 22 of resolution 2200 (2015).<sup>24</sup>

46. The Security Council should therefore determine whether the Galileo Remote Control System, or similar intrusion software systems, as considered by the Panel, falls within the category of “military equipment”<sup>25</sup> and thus whether an end-user certificate should be required for any future transfers of such systems.

47. Should the Security Council consider that the Remote Control System is indeed military equipment, the Government of Italy would have been non-compliant with paragraph 10 of resolution 1945 (2010) in 2012 by failing to ensure that the appropriate end-use certification for arms and related materiel, which includes military equipment as listed in paragraph 7 of resolution 1556 (2004), was in place for the initial supply of the Galileo Remote Control System to the Sudan.

## **E. Justice and Equality Movement bases in South Sudan**

48. Although, in a meeting with the Panel in London on 7 July 2015, JEM denied having bases in South Sudan, the Panel has independent corroboration that the Twelfth Battalion<sup>26</sup> of JEM certainly used a location near Timsaha,<sup>27</sup> Western Bahr el Ghazal State, for the training of recruits in 2014 and early 2015 before its incursion into South Darfur in mid-April 2015. The Panel is also certain that JEM operated a second training base at Khor Shamam<sup>28</sup> during the same period. The Khor Shamam base is, highly probably, home to elements of the First, Second, Eighth and Eleventh Battalions of JEM. The map in annex 17 shows the location of JEM training and/or logistics bases in South Sudan.

49. The JEM military units in Khor Shamam and Timsaha were almost certainly co-located with elements of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, meaning that it is almost certain that the Government of South Sudan was aware of the presence of JEM at those locations and had allowed the JEM military activities.<sup>29</sup> It is also highly probable that JEM has maintained training and logistics capability at both locations.

<sup>24</sup> The lack of cooperation on the part of Hacking Team with the Panel in 2014 also contravened paragraph 18 of resolution 2138 (2014). It was not reported at that time by the Panel in order to maintain the confidentiality of its investigations.

<sup>25</sup> The decision will also have an impact on Council Decision No. 2014/450/CFSP of 10 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in the Sudan and repealing Decision No. 2011/423/CFSP, given that this uses the terminology of resolution 1591 (2005) as its basis.

<sup>26</sup> Although referred to as a battalion, a JEM battalion is nowhere near the size and has nowhere near the capability of a typical professional army battalion of 650 men. Each JEM battalion has a motif. The Panel has identified nine, but cannot state to which battalion each motif belongs. The motifs are a lion, a snake, a scorpion, an eagle, a leopard, a tiger, a skull and crossbones, a cobra and rockets. The Panel has seen four of the motifs on captured JEM vehicles.

<sup>27</sup> N 08°58’41”, E 25°39’13”.

<sup>28</sup> N 08°32’54”, E 25°47’10”.

<sup>29</sup> The Panel has unconfirmed information of additional JEM bases in South Sudan at Tombura, Western Equatoria State (N 05°39’52”, E 27°28’18”), Boro Medina, Western Bahr el Ghazal State (N 08°27’51”, E 24°48’07”), and Manga, Unity State (N 08°42’33”, E 29°47’07”).

50. South Sudan has therefore certainly violated paragraph 8 of resolution 1556 (2004), read with paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005), by failing to take the measures necessary to prevent technical training on and assistance relating to the provision of weapons to JEM in South Sudan from 2014 to 21 April 2015.

### **Impact of the Justice and Equality Movement operation**

51. It is now certain that JEM deployed a significant armed force<sup>30</sup> into Darfur from South Sudan in mid-April 2015 (see route on map in annex 17). The supply (by physical transfer) of weapons and ammunition into Darfur by JEM is certainly a violation of the arms embargo. South Sudan has also certainly violated paragraph 7 of resolution 1556 (2004), read with paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005), by failing to take the measures necessary to prevent the supply of weapons and ammunition by JEM to Darfur.

52. The size of the JEM force (of more than 160 vehicles) made it a relatively easy target for the Government's intelligence, surveillance, targeting and reconnaissance assets, allowing the Rapid Support Forces to plan a highly effective interdiction attack in the area around Goz Dango<sup>31</sup> and Nakhara<sup>32</sup> on 26 April 2015. The JEM forces were completely overwhelmed, taking possibly more than 750 fatalities, with in excess of 250 fighters and 160 vehicles almost certainly being lost to the Rapid Support Forces.

53. The JEM operation failed to meet any of the following initial tactical objectives,<sup>33</sup> let alone its strategic objective of capturing Nyala:

(a) The capture of logistical assets from Rahad El Birdi,<sup>34</sup> south of Nyala, to sustain future operations;

(b) The commitment of some 50 4 x 4 militarized vehicles to attempt the capture of the ex-Janjaweed leader, Ali Kushayb, possibly to hand him over to the International Criminal Court;

(c) The commitment of some 100 4 x 4 militarized vehicles for the destruction of the Sudanese Armed Forces base at Rahad El Birdi.

54. The impact of the engagement on the JEM military capability has almost certainly been significant. It is highly probable that it will take some time before JEM can be regarded as having any form of credible operational military capability.

<sup>30</sup> Probably supported by some elements from SLA/MM. See "Sudanese army and rebels both claim victory in South Darfur battles", *Sudan Tribune*, 26 April 2015. Available from [www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article54742](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article54742).

<sup>31</sup> N 10°01'14", E 24°43'53".

<sup>32</sup> N 10°47'42", E 24°27'39".

<sup>33</sup> See "Will Goz Dango battle be the beginning of the end of a rebel movement?", *Sudan Vision*, 15 December 2015, available from <http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=249711>, and information provided by confidential sources.

<sup>34</sup> N 11°17'39", E 23°53'14".

## VI. Monitoring of offensive military overflights, including aerial bombardments, and aviation assets in Darfur

55. Pursuant to resolutions 1556 (2004), 1591 (2005), 1945 (2010) and 2200 (2015), the Panel continues to focus on monitoring developments and conducting investigations with regard to violations relating to military aviation assets or operations during its current mandate. The Panel is certain that the Government is the only party to the conflict in Darfur that operates offensive aviation assets and controls its airspace.


### A. Offensive military air operations

56. In paragraph 6 of resolution 1591 (2005), the Security Council demanded that the Government should cease offensive military flights in Darfur. During its current mandate, the Panel has continued to receive reports of alleged offensive military air operations, predominantly in the eastern Jebel Marra area (see annex 18). The Panel continues to analyse the frequency of reported offensive air operations against previous historical open-source data.

57. The rate of reported air strikes for the period January-October 2015 has decreased to a figure below the historical average level over the same period from 2006 to 2014 (see fig. II). The Panel considers that the reasons for the decrease include a reduction in the number of Sudanese Air Force air assets present in Darfur in 2015, combined with a significant decrease in the number of reported air strikes for the third quarter of 2015.

Figure II

Reported air attacks in Darfur, 1 January 2006-30 September 2015



58. The Panel finds that Antonov An-26 aircraft based in El Fasher have certainly been making aerial bombardment flights during its current mandate (see paras. 107-112 for further details).

## B. Overview of Sudanese Air Force assets in Darfur<sup>35</sup>

59. The Panel finds that the number of Sudanese Air Force assets deployed to Darfur fluctuated significantly between January and October 2015. The Panel is certain of the presence in Darfur of the aircraft listed in table 2 during the reporting period.

Table 2

**Sudanese Air Force assets operating in Darfur, January-October 2015**

<i>Type</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Tactical number</i>	<i>Role</i>	<i>Present in Darfur</i>
Su-25	2	2**, 2**	Fighter ground attack/close air support	At least from January to April
MiG-29	2	6**, 6**	Fighter ground attack/multi-role	At least in April
An-26	2	7715, 7719	Light bomber/transport	In 2015; one aircraft at the time (see annex 20, figs. 1 and 2)
Mi-17 <sup>a</sup>	1	537	Multi-role	At least from June to July
Mi-17 <sup>b</sup>	1	54*	Transport	At least in October
Mi-24	5	9**, 9**, 933, 965, 966	Attack/multi-role	From January to March and at least between May and October

<sup>a</sup> Mi-17 variant that could be fitted with external hard points.

<sup>b</sup> Mi-17 transportation variant with one large aft loading door.

60. The regular deployment and redeployment of the aircraft into Darfur are certainly a violation of paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005), read with paragraph 7 of resolution 1556 (2004).

61. The Panel finds that the Antonov An-26 aircraft (tactical number 7715) observed in 2014 (see [S/2015/31](#), paras. 124-125) was also used in 2015 as an improvised bomber, which certainly constitutes offensive overflight and therefore a violation of paragraph 6 of resolution 1591 (2005).

62. In October 2015, the Panel observed five Sudanese Air Force aircraft based in Darfur:

(a) One Antonov An-26 transport aircraft, being used mainly as an improvised bomber (based at the El Fasher forward operating base);

(b) Three Mil Mi-24 attack/multi-role helicopters: one of the Mi-35 subtype and two of the Mi-24P subtype (all based at the Nyala forward operating base);

(c) One Mil Mi-17 transport helicopter (based at the Nyala forward operating base).

<sup>35</sup> An overall historical summary is provided in annex 19.

63. The Panel also finds that Sudanese Air Force aircraft, although certainly based outside Darfur, were certainly providing logistical support to the Sudanese Armed Forces in Darfur (see table 3).

Table 3

**Sudanese Air Force transport aircraft supplying the Sudanese Armed Forces in Darfur**

<i>Type</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Tactical/civil registration number</i>	<i>Role</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
An-12	3	9955/ST-AZN, <sup>a</sup> 9966/ST-KNR, <sup>a</sup> 9988/ST-KNT <sup>a</sup>	Transport	9988/ST-KNT is new (see annex 20, fig. 3).
An-32	3	7710/ST-ALM, <sup>a</sup> 7720, 7721	Transport	
Il-76TD	2	-, -	Transport	Both aircraft had their registration markings removed; one displays the same features as ST-APS (see annex 20, fig. 4), the other as ST-AZZ (see annex 20, fig. 5).

<sup>a</sup> This aircraft has dual military/civil registration.

64. The Panel finds that, because these aircraft routinely fly into Darfur displaying military tactical numbers, they are certainly military aircraft, meaning that their deployment into Darfur is a certain violation of paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005), read with paragraph 7 of resolution 1556 (2004).

65. The Panel also finds that the aircraft listed in table 4, although certainly based outside Darfur, were certainly operated by the Government and almost certainly provided logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces in Darfur during its current mandate. More information on these transport flights is provided in paragraphs 95 to 97.

Table 4

**Summary of government transport aircraft supplying the Rapid Support Forces in Darfur**

<i>Type</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Tactical/civil registration number</i>	<i>Role</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
An-12	1	–	Transport	It had neither civil nor military markings (see annex 20, fig. 6).
An-74	2	ST-BDT, ST-GFF	Transport	See annex 20, figs. 7 and 8.
Il-76TD	1	ST-EWX	Transport	See annex 20, fig. 9.

### C. Newly identified Sudanese Air Force assets deployed to Darfur

66. The An-26 aircraft with tactical number 7719 was certainly flying occasional sorties in Darfur in 2013 and 2014. In 2015, it was based at the El Fasher forward operating base, where the Panel observed it in a light bomber role. The Government has submitted no exemption requests to the Committee for the deployment to Darfur of that aircraft, thereby certainly violating the arms embargo. The Government's use

of the aircraft as an improvised bomber certainly constitutes offensive military overflights, thus violating paragraph 6 of resolution 1591 (2005).

67. The Panel identified that two Mikoyan MiG-29 multi-role combat aircraft were certainly present at the Nyala forward operating base throughout April 2015. Satellite imagery shows the two aircraft on the military apron of Nyala Airport on five dates between 4 and 26 April 2015 (see annex 20, fig. 10). The Government has submitted no exemption requests to the Committee for the deployment to Darfur of those aircraft, thereby certainly violating the arms embargo. More information on the deployment to Nyala is found in paragraphs 70 to 73.

68. The Panel observed two Mil Mi-24P attack/multi-role helicopters in Darfur that had not been seen before. Helicopters with tactical numbers 965 and 966 were based at the Nyala forward operating base in October 2015 (see annex 20, figs. 11 and 12). The Government has submitted no exemption requests to the Committee for the deployment to Darfur of those helicopters, thereby certainly violating the arms embargo.

69. The Panel continues to monitor the deployment of air assets to Darfur and their operations.

## **D. Military aviation operational levels and deployments in Darfur**

### **Mikoyan MiG-29 multi-role combat aircraft**

70. The Panel reported on the presence of MiG-29 aircraft in Darfur for the first time in 2011 (see [S/2011/111](#), para. 84, and annex 20 to the present report, fig. 13). At that time, the Government stated that the aircraft had been deployed in Darfur to conduct border surveillance flights. During the current mandate, in a letter dated 22 October 2015, the Government informed the Panel that:

The presence of that aircraft is for national defense purposes against foreign threats. It is worth mentioning that this is a sovereign act conforming with the provisions of the Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) which reaffirmed the Council commitment to sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan. Furthermore, the presence of the aircraft was also in order to deter any incursion across the borders from Republic of South Sudan like the one that took place in Goz Dungo area during the first half of this year.

71. The Government's statement confirms that the MiG-29 combat aircraft can operate as both air defence and fighter ground attack/close air support aircraft. In the latter capacity, it can be fitted with a range of air-to-surface ordnance and precision munitions.

72. The Panel notes that the MiG-29 aircraft is a capable platform for the delivery of the RBK cluster munitions that have been present in the ready-use area of the Nyala forward operating base since mid-April 2015 (see paras. 32-34).

73. Satellite imagery taken on 12 and 23 April 2015 shows two vehicles near the aircraft, which are almost certainly fuel trucks. Analysis of the exact position of the aircraft on the ramp shows that they are parked in different locations during the month. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the aircraft have almost certainly been conducting flight operations over Darfur, but cannot verify whether the flights had a defensive or an offensive purpose.



### **Mil Mi-17 multi-role helicopter**

74. In June 2015, the Panel observed the presence of an armed multi-role version of the Mi-17 troop transport helicopter at the Nyala forward operating base (see annex 20, fig. 14). Although the helicopter had no external weapon racks fitted, it is capable of carrying up to two rocket pods or other air-delivered ordnance under the external hard points. The Panel has reported that the helicopter (tactical number 537) was first deployed to Darfur in 2010 (see [S/2011/111](#), para. 87).

### **Mil Mi-24 multi-role attack helicopters**

75. Satellite imagery confirms that at least two Mi-24 helicopters (Mi-24P or Mi-35 variants) were simultaneously deployed at the Nyala forward operating base from January to March 2015. From April to June 2015, the helicopters were absent. In September and October 2015, they had certainly been redeployed to Darfur. Such redeployment, after an initial withdrawal, constitutes a certain violation of paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005) by the Government.

### **Sukhoi Su-25 fighter ground attack/close air support aircraft**

76. On the basis of satellite imagery, the Panel finds that two active Su-25 aircraft were certainly simultaneously deployed at the El Fasher forward operating base between January and April 2015. However, the Panel has no information as to the identity of the aircraft, nor whether more than those two particular aircraft have been involved in a rotation (see [S/2014/87](#), paras. 118-119). The Panel continues to investigate.

77. During the Panel's visits to Darfur in June, September and October 2015, no Su-25 aircraft were found. The Panel is uncertain whether this is a temporary or permanent withdrawal, given that such aircraft have been a constant presence in Darfur since the Sudan received the first of them in 2008.

### **Antonov An-26 transport aircraft predominantly used as improvised bomber**

78. The An-26 aircraft has featured consistently in the Panel's reports since 2005. The Panel has always connected that aircraft type to aerial bombardments, and improvised air-delivered munitions have often been observed in the close vicinity of the designated parking spot for the aircraft on the south-east side of the main apron of the El Fasher forward operating base.

79. Satellite imagery shows that an An-26 aircraft was present more frequently than usual at the Nyala forward operating base in March and April 2015. Conversely, satellite imagery from that period shows that an An-26 aircraft was absent from the El Fasher forward operating base. The Panel is thus almost certain that the An-26 aircraft based in El Fasher was deployed to Nyala in March and April 2015.

80. The aircraft, with tactical number 7719, is all white, with no additional markings or national colours such as those displayed by the An-26 aircraft with tactical numbers 7706, 7715 and 7716.

81. Since mid-August 2015, the An-26 aircraft based in El Fasher has used a new and more remote parking place in the north-east corner of the airport, where UNAMID aircraft were previously parked.

### **Supply chain for Antonov An-26 aircraft used as improvised bombers**

82. Between May 2011 and October 2015, the Panel observed Antonov An-26 aircraft (tactical numbers 7706, 7715, 7717 and 7719) routinely operating in Darfur. The Panel is certain that those numbered 7715 and 7717 were involved in aerial bombing (see [S/2014/87](#), figs. 14-18 and paras. 103-115, and [S/2015/31](#), figs. 13A and 13B and paras. 119-129) and has investigated the supply chain for them.

83. The Panel is certain that, on 15 September 2006, Asterias Commercial S.A.<sup>36</sup> purchased three An-26 aircraft (manufacturer's serial numbers 12606, 13307 and 13405) from the Government of Romania for \$201,000. They all belonged to the Romanian Air Force. Asterias provided the Government with end-user certificates stating that a civilian entity, Mărculești International Airport in the Republic of Moldova, would use the aircraft.

84. The three aircraft were flown from Romania to maintenance facilities in Kyiv between 19 April and 21 June 2007 for a major overhaul and demilitarization.

85. Coincidentally, on 21 June 2007, the air operator's certificate of the intended operator, Mărculești International Airport, was revoked by the Moldovan authorities. Without that certificate it could not have been the legal end user of the aircraft. In the expectation that the certificate would soon be restored, Mărculești International Airport supplied a delivery verification certificate to Romania confirming that the three aircraft had arrived in Kyiv on 25 July 2007.<sup>37</sup> A life extension issued by Antonov for the aircraft with manufacturer's serial number 12606 on 4 May 2012 stated that Mărculești International Airport was both the owner and operator of An-26 series number 126-06. The Panel has never seen evidence that corroborates the manufacturer's statement. The Panel is certain that the aircraft has never been registered in the Republic of Moldova, and the Moldovan authorities have strongly denied the manufacturer's statement that Mărculești International Airport owned and operated the aircraft.

86. By the second half of 2009, the maintenance work on the three aircraft had been completed. Asterias contracted an air operator that regularly worked for it to fly the aircraft to Khartoum. On 12 November 2009, the An-26 aircraft with manufacturer's serial number 13307 (temporarily registered as UR-CFZ) flew to the Sudan, where it arrived the next day. On 5 January 2010, the An-26 aircraft with manufacturer's serial number 12606 (temporarily registered as UR-CFY) followed. On 23 February 2010, the third aircraft (manufacturer's serial number 13405, temporarily registered as UR-CGA) was ferried to Khartoum.

87. The Sudanese Air Force then proceeded to operate the aircraft with military tactical numbers: that with manufacturer's serial number 12606 was marked with tactical number 7717, that with manufacturer's serial number 13307 was marked with tactical number 7715 and that with manufacturer's serial number 13405 was marked with tactical number 7716.

<sup>36</sup> Asterias is a Panamanian company, established in July 1996 and registered in Greece since October 1996 as a foreign company. Its three Ukrainian directors predominantly operate from Ukrainian territory. The company used a residential address in the Voula district of Athens for its communications. The Panel is almost certain that the address is not the location from which the company conducted its business in 2009.

<sup>37</sup> The certificate was eventually restored on 14 October 2008.

88. The Panel is almost certain that Asterias was paid for the three aircraft by an entity in Khartoum called Marble Engineering. The Panel is certain that on 10 March 2010 Asterias received \$744,629 from Marble Engineering for contract AST-080218/S-02, signed on 18 February 2008, for the purchase of the aircraft with manufacturer's serial number 13405.<sup>38</sup> In addition to that payment, Asterias received other payments from Marble Engineering: on 22 December 2009 it received \$1.38 million for contract AST-090603, signed on 3 June 2009, and on 8 March 2010 it received \$170,285 for an RU19-A300 auxiliary power unit for an An-26 aircraft.

89. Asterias has also certainly invoiced Marble Engineering for various other services relating to aircraft transport, including the sale of an An-12 aircraft (manufacturer's serial number 8345702), which currently serves with the Sudanese Air Force (ST-ZNN/tactical number 9933), and the life extension of an An-26 aircraft (manufacturer's serial number 14405) (see annex 21). According to the manufacturer, the latter does not exist. The Panel is therefore almost certain that the invoice has a typographical error and should read 13405.

90. All payments from Marble Engineering to Asterias were transferred from an account with the Omdurman National Bank, which is commonly known in the Sudan as the bank of the Sudanese Armed Forces. The Panel was unable to locate any of the addresses or verify the contact details contained in the documentation relating to Marble Engineering that it studied. The Panel is almost certain that the addresses do not exist, and the listed telephone numbers are not in service. The Panel therefore finds it almost certain that the Government uses Marble Engineering as a front company for its defence interests.

91. The initial response of Asterias to the Panel's requests for information on this procurement was that it was "unable to provide the Panel with a scanned copy of contract AST-090603, as no copy of the contract has been kept" and that "the company's contracts and documentation are retained for one financial year". The company had "no information on the current owner of these aircraft".

92. In a subsequent response, Asterias denied ever hearing of Marble Engineering. The company stated that the three aircraft had been sold to Sudan Master Technology, providing supporting documentation, part of which was illegible. The documentation included elements of contract AST-080218/S-02 referring to the sale of the aircraft with manufacturer's serial number 13405, with registration UR-CGA, from Asterias to Sudan Master Technology (see annex 22). Nevertheless, the Panel has documentary evidence of payments to Asterias from Marble Engineering for that same contract. The Panel's investigations into the role of Sudan Master Technology continue.

93. Asterias told the Panel that it owned the aircraft until they arrived in Khartoum. Nonetheless, the Panel finds that Asterias remained connected to aircraft until March 2011, and to the aircraft with manufacturer's serial number 12606 until April 2012, because:

(a) Asterias made monthly payments to the air operator that ferried the three An-26 aircraft for the "support of operation of aircrafts An-26" between March 2009 and March 2011. A sum of more than \$145,375 (including a closing payment in August 2011 of \$5,850) was paid. The amount far exceeds industry standard rates for three 4,000-km ferry flights of twin-turbo propeller aircraft;

<sup>38</sup> Contract No. AST-080218/S-01 concerned the aircraft with manufacturer's serial number 13307.

(b) The temporarily assigned registrations were certainly cancelled only on 3 March 2011, more than a year after the last aircraft was delivered;

(c) Asterias certainly paid Antonov \$50,988 for the prolongation of the specified life of the aircraft with manufacturer's serial number 12606 (tactical number 7717) in March and April 2012.

94. The Panel further finds:

(a) That Asterias has certainly obstructed the work of the Panel by consistently and deliberately providing it with incomplete, evasive or untruthful answers concerning the sale of the three An-26 aircraft and failing to provide the specific information at its disposal, and thus failed to comply with paragraph 22 of resolution 2200 (2015);

(b) That it is almost certain that the Government procured the aircraft for military use. Any procurement for civilian use would not have necessitated the use of a front company (Marble Engineering), an end-use certification that became invalid shortly after its issuance (Mărculești International Airport) and the use of a dubious third-party broker (Asterias);

(c) That the Government has certainly obstructed the work of the Panel by failing to provide any information about the procurement of the aircraft, or the role of Marble Engineering, and thus failed to comply with paragraph 22 of resolution 2200 (2015).

## **E. Supply flights using civil-registered aircraft to Darfur**

95. The Panel has found that four civilian transport aircraft made direct supply flights from Khartoum to Darfur during the current mandate. Most flights were to Nyala, but El Fasher, El Geneina and Zalingei were also destinations. One Antonov An-12 aircraft (with no visible registration), two Antonov An-74 aircraft (ST-BDT and ST-GFF) and an Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft (ST-EWX) conducted the flights.

96. The Panel requested more information on the flights from the Government. The Government responded that "all the planes and flights the Panel refers to are civilian planes hired by civilian agencies for civilian purposes; therefore they do not fall under the mandate of the Panel". The Panel has, however, identified the following factors and indicators that do not support that statement:

(a) Three of the four aircraft are stationed at apron 1 of Khartoum International Airport, which is the military apron;

(b) Article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, to which Sudan is a State party, states that a State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. It is mandatory for a State to apply nationality and registration marks whenever its aircraft are engaged in international air navigation (art. 20). The registration rules of the International Civil Aviation Organization do not apply for aircraft that operate within the State's territory, but the An-12 aircraft with no visible registration is almost certainly a government-operated aircraft and not a civil aircraft (see art. 3 (b));

(c) A notice to airmen issued by the Sudanese Civil Aviation Authority for Nyala Airport on 4 May 2015, valid until 31 October 2015 (but revoked in August

2015), indicated that the “aerodrome is closed between 08:00 and 15:00 (local time), except for helicopter flights”. The measure adversely affected UNAMID and Sudanese civilian fixed-wing (aeroplane) operations. However, the four aircraft had unhindered access to Nyala within those time periods between May and August 2015;

(d) Three of the four aircraft have been identified by the Panel in the past (see [S/2007/584](#), paras. 97-114, [S/2008/647](#), paras. 63 and 73-74, [S/2009/562](#), para. 183, [S/2011/111](#), para. 79, [S/2014/87](#), para. 117, and [S/2015/31](#), table 5) in relation to military supply flights to Darfur, namely ST-BDT (see [S/2008/647](#), para. 74, and [S/2014/87](#), para. 117), ST-GFF (see [S/2008/647](#), para. 73) and ST-EWX (see [S/2007/584](#), para. 114, and [S/2011/111](#), paras. 79-80);

(e) One aircraft (An-74 ST-GFF) displays the logo of a commercial Sudanese air operator, Green Flag Aviation Co. Ltd.,<sup>39</sup> but the Panel has previously reported on the military links of Green Flag (see [S/2008/647](#), paras. 74 and 75, and [S/2009/562](#), paras. 185-189).

97. From analysis of the above evidence, the Panel finds it almost certain that the Government is making every effort to disguise the role of these particular aircraft in covertly transporting supplies into Darfur. The Panel finds, on the balance of probability, that the flights by the four aircraft are almost certainly being used to transport military supplies in violation of paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005), read with paragraph 7 of resolution 1556 (2004).

## **VII. Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights**

98. By its resolution 2200 (2015), the Security Council requested the Panel to report on violations of international humanitarian law or violations or abuses of human rights, including those that involved attacks on the civilian population, sexual and gender-based violence and violations and abuses against children, and to provide the Committee with information on the individuals and entities that met the listing criteria set out in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005).

99. During the period of investigations, violations of international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict continued unabated. The prevailing insecurity, the lack of law enforcement authorities and the absence of the rule of law in some areas ensured the perpetuation of violations with impunity by both the Government and the non-signatory armed groups. The following sections reflect the Panel’s investigations. More general information on the human rights situation on the ground and displacements is available in the relevant reports of the Secretary-General on UNAMID.

### **A. International humanitarian law violations attributable to the Government**

100. In 2015, the Panel investigated five incidents involving violations of international humanitarian law, for which it attributes responsibility to the Government. Three were targeted attacks against civilians and civilian objects that

<sup>39</sup> A similar Green Flag logo on the tail of another aircraft (An-74 ST-BDT) was removed in 2014.

occurred in the villages of Massala,<sup>40</sup> Sambal and Hillar Hager in the locality of Tawilla, North Darfur, on or around 1 January 2015; in Funga Suk, North Darfur, on or around 1 January 2015; and in Golo and Bardani<sup>41</sup> in Golo locality, Central Darfur, between 24 and 27 January 2015. Two were indiscriminate attacks of aerial bombardments in Rowata,<sup>42</sup> North Darfur, that occurred on 1 April 2015, affecting the civilian population, and on 6 April 2015, also affecting UNAMID.

### **Targeted attacks against civilians and civilian objects**

101. Violations of international humanitarian law, summarized in annex 40, table 1, in the above-mentioned incidents almost certainly included the pillaging of livestock and household items and the destruction of objects indispensable to civilians. In addition, sexual violence occurred against women and men in Golo and Bardani, respectively. Two people were killed in Massala and Sambal and civilian residences were burned (see the Golo case study in annex 23 and the Massala, Sambal and Hillar Hager case study in annex 24).

### **Individual and collective responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law**

102. In Massala, Sambal and Hillar Hager, victims attributed responsibility for the violations of international humanitarian law to armed groups of “Arab” origin. They identified the leaders of the perpetrators to the Special Prosecutor for Crimes in Darfur and El Fasher police station as Badr Abu Kinesh, Musa Neina and Hadu. Badr Abu Kinesh is allegedly a senior officer in the Border Guards and was also the North Darfur Commissioner for Peace and Security at the time of the incident. This was a civilian appointment made by Osman Kibir while Governor of North Darfur.<sup>43</sup> Musa Neina and Hadu are often associated with Badr Abu Kinesh, although it is unclear whether they too hold official ranks in the Sudanese Armed Forces. Badr Abu Kinesh has bases in Kutum, Korma and Tawilla (see annex 24).

103. In Funga Suk,<sup>44</sup> Golo and Bardani, the perpetrators were almost certainly the Rapid Support Forces and armed groups of “Arab” origin. In the latter two localities, Border Guard units were also highly probably involved in attacks against civilians. Conversely, it is also almost certain that the Sudanese Armed Forces unit based in Golo at the time of the attack took measures to protect civilians in Golo and their objects from violations perpetrated by the Rapid Support Forces, the Border Guards and the “Arab” armed groups identified above. Nevertheless, the measures proved inadequate (see annex 23). The Rapid Support Forces and the Border Guards are organs of the State and violations of international humanitarian law principles committed by them can certainly be attributed to the Government.

<sup>40</sup> N 13°29'51", E 24°39'41".

<sup>41</sup> N 14°09'01", E 22°40'59".

<sup>42</sup> Also pronounced as “Rofata”, located at N 13°20'15", E 24°30'04".

<sup>43</sup> It is highly probable that Badr Abu Kinesh held this post as recently as August 2015.

<sup>44</sup> N 13°16'32", E 24°38'13".

### **Relationship between the Rapid Support Forces and armed groups**

104. On the basis of five investigations<sup>45</sup> conducted in Tawilla, Golo, Birka,<sup>46</sup> Khor Abeche<sup>47</sup> and Funga, the Panel finds that violations of international humanitarian law were certainly committed in the four incidents involving the Rapid Support Forces and all five incidents involving the “Arab” armed groups. It is almost certain that the local senior commanders of all parties failed to take the measures necessary to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law.

105. In its final report for 2014 (S/2015/31), the Panel stated that it was not possible to confirm whether the non-uniformed armed men that often moved close to the Rapid Support Forces were Rapid Support Forces members, or whether they were an armed group there to take advantage of the chaos often resulting from operations by the Forces. The Panel is now almost certain that, for the Khor Abeche, Birka, Golo and Funga incidents, the Forces and the other armed group coordinated their movements during the assaults on the villages and shared a common purpose.

106. In the fifth attack, although Badr Abu Kinesh was in uniform, many of his armed group were in civilian attire and deployed on horses and camels. They were neither deployed nor legally operating as a formed Border Guard unit.

## **B. Indiscriminate air attack case studies**

107. The Panel has identified further evidence of indiscriminate air attacks<sup>48</sup> that seriously and recurrently affect the civilian population and objects (see paras. 108-112). It is certain that the attacks covered below were indiscriminate in nature and, as a result, caused significant harm to civilians. They resulted in certain violations of paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 1591 (2005) and of international humanitarian law.

### **Rowata air attack (1 April 2015)**

108. Rowata is a village in the Rokero area of Jebel Marra, located, according to SLA/AW, in the vicinity of a significant SLA/AW base. SLA/AW exercises control over the area, including the village, and was in the vicinity at the time of the attack. Witnesses reported that, between 1.30 and 2 p.m. on 1 April 2015, a white Antonov aircraft dropped 10 explosive devices, almost certainly improvised aerial-delivered munitions. One exploded in the village, where a number of people had gathered. In total, 15 women and children died (see S/2015/378, para. 4) and at least 17 women and children suffered burns. The fire that followed destroyed between 7 and 15 dwellings and killed livestock. According to SLA/AW, its fighters were uninjured and its equipment and base undamaged.

<sup>45</sup> For the present section, the Panel relies on its findings of 2014 and 2015. In 2014, the Panel investigated attacks committed by the Rapid Support Forces and armed groups identified to be of “Arab” origin in incidents relating to Birka and Khor Abeche.

<sup>46</sup> N 13°43'19", E 25°00'17".

<sup>47</sup> N 12°38'48", E 25°16'13".

<sup>48</sup> See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), customary international humanitarian law, rule 12, available from [www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1](http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1).

109. The attack also resulted in the displacement of civilians to more remote areas within Jebel Marra, where they have no access to medical assistance and humanitarian aid. The injured and their care providers remained in the village.

110. Imagery relating to the violations is provided in annex 25.

#### **Rowata air attack (6 April 2015)**

111. At around 1.30 p.m. on 6 April 2015, a UNAMID patrol reached Rowata to verify the bombing of 1 April 2015. The patrol observed a white Antonov aircraft at “low altitude” circling the village and the surrounding area. The patrol would not normally expect to see an Antonov aircraft at such a low altitude. At around 3 p.m., the aircraft dropped five explosive devices, two of which landed within 200 m of the patrol. There were no reported casualties or injuries to UNAMID, civilians or SLA/AW.

112. The detailed violations of sanctions and/or international humanitarian law in relation to these particular attacks are set out below.

#### **Violations against protected persons and their objects**

113. Civilians are protected from attack and cannot be targeted unless and until they take a direct part in hostilities.<sup>49</sup> It is almost certain that the civilians affected by the attacks were not taking a direct part in hostilities at that time.<sup>50</sup> It is certain that the Government was responsible for the attacks, given that it is the only party to the conflict that operates Antonov aircraft in Darfur. The Panel therefore finds it certain that the Government is responsible for the damage to civilian objects, the deaths of 15 civilians and the injuries to 17 women and children and thus violated international humanitarian law.

114. Civilian dwellings and livestock affected by the attack were entitled to the protection afforded to civilian objects and thus were not military objectives.<sup>51</sup> In any case of doubt, international humanitarian law dictates that the presumption is tilted in favour of considering persons and objects to be civilians and civilian objects.<sup>52</sup>

#### **Violations in respect of principles of proportionality and precautionary measures**

115. The Panel finds it certain that SLA/AW fighters were in, or in the vicinity of, the village during both attacks. Under international humanitarian law, fighters may be targeted and their equipment and military establishments considered to be

<sup>49</sup> Article 13 (3) of Additional Protocol II and see, for example, ICRC customary international humanitarian law, rule 6, which relates to the protection of civilians, and rule 33, which relates to peacekeepers and their objects.

<sup>50</sup> According to prevalent jurisprudence, “civilians whose activities merely support the adverse party’s war or military effort or otherwise only indirectly participate in hostilities cannot on these grounds alone be considered combatants. This is because indirect participation, such as selling goods to one or more of the armed parties, expressing sympathy for the cause of one of the parties or, even more clearly, failing to act to prevent an incursion by one of the armed parties, does not involve acts of violence which pose an immediate threat of actual harm to the adverse party”. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, third report on human rights in Colombia (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102 Doc 9 rev.1), 26 February 1999. Available from [www.cidh.org/countryrep/Colom99en/table%20of%20contents.htm](http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Colom99en/table%20of%20contents.htm).

<sup>51</sup> See, for example, ICRC customary international humanitarian law, rules 9, 10 and 33.

<sup>52</sup> This is also consistent with the obligation to verify that objects to be attacked are military objectives and not civilians or civilian objects.



military objectives. It also equally applies that the civilian population and any United Nations peacekeepers would not lose their immunity from attack because of the presence of SLA/AW fighters among the population.<sup>53</sup> In such a situation, the attacking party must ensure that the principles of proportionality and precautions in attack are given due consideration to minimize civilian damage.

116. The Panel finds that the aircrew failed to distinguish the protected persons and objects, including the nine clearly marked United Nations vehicles, from military objectives. This could be due to negligence or the technical inability to accurately identify targets (see para. 118). Alternatively, the aircrew deliberately attacked, regardless of the presence of protected persons and objects, in a manner that failed to respect the principles of international humanitarian law relating to proportionality, and failed to take appropriate precautions. The Panel thus finds that, irrespective of either scenario, it is certain that the Government is responsible for further violations of international humanitarian law by failing to respect the principles of proportionality and ensure that the necessary precautionary measures were taken.

**Violations in respect of means and methods of warfare (Antonov An-26/improvised aerial-delivered munitions combination)**

117. International humanitarian law prohibits means and methods of warfare that are by their very nature indiscriminate.<sup>54</sup> Means of warfare primarily consist of weapons, weapon systems and platforms, including military aircraft. Methods of warfare are the operational modes used by parties, such as tactics employed when attacking the adversary.

118. The Panel, based on analysis (see annex 26), is almost certain that the An-26 aircraft are incapable of precision bombing using improvised aerial-delivered munitions at the altitudes at which they routinely operate. The delivery technique from the open cargo hold of the aircraft, combined with the design of such munitions, indicates clearly that the circular error probable<sup>55</sup> radius would be higher than for a bomb of more modern design, delivered from a purpose-designed aircraft. Targeting would therefore be poor. Against this backdrop, the use of the An-26/improvised aerial-delivered munitions combination, at the altitudes at which the aircraft routinely operate, against area targets is certainly a violation of international humanitarian law.

## **C. International humanitarian law violations attributable to armed groups**

**Violations against persons in captivity**

119. The Panel identified violations of international humanitarian law committed against civilians and persons hors de combat by a specific non-signatory armed group. Given the fact that some of the captives remain in the custody of that group and the high likelihood of reprisals against them, the Panel's findings in this respect are contained in a confidential annex to the present report.

<sup>53</sup> See ICRC customary international humanitarian law, rule 6, and associated State practice.

<sup>54</sup> See ICRC customary international humanitarian law, rule 71.

<sup>55</sup> Circular error probable is a measure of a weapon system's precision or accuracy. It is defined as the radius of a circle, centred about the mean, whose boundary is expected to include the landing points of 50 per cent of the warheads.

**Violations of international humanitarian law relating to children attributable to the Justice and Equality Movement**

120. The Panel investigated the responsibility of JEM and its leaders for child recruitment, deployment and use in hostilities in South Darfur and other violations of international humanitarian law, including denying children protection from the effects of conflict. The Panel finds:

(a) That it is certain that children under 18 years of age, and almost certainly some under 15 years of age, were recruited, either by force or lured into JEM vehicles under the premise of protection or transport or being given/promised incentives, and subsequently taken to JEM training camps in South Sudan to undergo military training;

(b) That it is certain that JEM trafficked the children across the border of South Kordofan State to South Sudan and from South Sudan to South Darfur without the knowledge or consent of their parents or guardians and bypassed border controls. The map in annex 27 shows both locations from which children were recruited by JEM and the reported presence of child soldiers or children among JEM troops;

(c) That it is certain that children were present in the Khor Shamam and Deem Jalab military training camps, where they underwent military training. The training of children in military camps alongside adult fighters and the type of training given, including weapon handling, demonstrate the intent of JEM to use children in hostilities;

(d) That it is almost certain that some children were kept in shackles in the camps, and that children were kept against their will. It is certain that, at any given time, a child could not freely leave JEM;

(e) That, in or around March 2015, the military convoy, which included children (both as fighters and civilians), left Daleiba, South Sudan, to engage in hostilities in Nyala, South Darfur. It is certain that the children were deployed with adult fighters into South Darfur to participate in or support the hostilities. There is also no doubt that the children were unable to refuse to join the convoy;

(f) That it is certain that some children were given uniforms and weapons while on duty. The use of uniforms and weapons identifies the children as potential targets in the event of hostilities and makes them vulnerable to attack;

(g) That it is certain that the responsibilities of the children included guard duties, including guarding military vehicles. Their duties when deployed in Darfur included cleaning weapons, assisting in the repair of vehicles involved in battles, cooking and acting as lookouts, including during deployment. It is certain that most of the activities constitute direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian law.

121. The Panel thus finds that JEM and its senior military leaders are certainly responsible for violations of international humanitarian law associated with the recruitment of children and their use in hostilities in Darfur. In particular, the Panel has information that the JEM Chair and Supreme Commander of Forces, Jibril Ibrahim, the General Military Commander, Siddiq Mohammad Abdul Rahman Bongo, and other identified commanders of the Khor Shamam JEM base were all aware of the presence of children in training camps and JEM bases. They therefore had knowledge of child recruitment and of the potential and actual use of children in hostilities. In addition, the Panel finds that some of the leaders decided on the order of battle for Darfur and thus are directly responsible for the deployment of children in hostilities.

122. The Secretary-General has listed JEM as a persistent perpetrator for the recruitment and use of children in hostilities and has found evidence of violations every year since 2009 (see [A/63/785-S/2009/158](#) and Corr.1, [A/64/742-S/2010/181](#), [A/65/820-S/2011/250](#), [A/66/782-S/2012/261](#), [A/67/845-S/2013/245](#), [A/68/878-S/2014/339](#) and [A/69/926-S/2015/409](#)). The Security Council has expressed concern over persistent perpetrators in several resolutions (1539 (2004), 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011) and 2068 (2012)). In his most recent report ([A/69/926-S/2015/409](#)), the Secretary-General found that, in January and February 2015, JEM had forcefully recruited 55 children between 14 and 17 years of age. The Panel finds that some of those recruited early in 2015 were used in the Nakhara battle. Accordingly, the Panel can conclude that the recruitment and use of children by JEM certainly occur regularly and continuously and almost certainly with impunity.

123. The children interviewed by the Panel remain in detention. The Panel finds that the Government should consider non-judicial measures as alternatives to prosecution and detention and focus on their rehabilitation and reintegration, pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2225 (2015).

#### **D. Investigation into the incident in Kass on 23 and 24 April 2015**

124. The Panel initiated an investigation into the events in Kass of 23 and 24 April 2015 regarding the attacks on UNAMID (Nigerian Battalion 44, NIBATT44) and alleged attacks on civilians. The Panel has studied documentary evidence obtained to date and interviewed the battalion members involved, but further progress was constrained by a denial of access to the incident area by the local authorities on 20 and 21 October 2015 (the Panel was refused permission to leave the UNAMID base in Kass) and the fact that the local authorities prevented civilian witnesses from meeting the Panel at the United Nations team site. The lapse of time since the incident means that it is unlikely that any admissible physical forensic evidence would be found at the scene. The Panel also finds that no responsibility could be attributed for the events without a major forensic investigation (e.g. ballistic reconstruction and wound ballistic analysis), a capability to which the Panel has no access.

#### **E. Sexual and gender-based violence**

125. The Panel is aware of allegations of sexual violence committed in Tabit in 2014 and is almost certain that sexual violence occurred during, at least, the incidents in Golo and Bardani. The Panel also finds that effective investigations into some cases of sexual violence in conflict have been impeded by the lack of psychosocial-medical services on the ground to follow up on any intended interviews with potential victims (international recommended best practice require such services) and by the lack of witness and victim protection capability in Darfur, which means that victims may be placed at significant personal risk as a result of their being interviewed by the Panel. This holds particularly true when the alleged victims and their communities face significant threats and intimidation, as, for example, in the case of Tabit. Accordingly, where there is no appropriate psychosocial-medical support or security for sources, the Panel cannot investigate effectively.

126. The Panel is constrained in its work in respect of sexual violence and is unable, as yet, to independently identify perpetrators or, in the case of a coordinated and large-scale armed attack, the leaders. The Panel notes that it is the responsibility of the

Government to investigate the incidents, to bring the perpetrators to justice and to take measures to avoid an environment in which sexual violence can be committed with impunity. The Government's public response to the allegations has consistently been one of denial and intimidation. Further details are provided in annex 28.

## **F. Attacks against the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and humanitarian workers**

127. From 12 February 2015 to date (i.e. the first three quarters of the year), UNAMID patrols and UNAMID personnel have been victims of armed violence, including carjackings, armed robberies and ambushes, on at least 70 occasions (see annex 10). This is an increase of nearly 225 per cent compared with the same period in 2014, although most of this can be attributed to a spate of armed carjackings in the second quarter.

## **VIII. Financing of armed groups**

128. The availability of funding to armed groups allows them to enhance their military capabilities by purchasing more arms, ammunition, vehicles and other military equipment, often concomitantly violating the arms embargo, pay their members, and recruit more members. While securing financing through the illegal exploitation of natural resources and usurping the assets of fellow citizens and communities, armed groups are also known to commit violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, thereby posing a credible threat to the stability of Darfur. The Panel has investigated the funding of armed groups obtained through the exploitation of gold in Darfur. The Panel consulted Amjad Rihan, a specialist in due diligence issues for the export and procurement of minerals, in particular gold, who assisted the Panel in appreciating the complexities surrounding the issue. His name is mentioned herein with his consent.

### **A. Artisanal gold mining in Darfur**

#### **Background**

129. Almost 90 per cent of gold production in the Sudan comes from artisanal mining.<sup>56</sup> The location of artisanal gold mines in Darfur, as at August 2015, is shown on the map in annex 29. In view of the large-scale artisanal gold mining in Darfur that contributes<sup>57</sup> to more than 50 per cent of total Sudanese gold production, the Panel has examined the capability of armed groups to capitalize on the artisanal gold mining trade to illicitly raise funding. On 9 June 2014, the Minister of Minerals of the Sudan reported to the parliament that the Government had almost no control over the gold


<sup>56</sup> See "Sudan predicted to be Africa's largest gold producer by 2018", *Sudan Tribune*, 7 July 2014, available from [http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=51609](http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=51609), and "Sudan produces 73.3 tons of gold", *Sudanow*, 28 January 2015, available from <http://sudanow.info.sd/sudan-produces-73-3-tons-of-gold/>.

<sup>57</sup> The Government did not accede to the Panel's request for annual gold production data per mine in Darfur. Confidential sources stated that government estimates were based only on gold purchases by merchants in artisanal gold mining areas. Accordingly, the contribution of the mines in Darfur, and those elsewhere in the Sudan, is an estimate, based upon information from Panel interviews. See also paragraph 144.

produced by traditional mine workers.<sup>58</sup> The Panel therefore visited the Jebel Amir artisanal gold mines (see fig. III), one of the largest such sites in Darfur, to understand the measures put in place to administer them.

130. Information on the artisanal gold mining arrangements and the functioning of the Jebel Amir gold mines management council is provided in annex 30.

Figure III  
Jebel Amir gold mines as at 15 June 2015



*Legend:* Photograph number 1 shows the Jebel Amir mining area. Photograph number 2 shows a typical mine, of rectangular shape (4 m x 4 m), from where rocks (hopefully bearing gold) are removed in sacks and taken to a crushing machine. Photograph number 3 shows the crushing machine, where rocks are crushed into powder form. Photograph number 4 shows how powder from rocks is washed in mercury and water. Photograph number 5 shows how the mercury-gold compound is heated in a ladle, leaving gold nuggets after the mercury evaporates.

### Control of the Jebel Amir mines

131. The Panel is certain that the Abbala Rezeigat Militiamen of North Darfur,<sup>59</sup> locally referred to as the “Abbala militia” and hereinafter as the “Abbala Armed Group”, controls the Jebel Amir mines, based on the following factors:<sup>60</sup>

(a) In January 2013, the Sudanese Armed Forces withdrew from Jebel Amir<sup>61</sup> to avoid a confrontation with the Abbala Armed Group;

<sup>58</sup> See “75% of Sudan’s gold production is smuggled: official”, *Sudan Tribune*, 9 June 2014. Available from <http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51288>.

<sup>59</sup> See Belachew Gebrewold-Tochalo, *Anatomy of Violence: Understanding the Systems of Conflict and Violence in Africa* (Farnham, Ashgate Publishing, 2009), p. 169.

<sup>60</sup> Panel interviews with the members of the Jebel Amir gold mines management council, mine prospectors, mine workers, gold merchants and vendors working at the Jebel Amir mines, as well as confidential sources.

<sup>61</sup> See “Sudan army withdraws from gold mine area of Jebel Amer”, Radio Dabanga (Hilversum), 27 January 2013. Available from <http://allafrica.com/stories/201301280161.html>.

(b) The Abbala Armed Group comprises individuals from many Rezeigat clans, some of whom simultaneously serve in the government auxiliary forces (Border Guards, Central Reserve Police and Popular Defence Forces);<sup>62</sup>

(c) The Abbala Armed Group effectively controls the security subcommittee of the Jebel Amir gold mines management council.<sup>62</sup> Many members of the subcommittee are from the Abbala Armed Group, which Sheikh Musa Hilal Abdallah Alnsiem, a designated individual, controls.<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, by virtue of chairing the management council, Sheikh Musa Hilal also controls the subcommittee;<sup>63</sup>

(d) The security subcommittee members control the entry checkpoints to the mines. The prior permission or concurrence of Sheikh Musa Hilal is required for entry. The Panel's visit to the mines on 15 June 2015 required such permission;

(e) The commanders of the Sudanese Revolutionary Awakening Council, a political organization founded and controlled by Sheikh Musa Hilal, make decisions on the management of security at the mines;

(f) The spokesperson of the Sudanese Revolutionary Awakening Council stated in 2014 that the management council would be responsible for the protection of the mines, rather than the regular government forces;<sup>64</sup>

(g) The Sudanese MAM Group was awarded the concession for exploration of gold deposits at Jebel Amir in April 2014, but could not proceed with operations because Sheikh Musa Hilal warned the company against doing so, pointing out that "the current situation does not allow exploration in that region".<sup>65</sup>

## B. Annual gold yield of Jebel Amir

132. To arrive at an annual estimate of funding accruing to the Abbala Armed Group, the Panel developed a financial model, within which lower-level estimates for some variables were used. From analysis of the data derived from the model, the Panel finds it almost certain that the annual pessimistic estimate of gold yield from the mines is 8,571 kg, which equates to \$422 million at Jebel Amir local gold prices. The model also estimates annual incomes for a prospector and a miner to be \$32,400 and \$1,530, respectively (see annex 31).

<sup>62</sup> Panel interviews with the members of the Jebel Amir gold mines management council, mine prospectors, mine workers, gold merchants and vendors working at the Jebel Amir mines; confidential sources; and Panel interview with a very senior member of the security subcommittee of the management council.

<sup>63</sup> Panel interview with Sheikh Musa Hilal.

<sup>64</sup> See "Sudan: Musa Hilal's council forms Jebel Amer administration, calls for intifada in Sudan", Radio Dabanga (Hilversum), 16 December 2014. Available from <http://allafrica.com/stories/201412170243.html>.

<sup>65</sup> See "Darfur gold concession winner warned-off by Hilal", Dabanga, 17 April 2014. Available from [www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfur-gold-concession-winner-warned-off-by-hilal](http://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfur-gold-concession-winner-warned-off-by-hilal). Sheikh Musa Hilal confirmed the report in his interview with the Panel.

## C. Financial analysis of income streams of the Abbala Armed Group

### Levies

133. The Panel is certain that the following levies are imposed by the Abbala Armed Group on the prospectors and other persons engaged in support businesses in the Jebel Amir mining area:<sup>66</sup>

(a) For every sack of rocks extracted, the sum of 5 Sudanese pounds (\$0.82 at an exchange rate of 6.09 Sudanese pounds to the dollar) is paid to the Abbala Armed Group;

(b) One sack of extracted rocks is surrendered to the Group by the prospector for every alternate day of operations;<sup>67</sup>

(c) Every gold merchant engaged in purchasing gold from the site pays 1,000 Sudanese pounds (\$164) per month;

(d) Every commodity vendor in the mining area pays between 800 and 1,200 Sudanese pounds (\$131-\$197) per month for the shelter used to run the shop, depending upon its size;

(e) Every butcher pays 20 Sudanese pounds (\$3.28) per slaughtered sheep.

134. The Panel finds that the annual income of the Abbala Armed Group from levies on prospectors and support businesses equates to \$28 million (see table 5).

<sup>66</sup> Panel interviews with the members of the Jebel Amir gold mines management council, mine prospectors, mine workers, gold merchants and vendors working at the Jebel Amir mines, as well as confidential sources. The levies must be paid, irrespective of whether any gold is found in the rocks packed in sacks. Furthermore, the levies are over and above the licit levies charged by the Jebel Amir gold mines management council.

<sup>67</sup> On an average, 20 sacks are taken out of a mine in two days, wherein around 14 workers are employed. This means that the removal of one sack by the armed group equates to extortion of 5 per cent of the gold mined.

Table 5  
**Abbala Armed Group income from levies on prospectors and support businesses**

<i>Nature of levy</i>	<i>Daily</i>	<i>Monthly</i>	<i>Annually</i>	<i>Annually</i>
	<i>(Sudanese pounds)</i>	<i>(Sudanese pounds)</i>	<i>(Sudanese pounds)</i>	<i>(United States dollars)<sup>a</sup></i>
5 Sudanese pounds per sack	122 850	3 071 250	36 855 000	6 051 724
Surrender of one sack every alternate day of operation	368 550	9 213 750	110 565 000	18 155 172
Levy on shelter of vendors	70 400	1 760 000	21 120 000	3 467 980
Levy on gold merchants	8 000	200 000	2 400 000	394 089
Levy on butchers	6 000	150 000	1 800 000	295 567
<b>Total</b>	<b>575 800</b>	<b>14 395 000</b>	<b>172 740 000</b>	<b>28 364 532</b>

*Note:* The following figures in Sudanese pounds are sums levied on a daily basis: 122,850, 368,550 and 6,000. The following figures in Sudanese pounds are sums levied on a monthly basis: 1,760,000 and 200,000. The remaining figures are derived using the assumption of 300 days per year.

<sup>a</sup> Using an exchange rate of 6.09 Sudanese pounds to the dollar. To calculate the purchase price of gold at the mine site in dollars, the “ground” exchange rate was used (10.1 Sudanese pounds to the dollar).

#### **Abbala Armed Group as prospectors**

135. The Panel is almost certain that at least 400 mines are being exploited by the Abbala Armed Group, acting as the prospector, at Jebel Amir,<sup>68</sup> from which it garners an additional income of \$17 million (see annex 32, table 1).

#### **Abbala Armed Group as exporters**

136. Early in 2014, the Minister of Minerals of the Sudan informed the parliament that a substantial portion of the gold produced was smuggled abroad.<sup>69</sup> The incentive for smuggling is the margin between the international and local gold prices (see annex 32, table 3).

137. The Panel is certain that a substantial portion of the gold mined at Jebel Amir is first aggregated in El Geneina, Darfur, and then taken to Khartoum by air for subsequent illegal export to the United Arab Emirates. Table 2 in annex 32 provides an estimate of the expenses incurred in illegally exporting 15 kg of gold by two carriers, for one trip. From analysis, the Panel is almost certain that the Abbala Armed Group earns an additional annual income of some \$9 million through the illegal export of some of the gold produced at Jebel Amir (see annex 32, table 3).

<sup>68</sup> Panel interviews with the members of the Jebel Amir gold mines management council, mine prospectors, mine workers, gold merchants and vendors working at the Jebel Amir mines, as well as confidential sources. See also footnote 4 in annex 30.

<sup>69</sup> See “75% of Sudan’s gold production is smuggled: official”, *Sudan Tribune*, 9 June 2014, available from <http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51288>, and Ulf Laessing, “Special report: the Darfur conflict’s deadly gold rush”, Reuters, 8 October 2013, available from [www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/08/us-sudan-darfur-gold-idUSBRE99707G20131008](http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/08/us-sudan-darfur-gold-idUSBRE99707G20131008).



### **Total Abbala Armed Group income from Jebel Amir gold production and trade**

138. The Panel is almost certain that the Abbala Armed Group has an annual income of \$54 million, based on lower-case estimates.

139. In a letter of 13 November 2015, the Government informed the Panel that the “Jebel Amir area is under the control of concerned government authorities with no presence of armed groups”. The Panel is certain that, as at 15 June 2015, and also almost certain that, as at 25 October 2015, Jebel Amir was under the control of the Abbala Armed Group (see para. 131 and annex 30), but cannot verify any change back to government control since then.

## **D. Gold smuggling from the Sudan to the United Arab Emirates**


### **Analysis of trade data**

140. Given that Darfur accounts for more than 50 per cent of Sudanese gold production, analysis of the smuggling trends for the entire country is necessary to estimate the potential revenue streams of other armed groups within Darfur.<sup>70</sup>

141. The Panel has analysed the gold trade statistics reported by both the Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. It compared the quantity of gold exported to the United Arab Emirates, as declared to the Sudanese authorities at the time of export, and the quantity of Sudanese gold declared to the authorities of the United Arab Emirates at the point of import into the country (see fig. IV and table 1 in annex 33).

<sup>70</sup> It is necessary owing to the lack of data available from the Government on the production and export of gold at the regional or individual mine level. The Panel has requested information, but has not yet received a response.

Figure IV  
Apparent gold smuggling from the Sudan to the United Arab Emirates



142. The analysis indicates that, from 2010 to 2014, at least<sup>71</sup> 96,885 kg of gold was apparently smuggled from the Sudan to the United Arab Emirates, valued at \$4.6 billion.<sup>72</sup> This strongly implies that, on the basis of the ascertained 50 per cent contribution (see footnote 57 and para. 144) of gold from Darfur to annual production, up to 48,000 kg of gold from Darfur was possibly smuggled out of the Sudan in that time period. In the light of the data in table 3 of annex 32, it is estimated that this equates to an additional income of \$123 million<sup>73</sup> to Darfurian armed groups over that period.

#### Case study on smuggling

143. To validate the inference of smuggling derived from generic trade data (see para. 142 and annex 33), the Panel looked for specific instances of gold smuggling in 2012. After analysing documentation received from a confidential source, together with export data from the Central Bank of the Sudan, the Panel finds it almost certain that more than 10,100 kg of gold was smuggled from the Sudan to an entity in the United Arab Emirates by more than 16 entities and individuals. The balance of probability means that at least 50 per cent of the smuggled gold would have been mined in Darfur.

<sup>71</sup> In the absence of export data by country from the Sudan, the calculation assumes that all gold exports were to the United Arab Emirates. If some portion were exported elsewhere, the smuggled quantity and notional export duty loss would be even greater.

<sup>72</sup> The notional loss of royalty and export duty to the Government of the Sudan would be \$504 million (see annex 33).

<sup>73</sup> \$9.27 million x 48,000/3,630 kg = \$123 million.

## E. Analysis of geographical distribution of Sudanese gold exports

144. An analysis of total exports of gold to the United Arab Emirates in 2012 was undertaken by the Panel to identify the distribution of gold exports from the Sudan, and thus the mines in Darfur (see table 6).

Table 6  
Geographical distribution of Sudanese gold exports, 2012

Year	Imports into the United Arab Emirates (kg)	Value in the United Arab Emirates (millions of United States dollars)	Darfur exports (57 per cent)						Rest of the Sudan exports (43 per cent)	
			Darfur (Abbala Armed Group) (24 per cent)		Darfur (other armed groups) (23 per cent)		Darfur (rest) (10 per cent)		Rest of the Sudan (10 per cent formal sector) (33 per cent artisanal mines)	
			Value (millions of United States dollars)		Value (millions of United States dollars)		Value (millions of United States dollars)		Value (millions of United States dollars)	
			Mass <sup>a</sup> (kg)	Value (millions of United States dollars)	Mass <sup>b</sup> (kg)	Value (millions of United States dollars)	Mass <sup>c</sup> (kg)	Value (millions of United States dollars)	Mass <sup>d</sup> (kg)	Value (millions of United States dollars)
2012	65 000	3 507	15 600	842	14 500	782	6 500	351	28 400	1 532

<sup>a</sup> Based upon the testimony of mine workers and prospectors who had worked at the Jebel Amir mines in 2012.

<sup>b</sup> Based upon the testimony of mine workers and prospectors who had worked at the Hashaba, Dahab Sharu and Abdul Shakur mines in 2012. The Hashaba mines were under the control of SLA/MM in 2012.

<sup>c</sup> Some smaller artisanal mine sites in Darfur, such as Gabr Elganam, Sabrana, Owry and Garlanbang, are, highly probably, not under the influence of any armed groups.

<sup>d</sup> The formal gold mining sector, present in the rest of the Sudan, accounts for some 10 per cent of total production.

145. The Panel finds it highly probable that in 2012 the other armed groups in Darfur exported gold valued at \$782 million. It is not yet possible to identify the operating profit from that income stream, given that the local taxes and illegal levies on the gold mines elsewhere in Darfur differ from those at Jebel Amir. The Panel continues to investigate.

## F. Implementation of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Regional Certification Mechanism

146. The Panel met officials of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris to discuss the implementation of the Gold Supplement to the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas<sup>74</sup> in respect of artisanal gold emanating from mines controlled by armed groups in Darfur. OECD explained that its recommendations and processes formed the basis of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Regional Certification Mechanism,<sup>75</sup> designed to ensure that designated minerals, including gold, are sourced only from mine sites that are conflict free and meet minimum social standards.

<sup>74</sup> See Gold Supplement at [www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/goldsupplementtotheduediligenceguidance.htm](http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/goldsupplementtotheduediligenceguidance.htm) and OECD, *OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 2013), available from [www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf).

<sup>75</sup> See [www.oecd.org/investment/mne/49111368.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/49111368.pdf) and [www.oecd.org/investment/mne/47892582.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/47892582.pdf).

147. In 2010, the President of the Sudan signed the “Lusaka Declaration of the ICGLR special summit to fight illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Great Lakes region”.<sup>76</sup> At the summit, member States expressed concern about the persistent illegal exploitation of natural resources, including gold, and its linkage to the proliferation of small arms and weapons, the perpetuation of crimes against humanity and the financing of armed groups. The signatories to the Declaration committed themselves to advancing the six tools of the Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, in particular the Regional Certification Mechanism.

148. In paragraph 4.9 of the Regional Certification Mechanism manual, a “conflict-free” mineral chain is defined as one that is free from non-State armed groups or public or private security forces who “illegally control mine sites or otherwise control transportation routes, points where minerals are traded and upstream actors in the supply chain”; and/or “illegally tax or extort money or minerals at points of access to mine sites, along transportation routes or at points where minerals are traded”; and/or “illegally tax or extort money or mineral shares from mine site owners, mine site operators, intermediaries, traders, export companies, or any other actors in the upstream chain of custody”.<sup>77</sup>

149. The Regional Certification Mechanism further contemplates the issuance of an International Conference on the Great Lakes Region certificate, similar to a Kimberley Certificate for diamonds. The certificate would be issued only for those consignments that could demonstrate conflict-free origin, transport and processing.

150. The Panel finds that the effective implementation of the Regional Certification Mechanism by the Government at the earliest possible opportunity would almost certainly assist in obstructing this easy and substantial supply of funding currently available to the Darfurian armed groups. It would also have the potential to curb smuggling, given that, without an International Conference on the Great Lakes Region certificate, no gold would be allowed into the United Arab Emirates or other countries by the customs authorities.

151. Annex 34 provides further information on the Lusaka Declaration, the Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, the Regional Certification Mechanism and the status of implementation of the Initiative in the Sudan.

## **G. Procurement of gold from Darfur by the Central Bank of the Sudan**

152. In 2008, gold accounted for only 1 per cent of the export earnings of the Sudan. The figure had increased to 30 per cent by 2014. The Central Bank of the Sudan sources gold for export from artisanal mining sites, including the Jebel Amir mines, through buying agents who deduct a 7 per cent royalty from payments to prospectors.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>76</sup> See [www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/47143500](http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/47143500).

<sup>77</sup> Paragraph 3 of annex II to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance also provides a similar definition of conflict-free minerals.

<sup>78</sup> See International Monetary Fund, “Sudan”, IMF Country Report No. 13/320 (Washington, D.C., October 2013), paras. 20-21. Available from [www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13320.pdf](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13320.pdf).

153. The Panel is certain that the artisanal gold mined at Jebel Amir is, by definition, conflict affected, owing to the presence of private security forces, the illegal levies on prospectors, the illegal extortion of minerals and the illegal taxation of intermediaries and merchants. The gold procured by the Central Bank from the Jebel Amir mines is conflict affected, even though it is being brought into the legal gold supply and export system. The International Monetary Fund terms such purchases of gold by the Bank “unsterilized”.<sup>79</sup>

154. The Panel is also certain that, given that gold is being mined at many other major artisanal mining sites in Darfur under the control of armed groups, that gold too is conflict affected (see annex 29). Two other major artisanal mining sites in Darfur, Hashaba and Abdul Shakur, are under the control of “Arab militias” from the Kutum region. The Panel is certain that they also impose illegal levies on prospectors.

155. The Panel is certain that the procurement of conflict-affected gold by the Central Bank is not in compliance with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance and the Lusaka Declaration signed by the Sudan, read with the Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources. The Panel could not obtain the views of the Ministry of Minerals or the Central Bank on the issue, given that its requests in letters dated 12 June and 1 October 2015 for meetings with officials from those organizations were not acceded to by the Government. The Panel received a letter from the Government on 30 November 2015, wherein it emphasized the absence of rebel groups in artisanal mining areas. In its letter of 23 November 2015, the Panel had informed the Government about the presence of the Abbala Armed Group and armed “Arab militias” in the Jebel Amir and Hashaba/Abdul Shakur gold mining areas, respectively. These armed groups are non-signatory armed groups to the peace process (see also annex 23). The Government made no comment on the armed groups imposing illegal levies. When developing the potential income streams for the Abbala Armed Group, the Panel specifically did not include the levies collected by the tribal council, i.e., the Jebel Amir gold mines management council. Furthermore, the assessment of the Government with regard to the contribution of Darfur to the total gold production is contrary to the evidence obtained by the Panel (see footnote 57 and annexes 30 and 31). Investigations into the specific individuals and entities continue (see para. 143).

## **H. Entry controls by the United Arab Emirates**

156. The Panel visited Dubai to study the controls in place regarding the supply chain of gold. The Panel had requested the Government of the United Arab Emirates to provide information on procedural customs requirements for the import of hand-carried gold into the country. That information remains pending. Annex 35 provides further details.

## **I. Border management**

157. Considering the magnitude of the smuggling of natural resources and the reports of arms trafficking across international borders of regional countries under sanctions, including the external borders of Darfur, the Panel finds that regional capacity-building programmes should be considered for development by appropriate

<sup>79</sup> See International Monetary Fund, “Sudan”, IMF Country Report No. 14/364 (Washington, D.C., December 2014). Available from [www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14364.pdf](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14364.pdf).

organizations to enhance the efficacy of the implementation of sanctions. Annex 36 provides further information on strengthening border management capacity.

## **IX. Implementation of the travel ban**

### **A. Sheikh Musa Hilal**

158. The Panel met Sheikh Musa Hilal on 25 June 2015 in Khartoum and informed him of the exemption provisions in relation to foreign travel.

159. Subsequently, the Panel identified a new case of non-compliance with the travel ban by Sheikh Musa Hilal. The Panel is almost certain that he travelled to Cairo by air on 15 July 2015<sup>80</sup> and that he returned to the Sudan on 27 July 2015.<sup>81</sup> The Panel wrote to the Governments of Egypt and the Sudan on 21 July and 6 November 2015 to request more details. On 13 November 2015, the Government of Egypt informed the Panel that it had no information in that regard.

160. The Panel notes that, given that the Government of the Sudan prevented an opposition delegation from travelling to Strasbourg, France, for a meeting in June 2015,<sup>82</sup> it can implement exit controls. The Panel therefore finds that it is certain that the Government could have assisted in enforcing the travel ban on Sheikh Musa Hilal by sharing his departure information with the Government of Egypt.

161. The Panel thus finds it almost certain:

(a) That, by not preventing the entry of a designated individual, the Government of Egypt violated the travel ban put in place by paragraph 3 (d) of resolution 1591 (2005);

(b) That the Government of the Sudan failed to share the relevant departure information with the Egyptian authorities, thus not complying with paragraph 12 of resolution 2200 (2015);

(c) That Sheikh Musa Hilal failed to discharge his implied obligation to seek an exemption for his travel from the Committee.

162. Annex 37 provides further information on the violation.

### **B. Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu (also known as “Tek”)**

163. In paragraphs 179 and 180 of its final report for 2013 (S/2014/87), the Panel had identified violations of the travel ban by Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu, also known as “Tek”. During a meeting held in May 2015 in Chad, the Panel informed the Government of Chad that paragraph 3 (f) of resolution 1591 (2005) specifically provided for exemption measures, on a case-by-case basis, and encouraged it to

<sup>80</sup> See “Darfur Janjaweed leader flies to Egypt despite UNSC travel ban”, *Sudan Tribune*, 20 July 2015, available from [www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55768](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55768); and [www.twitter.com/wasilalitaha](https://twitter.com/wasilalitaha); and according to confidential sources.

<sup>81</sup> According to confidential sources.

<sup>82</sup> See “Sudanese security body resumes its travel ban series: representatives of ‘Call Sudan’ powers banned from travelling to attend European Parliament’s session”, Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, 9 June 2015. Available from <http://anhri.net/?p=145481&lang=en>.

seek exemptions from the travel ban in respect of any future visits by designated individuals.

### **C. Adam Yacub Sharif**

164. The Panel has not yet found documentary evidence that Adam Yacub Sharif is deceased (see [S/2013/79](#), para. 147). During a meeting on 21 May 2015, the national focal point stated that the Government had no evidence that he had died and therefore considered him to be still alive.

### **D. Improving the effectiveness of the implementation of the travel ban**

165. The Panel considers that Member States, including the Sudan as the country of residence of the designated individuals, should immediately inform a destination Member State and the Committee when a designated individual leaves the country. That would enable the destination country to implement the travel ban by denying entry to the individual.<sup>83</sup> The Panel considers that effectiveness would be further improved if the travel documents of all designated individuals were marked to state that the bearer is subject to a travel ban and requires the permission of the Committee to travel abroad.

166. Entities and individuals who knowingly abet or facilitate a designated individual in violating the travel ban pose a threat to the peace and stability of Darfur because such visits are often undertaken to raise funding or to meet members of non-signatory armed groups. Such entities and individuals are therefore liable to be specifically covered within the ambit of the listing criteria given in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005).

167. The provision of names alone cannot be relied upon to enforce the travel ban. Often, it is not the lack of will, but of biometric identification data that hampers the implementation of the ban. The Panel therefore considers that including imagery and other biometric data of designated individuals in the appropriate International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)-United Nations Security Council Special Notices would improve implementation.

## **X. Implementation of the asset freeze**

### **A. Implementation issues**

168. The Panel carefully studied the response of the Government submitted in 2014, wherein it outlined the problems in implementing asset-freeze measures against designated individuals because it was a violation of their human rights. Annex 38 provides a background note on the issue.

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<sup>83</sup> The Panel notes that, although article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”, under article 12 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights a State may place restrictions on the right to leave. This is a national decision, and exit controls by the State of residence would be the most effective way of enforcing the travel ban.

169. Some Member States have successfully implemented the asset freeze by adopting legislative and administrative measures consistent with their constitutions. Their legislation enables them to freeze assets linked to a sanctions regime purely on the basis of a designation articulated in a Security Council resolution, without any other prerequisite.

## **B. Sheikh Musa Hilal**

170. The Panel is certain that Sheikh Musa Hilal, a designated individual, controls the Abbala Armed Group and that the Group is in control of the Jebel Amir mines (see para. 131). Given that the Group is financially exploiting the gold mining trade at Jebel Amir by imposing illegal levies on prospectors, by directly prospecting and by illegally exporting mined gold, it is effectively creating assets.

171. In accordance with paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 1591 (2005), the Government of the Sudan is required to freeze all funds held by entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by designated persons or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction. Given that the Government has not frozen such assets, it is certainly violating the asset-freeze measures.

# **XI. Political and regional issues and efforts towards removing impediments to the inclusive political process**

## **A. Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur**

172. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, which was included in the Constitution on 4 January 2015, has become a core element of the inclusive political process. The term of the Darfur Regional Authority was extended until 14 July 2016 by a decree of 28 June 2015 in order to continue reconstruction and development projects and to organize the referendum on the permanent administrative status of Darfur (perhaps in April 2016) stipulated in the Doha Document.

173. The tenth meeting of the Implementation Follow-up Commission of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, held in Doha on 8 September 2015, saw the continuation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the launch of the second phase of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation. In addition to the 315 projects that have already been completed, the Darfur Regional Authority intends to earmark 900 million Sudanese pounds for 443 new projects in 40 areas. The full implementation of the ambitious development objectives of the Darfur Development Strategy, adopted at the international donor conference held in Doha on 7 and 8 April 2013, will, however, require an influx of funding, which is currently only trickling in because of the instability and insecurity in Darfur. This injection of international capital is a critical component in easing the suffering and frustration of the people of Darfur, who yearn to reap the benefits of the Doha Document. Internal divisions compromise the proactive approach of the Authority to this development work.

174. The achievements announced by the Darfur Regional Authority are challenged by officials of the Liberation and Justice Movement, a mainstay of the Authority. Tensions have increased in 2015 between supporters of the Chair of the Authority,



Tijani Seissi Ateem, and his rival, Bahr Abu Garda, who is the Secretary-General of the Liberation and Justice Movement and the Federal Minister of Health. The tensions between the two factions are, however, reportedly abating following the mediation of Qatar, which organized a meeting with the two rivals on the margins of the tenth meeting of the Implementation Follow-up Commission.

## **B. Major impediments to a way out of the crisis**

175. The Government and the non-signatory armed groups are continuing to pursue the military option. The success of Operation Decisive Summer 2 during the first half of 2015 considerably reduced the operational capacity and freedom of movement of SLA/AW, the residual combatants of SLA/MM and JEM. Fighting declined dramatically during the second half of 2015 owing to the rainy season (July-September), the Government's unilateral declaration of a ceasefire for two months, effective from 22 September 2015, and the unilateral declaration by SRF of a ceasefire for six months from 21 October 2015.

176. Following the presidential elections, held from 13 to 15 April 2015, the Government immediately began to take over the decision-making and command centres in the five states of Darfur. The appointment of the five governors of those states, a new presidential prerogative, illustrates the security-based approach of the Government to the conflict. Of the five governors, three are officers of the National Intelligence and Security Service (East, North and West Darfur) and the other two are members of the National Congress.

177. Rivalries have occasionally been exacerbated and the social divide has deepened as a result of the continued militarization and politicization of tribal affairs. Since September 2015, the situation has become calmer, but tribal conflict remains a latent threat (see annex 39). Overall, the prevalence of the *assabiyyat* (clannish spirit) influences tribal behaviour and continues to fan the flames of conflict. Notwithstanding interventions by the Government, governors, traditional conflict-settlement bodies (consultative assemblies (*shura*), the Council of Elders (*ajawid*)) and the Darfur Regional Authority, often with the support of UNAMID, the ceasefire and/or reconciliation agreements have all too often been ignored, given that they do not tackle the root causes of the conflicts, which are the battle for the preservation of ancestral rights on tribal lands (*hakura*), which are deemed to be inalienable; the full exercise of political and socioeconomic leadership within the *hakura*; a claim to entitlement to natural resources; the permanent tension between nomadic/semi-nomadic and sedentary farmers; and efforts to combat the theft of livestock.

178. During the reporting period, armed crime has continued throughout Darfur. The almost daily and considerable nuisance of (armed) robbers, highway bandits, militias, nomads and armed gangs, all labelled by the Government as "uncontrolled and outlaw elements", in addition to abductions and rape and crop destruction, among other things, continues unabated. Neither individuals (displaced persons in camps and isolated people living in urban and remote rural areas), nor public and private property or commercial centres, are safe from attacks by armed robbers. UNAMID, other United Nations agencies (in particular the World Food Programme) and international non-governmental organizations have also been the targets of increasing levels of armed crime.

### **C. Situation of non-signatory armed groups**

179. The three non-signatory armed groups are beginning to lose momentum as a result of leadership disputes, the development of hierarchical factions and their weariness in maintaining an armed struggle (which, after 12 years, has been unsuccessful and only amplified the suffering of civilians). The Panel discerns a growing awareness among elements of the groups regarding the futility of the military option. Many past executives and field commanders have either distanced themselves from the armed struggle or joined the inclusive political process.

180. Conversely, the Panel notes the emergence of new dissident groups as a result of the weariness of fighters and the effectiveness of the Government's fragmentation policy since 2010. Five such dissident groups were formed in 2015.<sup>84</sup>

181. Lastly, the Panel has observed the emergence of weak cohesion and unity within SRF. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM/N) and the three main non-signatory armed groups maintain their strategic goal of regime change, but do not share a politically cohesive approach against the Government. The leader of SLM-A/AW has a tendency to break the consensus. Although the SRF charter, adopted in May 2013, provides for a presidency rotating between the four partners, SPLM/N has maintained dual political and military leadership since 22 February 2012. Following the recent meeting of the SRF leaders, held in Paris from 13 to 17 October 2015, at which the participants reaffirmed the principle of alternation, the SPLM/N leaders still refused to renounce the rotating presidency to Jibril Ibrahim (JEM). This bitter leadership struggle has caused a serious split within SRF and mutual distrust among partners, who have engaged in a virulent media campaign against one another.

182. While the military capability of the three main movements has been weakened, their leaders, Jibril Ibrahim, Minni Arkou Minnawi and Abdel Wahed Muhammad Nour, remain key political actors on the international scene.

### **D. Challenges to the inclusive political process**

183. Throughout 2015 the inclusive political process has been virtually frozen. This lethargy has been accompanied by disputes between the Government and the non-signatory armed groups supported by the civil opposition bloc. Notwithstanding the commitment of the President to the National Assembly on 2 June 2015 that he would proclaim a general amnesty in favour of opponents, thus allowing them to participate in the National Dialogue, persistent mistrust and suspicions remain. While both the Government and the opposition reiterate their commitment to peace, their political positions still remain diametrically opposed.

184. Owing to its military superiority, the Government believes that it can negate the military impact of the non-signatory armed groups and therefore has a strategy

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<sup>84</sup> Three breakaway factions from SLM-A/AW, SLM-A/MM and SLM-A/Karbino joined the National Dialogue on 10 October 2015 as a result of the efforts of Chad. The fourth (SLM-A/AW) has been led since 25 July 2015 by Nimr Muhammad Abdul Rahman and the chief of staff of the SLM-A/AW forces, General Muhammad Adam Abdul Salam (also known as Qaddoura), former comrades in arms of Abdel Wahed. The fifth breakaway faction, founded on 22 May 2015 by a group of executives from JEM, is led by Mansour Arbab Younes.

of maintaining the status quo. According to an article on the Sudan Tribune website, in his address to the Sudanese Armed Forces command on 8 September 2015, the President said that the rebellion would end in 2016. The Government's intent is to maintain full control of the National Dialogue, reject the holding of a preparatory meeting in Addis Ababa that would provide for negotiations on procedural matters relating to the Dialogue<sup>85</sup> and stress that the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur remains the bedrock of the negotiations in Doha, even without the participation of the Chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, on technical aspects of the Document (e.g. security arrangements, a lasting ceasefire mechanism and representation of newcomers in the sharing of power and wealth).

185. SRF, in its road map for a way forward, takes a contrary position to that of the Government by calling for the holding of a preparatory meeting in Addis Ababa, rejecting a final and lasting settlement on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, expressing support for the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, while calling for it to be strengthened, endorsing the recommendations of the African Union Peace and Security Council at its 539th meeting and stressing that the National Dialogue must reflect the constitutional process, including the peaceful alternation of power, good governance, fundamental freedoms and freedom of expression.

186. At the current stage, the protagonists disagree on the purpose of the inclusive political process. If the National Dialogue were brought to a successful conclusion, the Government would, at most, accept involving the civil and military opposition in the Government under the leadership of the National Congress. To the contrary, the opposition perceives the Dialogue process as the beginning of democratic and constitutional transformation, which effectively means a change of regime in the long term.

187. In addition to the sharply divergent positions of the stakeholders, the Government was also irritated by the recommendations of the African Union Peace and Security Council at its 539th meeting, which it viewed as an endorsement of the demands of the civil and armed opposition. This led to a breakdown in confidence between the Government and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel. The Panel has learned that the most recent attempts by the Chair of the High-level Implementation Panel and the Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union to convince the Government to participate in the preparatory meeting in Addis Ababa were rebuffed by the President, who took an intransigent position. The Panel has also learned that some people within government circles are surprised at his position, which may turn dialogue into mere monologue with a predictable outcome.

## **E. Launching of the National Dialogue**

188. The impasse notwithstanding, the official launch ceremony for the National Dialogue, which was attended by the Panel, was held on 10 October 2015 in Khartoum. It was inaugurated by the Presidents of the Sudan and Chad, the leaders of the three new dissident movements of SLM/AW and SLM/MM<sup>86</sup> and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. It was also attended by the African Union-

<sup>85</sup> In accordance with the Berlin Declaration of 27 February 2015 and the recommendations of the African Union Peace and Security Council at its 539th meeting, on 25 August 2015.

<sup>86</sup> The new dissident movements belonged to SLM/AW (Aboul-Qassem Imam), SLM/MM (Muhamadayn Ismail Bichir) and SLM-A/Karbino (al-Taher Abou Bakr Hajr).

United Nations Acting Joint Special Representative for Darfur, representatives of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the 92 internal opposition political parties, nine non-signatory armed groups, sectors of civil society, research centres and the “Turuqi” mystical brotherhoods.

189. It should be noted that the African Union, the Chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, the Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union and the civilian and armed opposition<sup>87</sup> were absent from the opening ceremony. The most glaring absence, though, was that of Sheikh Musa Hilal.

190. During the inaugural session, the armed groups and political diaspora were called upon to participate. The National Dialogue will be structured (for three months) around the following six priority themes under the road map adopted by the “7 + 7 Committee” in charge of the Dialogue on 16 August 2014: peace and security, the economy, basic rights, freedoms, national identity and foreign affairs.

191. Stressing that the door remained open to holdouts, the President of the Sudan announced that he was prepared to put in place the following confidence-building measures: the definitive cessation of hostilities, provided that the armed groups agreed to do likewise; political freedom; freedom of expression; security guarantees for the representatives of non-signatory armed groups willing to travel to Khartoum to participate in the National Dialogue; and the release of all political prisoners. He also stated that, if the holdouts still refused to participate, the conflict in Darfur, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan would be resolved militarily on the ground.

192. The President of Chad stressed that the absence of the three non-signatory armed groups was counterproductive and signalled his willingness to tirelessly pursue his good offices in persuading the groups to participate.

193. The situation is that, nearly 20 months after the President’s national dialogue initiative was announced on 27 January 2014 and unanimously supported by the international community, the formal launch has made little difference. The boycott by the recalcitrant non-signatory armed groups and the civil opposition political parties meant that the Government felt that it had no choice but to begin the dialogue with “only those present”.

194. The absence of Sheikh Musa Hilal suggests the limitations of the exercise. He continues to have ambiguous relations with the Government and expects to secure senior government positions for his supporters, even though many representatives of his own confederation of Rezeigat tribes are already closely involved in governance. Although he has been living in seclusion in Khartoum since the re-election of the President, Sheikh Musa Hilal still holds sway over the northern branch of the Rezeigat tribe, from which the field commander of the Rapid Support Forces (Hemeti) hails, and that branch also extends into Chad. He maintains contact with the non-signatory armed groups and is a formidable tribal chief, with considerable financial and military resources. He also draws support from the Abbala (camel herders) branch of the northern Rezeigat, the predominant tribe in the Border Guards. Thus, given the potential impact of “Arab” tribes on the course of events, he is certainly a person to be reckoned with.

<sup>87</sup> The four armed wings of SRF (SPLM/N, JEM, SLM-A/AW and SLM-A/MM), all the members of the Call of Sudan coalition and the signatories to the Berlin Declaration: the Umma National Party of Sadiq al-Mahdi, Reform Now of Ghazi Salah Eddine, the National Consensus Forces of Farouk Abu Issa and the Confederation of Sudanese Civil Society Organizations of Amin Makki.

195. The absence of the African organizations that had been involved in the National Dialogue process from the outset signalled their irritation with the Government's intransigent attitude towards the African Union and the Chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel. Such intransigence suggests an emerging divergence of views between the Arab grouping and the African Union. In his opening statement, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States stressed the nearly unconditional support of the League for the Government's management of the Dialogue.

196. Nevertheless, the dialogue between the Government and the African Union remains open. Following talks in Addis Ababa on 23 October 2015 between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan, the Chair of the African Union Commission and the Chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, the Government accepted a resumption of negotiations with the non-signatory armed groups in Addis Ababa that opened on 19 November 2015.<sup>88</sup> With the exception of the leader of SLM-A/AW, who boycotted the meeting, the Government and the leaders of JEM and SLM-A/MM mutually underlined their commitment to finalizing a permanent humanitarian ceasefire. Such an agreement would be conducive to a climate of confidence and open the door for further talks on the mechanisms for and modalities of the participation by JEM and SLM-A/MM in the National Dialogue in Khartoum.

## F. Regional environment

197. The immediate regional environment, which includes neighbouring States, Libya and South Sudan, both affected by internal conflict, remains particularly tense.

198. The Panel has not yet identified any direct impact of Libyan elements of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on the security situation in Darfur. According to an article in *Al-Sudani* on 14 July 2015, the minister in charge of Darfur believes that the Sudan is not a priority of ISIL and considers that Boko Haram is unlikely to move its activities into Darfur and the Sudan. Nevertheless, the presence of the Salafist jihadist ideology of ISIL, although insignificant in the Sudan, has been confirmed and a religious preacher has demonstrated his allegiance to the leader of ISIL.

199. In May 2015, the Minister of Higher Education and Technology also acknowledged that ISIL had recruited students at the University of Khartoum.

200. The Panel has heard consistent allegations from various sources, including from non-signatory armed groups, of the involvement of armed elements of SLA/MM in the Libyan conflict. Sources report that SLA/MM elements were deployed alongside the forces of General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar in Kufra, near the Sudanese/Libyan border, their role being to combat the Libya Dawn radical brigades. The fighters have now allegedly returned to Malha, North Darfur. The Panel is unable, at the current stage, to confirm or dismiss the allegations.

<sup>88</sup> The United States Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan and representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom and States members of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development followed the negotiations in Addis Ababa.

201. The Sudan continues to accuse South Sudan of supporting the non-signatory armed groups and allowing them to enter Darfur in violation of bilateral border and security agreements. The allegations that South Sudan is financing and providing military equipment to JEM have yet to be confirmed by the Panel, but the presence of JEM military training camps in South Sudan, the deployment of JEM into South Darfur from South Sudan and their support for the President of South Sudan in the civil war have all been proved. The Panel finds it almost certain that the political executive members of some non-signatory armed groups remain present in Juba.

202. The visit by the President of Uganda to Khartoum on 15 September 2015, the first such visit since 1990, appears to have set in motion a process of reconciliation between the two countries. Reliable sources report that the two Presidents have agreed to work together to stabilize the fragile peace agreement, painstakingly finalized on 16 August 2015, between the President of South Sudan (of Dinka ethnicity, and close to Uganda) and his Nuer rival, Riek Machar (close to the Sudan). Uganda appears now to admit the inevitable role of the Sudan as a central player. Furthermore, following his discussions with the Second Vice-President of the Sudan on 8 February 2015, the President of Uganda appears to have prevailed upon the non-signatory armed groups to leave Ugandan territory. He agreed not to renew their passports in return for the end of Sudanese support for the Lord's Resistance Army.

203. It appears that Chad is mainly concerned about the potential for the Libyan conflict to spill over into its territory, the proliferation of arms in Darfur and the Sahel region and the emerging capacity of Boko Haram, which carried out four armed attacks in N'Djamena in 2015. Accordingly, Chad has been vigorously contributing to the stabilization and pacification of Darfur. In his opening statement at the launch of the National Dialogue, the President of Chad stressed the close ties between Chad and the Sudan, noting that the destinies of the two countries were intertwined, with security and stability in Darfur being vital to security and stability in Chad.

204. The President of Chad, a consistent key player in the inclusive political process, travelled to Paris on 3 October 2015 to meet Jibril Ibrahim, Minni Arkou Minnawi and Abdel Wahed Muhammad Nour in order to persuade them to join the National Dialogue. Although that meeting, which was held on the eve of the launch of the Dialogue in Khartoum on 10 October 2015, did not achieve the desired outcome, he intends to persevere in his peace efforts.

## **G. Efforts towards removing impediments to the inclusive political process**

205. Facing the intransigent positions of the protagonists to the conflict, peace efforts struggle to find a compromise that is capable of bringing the Government, the civil opposition and the non-signatory armed groups to the negotiation table, the increased involvement of international actors in 2015 notwithstanding. The meeting between the African Union, the Acting Joint Special Representative and the non-signatory armed groups, held in Paris on 14 and 15 August 2015, the 539th meeting of African Union Peace and Security Council, held in Addis Ababa on 25 August 2015, the meeting of the Troika (United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Norway), Germany and France with SRF, held in Paris on 9 September 2015, and the meetings in Khartoum with German envoys in September 2015 all

demonstrate the international community's determination to pursue its efforts to find ways of putting the inclusive political process back on track.

## **XII. Recommendations**

206. The Panel has considered all the sanctions violations (see annex 40), examined options and makes the recommendations set out below to the Security Council and the Committee.

### **A. Security Council**

207. The Panel recommends to the Security Council that it:

#### **Arms embargo**

(a) Determine whether intrusion software falls within the ambit of the term "arms and related materiel" contained in resolutions 1556 (2004), 1591 (2005) and 1945 (2010);

(b) Reaffirm the requirement that all States shall ensure that any sale or supply of arms and related materiel to the Sudan not prohibited by resolution 1556 (2004) and resolution 1591 (2005) be made conditional upon the necessary and appropriate end-user documentation so that States may ascertain that any such sale or supply is conducted consistent with the measures imposed by those resolutions;

#### **International humanitarian law**

(c) Consider insisting that the Government conduct future combined operations in Darfur using only officially formed units or subunits of the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, the Border Guards, the Popular Defence Forces or the Central Reserve Police and that such units desist from cooperating with unofficial groupings of non-uniformed armed "Arab" or other groups;

(d) Consider urging the Government to engage in systematic and effective investigations into and prosecutions of the international humanitarian law violations committed by the Rapid Support Forces and auxiliary forces during Operations Decisive Summer 1 and 2;

#### **Financing of armed groups**

(e) Consider urging the Government to immediately initiate the implementation of all aspects of the Lusaka Declaration, including the Regional Certification Mechanism, and the harmonization of the appropriate legislation, to ensure a conflict-free supply chain for conflict minerals, including gold, from Darfur;

(f) Consider expanding the listing criteria in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005) to include those individuals and entities who are determined to be a threat to peace and stability in Darfur through the illicit levies on prospectors and other persons engaged in artisanal mining of gold, illicit exploitation and illicit trafficking of natural resources, including gold;

(g) Consider calling upon Member States to take appropriate steps to raise the awareness of importers, processing industries and consumers of Sudanese gold and ensure that they effectively adhere to the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, read with the Gold Supplement;

#### **Travel ban**

(h) Consider expanding the scope of the listing criteria set out in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005) to include those individuals and entities that knowingly facilitate the travel of a listed individual in violation of the travel ban, given that such violations can undermine the peace, stability and/or security of Darfur;

(i) Consider expanding the scope of the travel ban by requiring Member States to immediately notify the destination Member State and the Committee on the departure from their territories of designated individuals;

(j) Consider encouraging Member States to indicate on the travel documents of all designated individuals that the bearer is subject to a travel ban imposed by the Security Council.

### **B. Committee**

208. The Panel recommends to the Committee that it consider:

#### **Aviation and arms embargo**

(a) Issuing an implementation assistance notice, urging and encouraging States to desist from the sale or supply of Antonov An-26 aircraft, undertaking maintenance of such aircraft or supplying spare parts for such aircraft, whether or not originating in their territories, to the Government of the Sudan, unless appropriate end-use certification is supplied in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 10 of resolution 1945 (2010), noting that the Antonov An-26 type aircraft, designed as a dual-use military or civilian aircraft, has been consistently used in Darfur primarily in a military role, including for conducting offensive overflights;

#### **International humanitarian law**

(b) Calling upon the Government to ensure that all detainees associated with the Darfur conflict, including those from the Nakhara battle, benefit from the fundamental guarantees and protections contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, and that a neutral humanitarian organization is granted free access to all detainees associated with the conflict;

(c) Calling upon the Government to ensure that the requirements of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict in Darfur are fully implemented;



**Financing of armed groups**

(d) Urging the Government to strengthen exit customs controls to interdict the illicit passage of natural resources, including gold;

**Travel ban**

(e) Urging Member States to submit any imagery and other biometric data on designated individuals to INTERPOL for inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices;

**General**

(f) Encouraging the Government to cooperate with the World Customs Organization and other interested delivery agencies in the development of a border management capacity-building programme to strengthen the capacity of the relevant Sudanese border management government agencies;

(g) The information provided by the Panel, in confidential annexes, relating to individuals and entities that meet the listing criteria set out in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005), read with paragraph 3 of resolution 2035 (2014).

## **Annex 1**

### **Details of the Panel's mandate and methodology**

#### **A. Mandate details**

1. In paragraphs 7 and 8 of its resolution 1556 (2004), the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the “janjaweed”, operating in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur. In its resolution 2035 (2012), the Council extended the reference to the three states of Darfur to all the territory of Darfur, including the new states of Eastern and Central Darfur created on 11 January 2012. In paragraph 7 of its resolution 1591 (2005), the Council extended the arms embargo to include all parties to the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in the aforementioned areas. In paragraphs 3 (d) and 3 (e) of that resolution, the Council imposed targeted travel and financial sanctions on designated individuals (the listing criteria were further extended to entities in resolution 2035 (2012)), to be designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), on the basis of the criteria set out in that resolution. In its resolution 1672 (2006), the Council designated four individuals. The enforcement of the arms embargo was further strengthened by resolution 1945 (2010).

2. The Panel operates under the direction of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005). The mandate of the Panel, as set out in resolution 1591 (2005), is:

- (a) To assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the arms embargo;
- (b) To assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the targeted travel and financial sanctions; and
- (c) To make recommendations to the Committee on actions that the Security Council may want to consider.

3. In its resolution 2200 (2015) and preceding resolutions, the Security Council also requested that the Panel:

- (a) Continue to coordinate its activities, as appropriate, with the operations of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and with international efforts to promote a political process in Darfur, and with other Panels or Groups of Experts, established by the Security Council, as relevant to the implementation of its mandate;
- (b) Assess in its interim and final reports:
  - (i) Progress towards reducing violations by all parties of the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004), paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005) and paragraph 10 of resolution 1945 (2010);
  - (ii) Progress towards removing impediments to the political process and threats to stability in Darfur and the region;
  - (iii) Violations of international humanitarian law violations of international humanitarian law or violations or abuses of human rights, including those that involve attacks on the civilian population, sexual- and gender-based violence and violations and abuses against children;

(iv) Other violations of the above-mentioned resolutions;

(c) Provide the Committee with information on those individuals and entities meeting the listing criteria in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005); and

(d) Continue to investigate the financing and role of armed, military and political groups in attacks against UNAMID personnel in Darfur, noting that individuals and entities planning, sponsoring or participating in such attacks constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and may therefore meet the designation criteria provided for in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005).

## B. Methodology

4. The Panel followed a professional and technical methodology underpinned by the maintenance of transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence. The Panel worked in full conformity with the best practices and methods recommended by the Security Council's Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). Emphasis has been placed on the adherence to standards regarding transparency and sources, documentary evidence, corroboration of independent verifiable sources and providing the opportunity to reply. The Panel based its reasoning on a balance of probability to ascertain that a reported fact or piece of information can be substantiated on the basis of a credible source or verifiable evidence.<sup>1</sup>

5. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done on the basis of consensus.

6. In line with guidance received from the Security Council's Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997), the Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in the majority of incidents that are covered in this update. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings.

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<sup>1</sup> Terminology relating to the probability of an event, shown in bold in the report, uses a qualitative statement to reflect as associated probability or confidence percentage. (**Certain** > 99%, **Almost Certain** 90-98%, **Highly Probable** or **Highly Likely** 75-89%, **Probable** or **Likely** 55-74%). The term awarded is based on a subjective assessment of the quality of the combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence the Panel has seen and/or had access to.

## Annex 2

### Summary of Panel travel

<i>Expert</i>	<i>March 2015</i>	<i>April 2015</i>	<i>May 2015</i>	<i>June 2015</i>	<i>July 2015</i>	<i>August 2015</i>	<i>September 2015</i>	<i>October 2015</i>	<i>November 2015</i>
<b>Coordinator/ Finance</b>	12		25-29	1-30	1-3 26-31	1-5/6-8/9-11/18-22/ 23-24/25-26	8-11 30	1-3/4-8/9-30	5-9/10-24
	Appointed		New York	Sudan	Sudan/Brindisi	Brindisi/Spain/ Belgium/New York/ France/Ukraine	New York/Greece	Greece/UAE/ Sudan	Geneva/Brindisi
<b>Arms</b>	12	1-30	10-25	17-30	1-3/6-9/26-31	1-5	23-30	1-12	5-7/10-24
	Appointed	Awaiting Visa	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan/London/ Brindisi	Brindisi	Sudan	Sudan	London/Brindisi
<b>Aviation</b>	12	1-30	11-26	17-30	1-3 26-31	1-5 25-26	8-11 12-29 30	1-3 13-27	10-24/25-26
	Appointed	Awaiting Visa	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan/Brindisi	Brindisi/Ukraine	New York/Sudan/ Greece	Greece/Sudan	Brindisi
<b>IHL</b>	12	1-30	3-6/7-11/20-31	1-30	1-3/6-9/ 26-31	1-3	8-11 12-24	1-28	5-7/8-10/10-24/25-26
	Appointed	Awaiting Visa	Geneva/ Netherlands/ Sudan	Sudan	Sudan/London/ Brindisi	Brindisi	New York/Sudan	Sudan	UK/Geneva/Brindisi/ Netherlands
<b>Regional</b>	12	1-30	3-7/8-23/24-31	1-3	1-25 26-31	1-5/6-8/9-11/12-16/ 23-24		4-8/9-31	10-24
	Appointed	Awaiting Visa	New York/Sudan/ Chad	Ethiopia	Sudan/Brindisi	Brindisi/Spain/ Belgium/UAE/France		UAE/Sudan	Brindisi

### Annex 3

#### **‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel**

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual<sup>1</sup> in a report as recommended for designation, impacts adversely on the fundamental human rights and reputation of the person. As such, it is important that the Panel allows the individual concerned to provide an alternative narrative and to provide concrete and specific information/material to support the narrative. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that his/her conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.
2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
  - (a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
  - (b) It is reasonable for the Panel to deny an individual an opportunity to reply if a Panel concludes based on credible evidence that doing so would:
    - (i) Result in the individual moving assets if he/she receives advance warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
    - (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources or areas;
    - (iii) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
    - (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field; and/or
    - (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. Unless any of 2 (b) (i) to (v) above apply, members of the Panel should be in a position to provide an individual with an opportunity to reply, and for the individual to communicate directly to the Panel to convey his/her personal determination as to the level and nature of interactions with the Panel.
4. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
5. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual his/her response or level of interaction with the Panel.
6. The individual, on the other hand, in making his/her determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representatives or his/her government) to communicate on his/her behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.
7. The key requisite is that the Panel, at the conclusion of its investigations, is able to directly communicate with the individual to afford the ‘opportunity to reply’ to allegations against him/her. Some possible differences between a right of reply (after designation) and the opportunity to reply (before designation) are as shown in the table below:

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<sup>1</sup> The term ‘individual’ in this note includes entities that may also be recommended for designation.

<i>Question</i>	<i>Right of Reply</i>	<i>Opportunity to Reply</i>
Who is the responsible entity?	A duly appointed focal person/ ombudsperson with the ability to provide an effective remedy.	The Panel
When should the right of reply/ opportunity to reply be given?	After the individual/entity is designated.	If possible before an individual or entity is named in the report as having violated the sanctions regime and definitely before a confidential recommendation is made to the Sanctions Committee recommending designation.
What are the objectives sought to be achieved?	To afford the individual/entity the ability to contest the listing/ designation. It is up to the relevant competent body to decide on the extent of information shared with the individual/entity, but it should be sufficiently detailed to enable him to prepare an informed response.	To allow the Panel to complete its investigation and to ensure that the individual/entity does not have an alternative narrative that requires further investigation prior to a recommendation for designation.
What information should be shared with the individual/ entity?	Information deemed necessary by the competent authority.	<p>Sufficient information on the activities being investigated.</p> <p>Outline of allegations against individuals/entities to enable them to provide an informed response to these allegations.</p> <p>Sufficient information on the relevant violations of the Security Council resolution.</p> <p>Any other information deemed relevant.</p>

## Annex 4

### Summary of Panel correspondence (12 February-29 November 2015)

This Annex summarizes the level of responses to the Panel's written requests for information from States, international organizations, national authorities or commercial entities.<sup>1</sup>

Country/Organization	Number of letters sent <sup>2,3</sup>	Information fully supplied	Information partially supplied	Information not supplied	No answer	Visit or Visa request(s)
		#	#	#	#	#
Austria	1	1				
Belarus	1				1	
Bulgaria	1				1	
China	1		1			
Djibouti	1	1				
Egypt	2		1		1	
Greece	1	1				4
Israel	1				1	
Italy	4		2		2	
Jordan	1				1	
Moldova	3	3				
Oman	1				1	
Panama	2	1		1		
Romania	3	3				
Russian Federation	1				1	
Sao Tome and Principe	1				1	
South Africa	1	1				
South Sudan	4				4	
Sudan	22	1	1 (Visit) <sup>4</sup> 6	2 (Meeting) <sup>5</sup> 2	10	8
Turkey	1	1				
UAE	6	1			5	3
Ukraine	4	4				2
UK	1		1			

<sup>1</sup> If the response to a Panel letter was verbal, or access was granted, or information shared in another way, then that has been included as an effective response. Therefore the number of letters sent by the panel does not equate to formal written responses.

<sup>2</sup> This does not include letters sent requesting visits or visas, these are recorded in the visit or visa request column. If the Panel has only ever written to a Member State for a visa request, and that request was expedited, then that Member State is not listed. This makes the data easier to interpret.

<sup>3</sup> If a response was given as a result of a reminder letter then only one letter is recorded as being sent.

<sup>4</sup> Access to captured weapons permitted in response to written request.

<sup>5</sup> The meetings were not arranged as requested.

<i>Country/Organization</i>	<i>Number of letters sent</i>	<i>Information fully supplied</i> #	<i>Information partially supplied</i> #	<i>Information not supplied</i> #	<i>No answer</i> #	<i>Visit or Visa request(s)</i> #
USA	1				1	
SUB-TOTALS	65	19	10	6	31	17
ICGLR	1	1				
SRSG CAAC	1	1				
UNICEF	1	1				
WCO	1	1				
JEM	5				5	
SLA/AW	2				2	
SLA/MM	1				1	
Amros (Djibouti)	2	2				
Asterias (Panama)	2		2			
Cranfield (UK)	1				1	
Egypt Air (Egypt)	1	1				
Entity A	1	1				
Entity B	1		1			
Entity C	1		1			
Kamaz International Trading (UAE)	1				1	
MIC (Sudan)	2				2	
Individual A (Greece)	2	2				
Individual B (Greece)	1	1				
Streit (UAE)	3	1		1	1	
Toyota (Japan)	3	3				
Vision Valley (UAE)	1	1				
Wadi Al Neel (UAE)	1				1	



## Annex 5

### Summary of reported RSF operations in Darfur (01 January-30 September 2015)<sup>1 2</sup>

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location<sup>3</sup></i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Damage/Comment</i>	<i>Resulting IDP</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Injured</i>
01 Jan	Dobo	South		Farms plundered		4	NK
01 Jan	Fananga <sup>4</sup>	North	SLM/MM LFM <sup>5</sup>			50+	NK
03 Jan	Funga Suk	North	SLA/AW			NK	NK
6/7 Jan	Tawila	North	SLM/MM	Villages plundered	50,000+	NK	NK
06 Jan	Shagar Gei	North				6	3
07 Jan	Birdik	North	SRF			NK	NK
08 Jan	Pious	East				NK	NK
11 Jan	Dillow	South				1	0
22 Jan	Deribat Area	North	SLA/AW			12	NK
22 Jan	El Malam	North				NK	NK
24 Jan	Kobos	North		Village plundered			
24 Jan	Golo	Central	SLA/AW	Village plundered		5	5
24 Jan	Arra	Central		Village arson		0	0
24 Jan	Koron	Central	SLA/AW			NK	NK
25 Jan	Sarrong	Central	SLA/AW			NK	4
25 Jan	Graida	South		Presence only		NK	NK
26 Jan	Golo Area	Central				7	13
28 Jan	Musbat	North				3	NK
30 Jan	Hamia Rotoke	South		Individual RSF soldier		1	0

<sup>1</sup> Multiple sources, including UN reports, print media, internet and radio.

<sup>2</sup> The dashed lines on this, and all subsequent, tables indicate the commencement of the mandate period or end of reporting quarters.

<sup>3</sup> Identifying particular locations within Darfur remains a challenge for the Panel. UNAMID GEO maintains a database of over 4802 place names (and variations) with accurate GEO co-ordinates. This database is routinely updated. Yet government agencies, press reports, local residents and even UN organizations all use different spellings for the same place. The panel has been able to positively identify only 51% of the locations reported in this Table and those that follow.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-s-forces-recapture-jebel-marra-area-from-darfur-rebels>.

<sup>5</sup> Liberation Forces Movement.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location<sup>3</sup></i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Damage/Comment</i>	<i>Resulting IDP</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Injured</i>
30 Jan	Um Meineilkhir	North		Village		1	1
30 Jan	Hashaba, Um Sidir, Basheen, Mellit	North		Villages		NK	NK
01 Feb	Ed el Gerid and Birdik	North		Villages		3	1
02 Feb	Graida	South	Fallata			5	3
03 Feb	Donkey Ba'ashim	North		Village		10	4
03 Feb	Tima	North		Village		NK	9
08 Feb	Korny	Central	SLA/AW			2	1
09 Feb	Khazan Tungar	Central	SAF Militia			9	12
15/16 Feb	Fama and Karkary	North		Cattle rustling		0	0
22 Feb	Shangil Tobaya	North	Civilian			1	0
24 Feb	Abu Sallalah	South	Civilian			2	0
24 Feb	Fanga	North	Civilian			1	0
02 Mar	Khor Almalih	North	SLA/MM	23 arrested and 6 vehicles captured by RSF		18	7
07 Mar	Tim Sahah	South	SRF			NK	NK
08 Mar	Tiro, Rokoro	North	SLA/AW	Village destroyed		6	NK
15 Mar	Nyala/Kass	South	Armed NK			2	0
18 Mar	Gemiza	South	Civilian			0	1
19 Mar	Wadi Ashara	North	Civilians	Cattle rustling		4	1
22 Apr	Golo	Central	Civilian	Convoy carrying oranges		0	0
26 Apr	Nakhara	South	JEM	Convoy		200	30
02 May	Jumeiza	North	SLM/MM			64 <sup>6</sup>	NK
08 May	Dobo El Madrasa	North	Civilians	Village destroyed		3	0
13 May	Tawila	North	Civilians	Convoy looted <sup>7</sup>		0	0
13 May	Gireida	South	Civilian	Armed robbery		1	0
16 May	Gireida	South	Civilian	Armed robbery		2	0
17/18 May	Abu Zereiga, Dolma, Humeida, Nemra, Masaleet, Sharafa, and Tokomari	North	Civilians	Villages attacked		0	NK


<sup>6</sup> 60 x RSF Fatalities, 4 x SLA/MM.

<sup>7</sup> RSF Force allegedly commanded by Colonel Gidou Mohamed Hamdan Ahmed.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i> <sup>3</sup>	<i>State</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Damage/Comment</i>	<i>Resulting IDP</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Injured</i>
28 May	Um Bereida	South	Civilians	Dispute over sale of goods		2	1
28 May	Rahad El Berdi	South	Civilian	Alleged murder of civilian <sup>8</sup>		1	0
02 Jun	Mere	South	Criminals	In support of CRP operation to recover UNAMID vehicles.		6	3
06 Jun	Um Bululu IDP	West	Civilians	Armed dispute		1	4
24 Jul	Thur IDP	Central	IDPs	Attempted armed robbery		1	0
09 Sep	Aien Sero	North	Individuals	16 miners arrested		0	0
22 Sep	Tawila	North	Militias			4	13
28 Sep	Otash IDP	South	IDP	Accidental shooting		0	1


<sup>8</sup> In this case it was reported that the individual RSF member was arrested and committed to trial.

Figure 5.1

**Reported RSF initiated armed violence (Quarterly Analysis 2013-2015)**

## Annex 6

### Map of RSF operational activity 2015



**Annex 7****Summary of reported<sup>1</sup> non-signatory group initiated armed violence (01 January-30 September 2015)<sup>2</sup>**

			Non-signatory group						Target		Government Casualties		
			JEM	LJM	SLA-AK <sup>3</sup>	SLA-AW	SLA-MM	SPLM-N	SRF	GoS	NK	Fatal	
Date	Location (Town)	Sector											Remarks
04 Jan	Fanga Suk	North	P						X		NK	NK	Counter-Attack
16 Feb	Golo	North	P						X		NK	NK	
18 Feb	Karmel	North	P						X		14	NK	Internal feud
19 Feb	Golo	North	P						X		9	NK	
24 Feb	Guldo	North	P						X		NK	NK	
8 Mar	Golo	North	P						X		9	NK	
9 Mar	Nooni	Central	P						X		4	NK	
10 Mar	El Fasher	North	PX								0	0	
13 Mar	Rokoro	Central	P						X		68	100+	
24 Mar	Kora	Central	P						X		5	7	Civilians killed
26 Apr	Buram, Sesseban and Antikina	South	P	P					X		NK	NK	Attacked RSF. Armed force of 300 vehicles and 5 tanks
02 May	Jumeiza	North	P						X		60	9	Attacked Fur tribe
10 May	Niskam, Rokoro	North	P							X	NK	NK	


<sup>1</sup> These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity where possible. The data does not necessarily include un-reported incidents of armed violence, but does indicate the magnitude of the issue. The data is included as it is 'reported' and therefore may not necessarily be totally accurate.

<sup>2</sup> P = Perpetrator. X = Target. NK = Not Known, TBC = To Be Confirmed.

<sup>3</sup> Also reported as being called the Sudan Liberation Movement for Justice (SLMJ) or SLA/Justice.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location (Town)</i>	<i>Sector</i>	<i>Non-signatory group</i>							<i>Target</i>		<i>Government Casualties</i>		<i>Remarks</i>
			<i>JEM</i>	<i>LJM</i>	<i>SLA-AK<sup>3</sup></i>	<i>SLA-AW</i>	<i>SLA-MM</i>	<i>SPLM-N</i>	<i>SRF</i>	<i>GoS</i>	<i>NK</i>	<i>Fatal</i>	<i>Injured</i>	
09 Jun	Savanga, Dubo Neita, Golo	Central			P					X		30	38	Convoy of 82 x 4X4 attacked
15 Jun	Seleah	West			P					X		2	5	2 4x4 seized
16 Jun	Sirba	West			P					X		NK	NK	
16 Jun	Burgo, Rokoro	Central			P					X		NK	NK	
03 Jul	Guldo	North			P					X		1	2	Arms seized
14 Jul	Kafod	North							P	X		1	0	SLA Free Will attacked PDF Camp
14 Jul	Kafod	North							P	X		6	3	SLA Free Will attacked PDF Funeral
06 Sep	Kurra, Rokoro	Central			X						X	0	0	Details NK

Figure 7.1  
**Reported non-signatory armed group initiated armed violence**  
(Quarterly Analysis 2013-2015)





## Annex 8

### Summary of non-signatory armed group weapon and ammunition seizures claimed by Government

The Panel was allowed to inspect weapons in the custody of the RSF on 30 June 2015, but could not independently verify they were all ex-JEM. The age and condition of these weapons were also of such poor quality that the initiation of tracing requests would almost certainly not result in any evidence emerging as to their supply route to Darfur.

#### 8.1 Weapons

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Group</i>	<i>Assault Rifles</i>	<i>Medium Machine</i>	<i>Heavy Machine</i>	<i>Gun<sup>1</sup></i>	<i>Anti-Aircraft Gun<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>Grenade Launcher</i>	<i>Cannon</i>	<i>RPG 7</i>	<i>Recoilless Rifle (RCL)</i>	<i>Mortar<sup>3</sup></i>	<i>RCL</i>	<i>MBRL<sup>4</sup></i>	<i>MBRL<sup>5</sup></i>	<i>Total</i>
			<i>7.62m</i>	<i>12.7m</i>	<i>14.5m</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>23mm</i>	<i>30mm</i>	<i>37mm</i>	<i>40mm</i>	<i>73mm</i>	<i>82mm</i>	<i>106mm</i>	<i>107mm</i>	<i>122mm</i>	
2 Mar	Khor Almalih	SLA/MM		6	1											7
26 Apr	Nakhara Area <sup>6</sup>	JEM	500+		15	6		1	2		5	3	4	11	4	647+
7 Jun	El Fasher <sup>7</sup>	SLA/MM	24	5		2				5			2			38
<b>TOTALS</b>			<b>524+</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>4</b>		<b>692</b>

#### 8.2 Vehicles

Over 172 vehicles, mainly 4x4 type, were claimed by the RSF to have been captured by the Government from the non-signatory armed groups.

<sup>1</sup> ZPU-24 or Type 56 variant. (*Zenitnaya Pulemetnaya Ustanovka*. (Anti-Aircraft Gun)).

<sup>2</sup> ZU-23-2 or Type 80 variant. (*Zenitnaya Ustanovka*. (Anti-Aircraft Gun)).

<sup>3</sup> 82-PM or Type 67 variant.

<sup>4</sup> Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher.

<sup>5</sup> BM-21 or Type 89 variant.

<sup>6</sup> Data from Government supplied on 22 September 2015 by the NFP. Verbal discussions with an RSF Commander at the Nyala weapons warehouse suggested that the number of weapons captured was much greater (as reported in the Panel mid term report).

<sup>7</sup> Orgajur Group moved over to the Government on 7 June 2015.

### 8.3 Ammunition (Rounds)

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Group</i>	<i>7.62mm</i>	<i>12.7mm</i>	<i>14.5mm</i>	<i>23mm</i>	<i>40mm RPG</i>	<i>Total</i>
2 Mar	Khor Almalih	SLA/MM						
26 Apr	Nakhara Area	JEM						
7 Jun	El Fasher	SLA/MM	410	1,500	3,050	1,992	66	
<b>TOTALS</b>			<b>410</b>	<b>1,500</b>	<b>3,050</b>	<b>1,992</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>6,718</b>

## Annex 9

### Summary of reported<sup>1</sup> armed violence initiated by Government (non-RSF) forces (01 January-30 September 2015)<sup>2 3 4</sup>

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target													Casualties		Remarks
			JEM	LJM-TH	SLA-AW	SLA-MM	SPLA	SPLM-N	SRF	IDP	Civilian	Criminal	SAF	NK	Fatal	Injured		
02 Jan	Grindling	West								X					0	2	Drunk SAF soldier committed offence	
03 Jan	Funga Suk	North				X									NK	NK		
07 Jan	El Geneina	West									X				1	0	GoS Police members initiated attack??	
13 Jan	Orchi	North				X									39	NK	SLA/MM Commander Mohamed Harry Shardgo killed	
19 Jan	Nyala	South									X				0	9	During demonstration at market	
16 Feb	Kanzanjadeed	East									X				2	2	PSO <sup>5</sup> stopping civilian violence	
20 Feb	Maila	East			X										11	NK		
20 Feb	Golo	East			X										NK	NK		
21 Feb	Golo	East			X										NK	19		
22 Feb	Abu Karinka	East											X		2	2	PDF v SAF	
04 Mar	Ed Daein	East									X				1	0	Drunk CRP member committed offence	
04 Mar	Garsila	West											X		1	0	SAF soldier shot CRP Officer	
09 Mar	Terro	Central									X				0	0		
12 Mar	Sirba	West									X				1	0	GoS Police members	
30 Mar	Zamzam	North								X					1	0	CRP member was drunk	
30 Mar	Kabkabiya	North									X				0	1	Stray round from warning shots	
06 Apr	Tofai, El Kuma	North									X				2	0	Border Guards attack	
09 Apr	Al Wihda, Nyala	South									X				1	0	Stray round	
13 Apr	Mournei IDP	West								X					0	9	Stray rounds	

<sup>1</sup> These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity where possible. The data does not necessarily include un-reported incidents of armed violence, but does indicate the magnitude of the issue. The data is included as it is 'reported' by various sources and therefore may not necessarily be totally accurate. Data has been included for the first three Quarters of 2015 only, which allows for trend analysis against previous years activities.

<sup>2</sup> P = Perpetrator. X = Target. NK = Not Known. TBC = To Be Confirmed.


<sup>3</sup> The dashed lines on this, and all subsequent, tables indicate the commencement of the mandate period or end of reporting quarters.

<sup>4</sup> This table does NOT include attacks initiated by the RSF against civilian targets. These are covered in annex V.

<sup>5</sup> Peace Support Operation.

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target														Casualties		Remarks
			JEM	LJM-TH	SLA-AW	SLA-MM	SPLA	SPLM-N	SRF	IDP	Civilian	Criminal	SAF	NK	Fatal	Injured			
14 Apr	Zalinegei	Central										X			2	18	Related to prison escape		
16 Apr	Kuma	North									X				0	0	Armed carjacking by CRP of INGO 4X4		
17 Apr	Al Jeer	South								X					1	0	Stray rounds		
17 Apr	Labado	East											X		0	0	“Blue on Blue”. SAF v SAF		
18 Apr	Foro Baranga	West								X					1	0	Stray round		
27 Apr	Um Takina	South	X												0	0	40 captured by PDF		
28 Apr	Graida	South								X					1	0	SAF personal dispute, No arrest.		
07 May	Near Rockero	Central			X										6	1	Border Guards attack		
31 May	Abuzar	West								X					1	0	GoS Police shot 14yr old boy		
08 Jun	Tawila	North										X			7	6	Stopped armed robbery		
06 Jul	El Geneina	West								X					0	1	Injured during inter GoS fight		
09 Jul	Korma IDP	North							X						0	1	Negligent discharge by SAF		
14 Jul	Kafout	North								X			X		3	0	PDF v Militia		
18 Jul	Bardani	West								X					0	1	SAF at bus at checkpoint		
19 Jul	Tawila	North												X	0	0	CRP		
24 Jul	Anka	North								X					9	4	Killers in CRP and SAF uniforms		
4 Aug	Zalingei	Central								X					1	0	SAF officer in self-defence		
9 Aug	Amin Abid	North								X					1	1	At VCP when vehicle failed to stop		
14 Aug	Althoprah	Central								X					1	1	Drunken BG		
28 Aug	Nertiti	Central											X		1	2	“Blue on Blue”		
31 Aug	Dimo	South								X					2	0	“Tortured to Death Allegation”		

Figure 9.1

**Reported Government initiated armed violence (Quarterly Analysis 2013-2015)**

**Annex 10****Summary of reported<sup>1</sup> armed violence against UNAMID (01 January-30 September 2015)<sup>2 3</sup>**

Date	Location	Sector	UNAMID Target						Casualties		Remarks	
			Base	TS	Patrol	Residence	Individual(s)	A/C <sup>4</sup>	Perpetrator	Fatal		Injured
06 Jan	Karesmano	South			X				Armed NK	0	0	5/2 attackers killed/wounded
06 Jan	Habilla	West			X				Armed NK	0	0	
06 Jan	Sheria	East		X					SAF	0	0	Stray bullet
07 Jan	Tulus	South		X					Armed NK	0	0	Random shooting
12 Jan	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed carjacking
23 Jan	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Attempted robbery
26 Jan	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed carjacking
29 Jan	Zalingei	Central					X		Armed NK	0	0	2 UN contract aircrew abducted
11 Feb	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
23 Feb	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed carjacking
01 Mar	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed carjacking
02 Mar	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
04 Mar	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed carjacking
10 Mar	Kutum	North			X				Armed NK	0	1	UNAMID returned fire to protect WFP convoy
15 Mar	El Fasher	North			X				Armed NK	0	0	Garbage truck car-jacked
20 Mar	Tulus	South		X					Armed NK	0	0	Shots fired from 400m

<sup>1</sup> These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity where possible. The data does not necessarily include un-reported incidents of armed violence, but does indicate the magnitude of the issue. The data is included as it is 'reported' and therefore may not necessarily be totally accurate.

<sup>2</sup> P = Perpetrator. X = Target. NK = Not Known. TBC = To Be Confirmed.

<sup>3</sup> The dashed lines on this, and all subsequent, tables indicate the commencement of the mandate period or end of reporting quarters.

<sup>4</sup> Aircraft.


Date	Location	Sector	UNAMID Target						Casualties		Remarks	
			Base	TS	Patrol	Residence	Individual(s)	A/C <sup>4</sup>	Perpetrator	Fatal		Injured
27 Mar	Tulus	South		X					Armed NK	0	0	Three shots fired
06 Apr	Rowata	Central				X			SAirF	0	0	SAirF bombs landed 200m away from UNAMID Patrol, APC was affected by fragmentation.
09 Apr	Nyala	South				X			Armed NK	0	0	Armed carjacking
22 Apr	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
23 Apr	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
23 Apr	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery, second incident
23 Apr	Kass	South				X			Armed NK	0	3	Armed attack, 4 attackers killed.
24 Apr	Kass	South				X			Armed NK	0	4	Armed attack.
25 Apr	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
26 Apr	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
26 Apr	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
28 Apr	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
29 Apr	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
01 May	Tulus	South		X					Armed NK	0	0	Shots fired from 300m
06 May	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery 1
06 May	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery 2
07 May	El Fasher	North					X		GoS Diplomatic Police	0	0	Celebratory fire
07 May	El Fasher	North				X			GoS Diplomatic Police	0	0	Physical attack of convoy
09 May	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
09 May	El Fasher	North				X			Armed NK	0	0	Attempted car-jacking
11 May	El Fasher	North					X		Armed NK	0	0	Armed car-jacking

Date	Location	Sector	UNAMID Target						Casualties		Remarks
			Base	TS	Patrol	Residence	Individual(s) A/C <sup>4</sup>	Perpetrator	Fatal	Injured	
11 May	Tulus	South		X				Armed NK	0	0	5 shots fired from 300m
11 May	Tulus	South			X			Armed NK	0	0	1 shot fired at QRF
12 May	Hillet Hashab	North			X			Armed NK	0	0	Disturbed village arson
13 May	Sharafa	North			X			Armed NK	0	0	Warning shots fired in air
13 May	Muhajeria	East					X	GoS MI	0	0	Warning shots to deter over-flight
25 May	El Fasher	North					X	Armed NK	0	0	Armed car-jacking
26 May	El Geneina	West					X	Armed NK	0	0	Armed car-jacking of water truck
30 May	El Fasher	North			X			Armed NK	0	0	Attempted car-jacking
31 May	El Fasher	North					X	Armed NK	0	0	Armed car-jacking
02 Jun	El Fasher	North					X	Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
04 Jun	Gibsra, Kutum	North			X			Armed NK	0	0	Armed car-jacking
05 Jun	El Fasher	North					X	Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
15 Jun	El Fasher	North			X			Armed NK	0	0	Attempted car-jacking
16 Jun	Quarin	North			X			Armed NK	0	0	Stray bullet towards UNAMID escorted convoy
19 Jun	El Fasher	North					X	Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
22 Jun	El Fasher	North					X	Armed NK	0	0	Attempted armed robbery
24 Jun	El Fasher	North					X	Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
27 Jun	El Fasher	North					X	Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
28 Jun	El Fasher	North					X	Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
28 Jun	Nyala	South			X			Armed NK	0	0	Armed car-jacking
28 Jun	El Fasher	North					X	Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
30 Jun	El Fasher	North					X	Armed NK	0	0	Armed robbery
30 Jun	El Fasher	North					X	Armed NK	0	0	Attempted car-jacking
05 Jul	Nyala	South			X			Armed NK	0	1	Attempted car-jacking
09 Jul	El Geneina	North	X					SAF	0	0	During live firing training nearby



<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Sector</i>	<i>UNAMID Target</i>						<i>Casualties</i>		<i>Remarks</i>
			<i>Base</i>	<i>TS</i>	<i>Patrol</i>	<i>Residence</i>	<i>Individual(s)</i>	<i>A/C<sup>4</sup></i>	<i>Fatal</i>	<i>Injured</i>	
13 Jul	El Fasher	North					X	Armed NK	0	0	Attempted armed robbery
15 Jul	Bowa - Termes	North			X			Armed NK	0	0	Reason NK
23 Jul	Tulus	South		X				Armed NK	0	0	Reason NK
18 Aug	Aljazera	North			X			Armed NK	0	0	Weapons stolen
05 Sep	El Geneina	West	X					Armed NK	0	0	Stray bullet
06 Sep	Tulus	South		X				Armed NK	0	0	Shots at TS
09 Sep	Nyala	South					X	Armed NK	0	0	Attempted abduction of national staff
27 Sep	Mellitt	North			X			Armed NK	1	4	Five APCs attacked

Figure 10.1

**Reported Armed Violence Attacks against UNAMID (Quarterly Analysis 2013-2015)**

## Annex 11

Summary of reported<sup>1</sup> armed inter-tribal violence (01 January-30 September 2015)<sup>2 3</sup>

Date	Attack Location (Town)	Sector	Armed tribes involved																Casualties		Remarks	
			Abbala	Beni Halba	Beni Hussein	Fallata	Fur	Habbiniya	Hamar	Maaliya	Massalit	Misseriya	Nwaiba	Rezeigat	Salamat	Tamar	Tarjam	Taisha	Other or NK	Fatal		Injured
13 Jan	Beighit	East							P				X							1	7	
15 Jan	Abu Zabra	East							X				P							4	2	
18 Jan	Baba	South						P X												1	1	
21 Jan	Shearia IDP	East									P							X		1	0	
30 Jan	Al Nadif	South				X								X						19	30	
01 Feb	Forika and Donkey Abiad	South				P				X										7	17	
02 Feb	Dikkar	South				X				P												
05 Feb	Gemesa	South				X								X						3	2	
05 Feb	Korti	West																PX		2	14	Maharia v Awlad Najaa
22 Feb	Al-Qirfa	East						X	X											3	4	
27 Feb	Sari	North																		5	NK	Berti v Zeyadiyah
28 Feb	Markisi	North																		4	3	Zeyadiyah v Berti
06 Mar	Orokom	Central	X															X		4	4	Borno
08 Mar	Kreneik	Central														X		P		1	1	
17 Mar	Markisi	North																PX		22	2	Berti v Zeyadiyah
18 Mar	Kuliet, Mellit	North																PX		0	2	Berti v Zeyadiyah
19 Mar	Mellit	North																PX		28	10+	Berti v Zeyadiyah
19 Mar	Kuli	North																PX		7	NK	Berti v Zeyadiyah, Berti in CRP uniform

<sup>1</sup> These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity where possible. The data does not necessarily include un-reported incidents of armed violence, but does indicate the magnitude of the issue. The data is included as it is 'reported' and therefore may not necessarily be totally accurate.

<sup>2</sup> P = Perpetrator. X = Target. NK = Not Known. TBC = To Be Confirmed.


<sup>3</sup> The dashed lines on this, and all subsequent, tables indicate the commencement of the mandate period or end of reporting quarters.

			Armed tribes involved																Casualties		Remarks		
Date	Attack Location (Town)	Sector	Abbala	Beni Halba	Beni Hussein	Fallata	Fur	Habbiniya	Hamar	Maaliya	Massalit	Misseriya	Nwaiba	Rezeigat	Salamat	Tamar	Tarjam	Taisha	Other or NK	Fatal		Injured	
20 Mar	Mellit	North																		PX	11	NK	Berti v Zeyadiyah
21 Mar	Buram	North				X										X					40+	60+	
22 Mar	Benama	North																		PX	14+	NK	Berti v Zeyadiyah
24 Mar	El Sunta	South						X						X							14	22	
24 Mar	Burum, Nadhif	South				X										X					49	60	
24 Mar	Sukara and Ragtag	South				X										X					25	83	
24 Mar	Um Seleilo, Mellit	North																		PX	5	NK	Berti v Zeyadiyah, Zeyadiyah in BG and CRP uniform
27 Mar	Tofai, Mellit	North																		XP	1	0	Zeyadiyah x Berti
28 Mar	Mellit	North																			23	11	Berti v Zeyadiyah
01 Apr	Abu Karinka	East								X				P							30	NK	
03 Apr	Masteri	West									X										1	9	Inter Tribal
25 Apr	Abu Dangal	East								P				X							2	0	
26 Apr	Abu Dangal	East								X				P							8	4	
27 Apr	Haraza, Kass			X																	1	0	Accidental clash between tribes who were pursuing JEM
28 Apr	Al Fadul	East								X				P							6	5	Cattle rustling
05 May	Kalamasina	Central															X		P		1	0	Reason NK
11 May	Abu Karinka									X				P							107+	57+	
15 May	Anderi	West																		PX	1	0	Mahariya v Najah
09 Jun	Um Shalaiya IDP	West					X													P	1	0	P was Mahadi
11 Jun	Um Shalaiya IDP	West					X													P	1	0	P was Mahadi, retaliation
01 Jul	Yassin	East																		PX	5	7	Birgit v Khouzam
02 Jul	Yassin	South																		XP	2	0	Birgit v Khouzam

Date	Attack Location (Town)	Sector	Armed tribes involved																	Casualties		Remarks
			Abbala	Beni Halba	Beni Hussein	Fallata	Fur	Habbiniya	Hamar	Maaliya	Massalit	Misseriya	Nwaiba	Rezeigat	Salamat	Tamar	Tarjam	Taisha	Other or NK	Fatal	Injured	
02 Jul	Abu Demat	South					X			P				X						2	0	
03 Jul	Geigi	South						X						P						0	0	Cattle rustling
04 Jul	Talha	South						P						X						42	NK	Retaliation
04 Jul	Ingumbail	Central													P					1	5	
05 Jul	Sunta	South						X						P						6	11	More retaliation
05 Jul	Abu Gira	North																		15	4	Berti v Zeyadiyah
08 Jul	Ein El Dess	North																PX		5	4	Berti v Beni Omra
08 Jul	Fado	Central				P												P		1	0	
10 Jul	Hellit Ahmed Shaib	North																PX		0	0	Beni Omra v Berti
10 Jul	Hamada	South																PX		1	0	Birgid v NK
10 Jul	Kasangi	South																P		1	0	P = Umkamalti
13 Jul	El Ferida	East						X						X						1	1	Reason NK
14 Jul	Al Sunta	South					X	P						X						42	NK	Related to cattle rustling
15 Jul	Al Sunta	South		X				X						P						130	40	Retaliation
23 Jul	Adikong	West				X														0	2	Mahiya v Nagaa
27 Jul	Mellit	North	P		X													PX		2	3	Beni Omra v Berti
29 Jul	Beer Madena	West	P		X					X								P		0	2	
13 Aug	Amud el Arden	South													X					62	31	Related to cattle rustling
16 Aug	El Miram	East									X			P						1	0	Related to cattle rustling
17 Aug	Osman Douma	North																X		0	0	Berti Targets
17 Aug	Husban Duma	North																P		10	NK	Berti Revenge
18 Aug	Karoya Laban	North																X		2	2	Berti
31 Aug	Katur	North																P		1	4	Cattle rustling
01 Sep	Uyer	West																X		1	1	Awlad
06 Sep	Shaq El Simea	North																X		1	10	Berti
08 Sep	Gusa	North																		0	2	
08 Sep	Gusa	North																		0	2	Incident 2
13 Sep	Adilla	East								P				X						0	5	

Date	Attack Location (Town)	Sector	Armed tribes involved															Casualties		Remarks		
			Abbala	Beni Halba	Beni Hussein	Fallata	Fur	Habbiniya	Hamar	Maaliya	Massalit	Misseriya	Nwaiba	Rezeigat	Salamat	Tamar	Tarjam	Taisha	Other or NK		Fatal	Injured
21 Sep	Sheiria	East	P															X		3	5	In retaliation for rustling
26 Sep	Kabkabiya	North	PX																	1	1	Tribesman v GoS Police

Figure 11.1

**Reported inter-tribal armed violence (Quarterly Analysis 2013-2015)**

## Annex 12

Summary of reported<sup>1</sup> 'Militia',<sup>2</sup> 'Arab Militia' or 'Unidentified' initiated armed violence (01 January-30 September 2015)<sup>3 4</sup>

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
02 Jan	Biera	North		X				7	2	
03 Jan	Nertiti	Centre		X				0	0	
07 Jan	Kerenek	West		X				0	2	
07 Jan	Birdik	North		X				10	NK	
11 Jan	Umgozeen	North		X				1	2	
11 Jan	Sany Haya	North		X				3	0	
13 Jan	Orchi	North	X					1	0	An SLA/MM Commander killed
17 Jan	Sasusa	North		X				1	10	
18 Jan	Al Salam	West		X				0	2	
19 Jan	Camp Habat	Central		X				0	1	
19 Jan	Taradona	North		X				2	2	
19 Jan	Hamida	West		X				1	0	
22 Jan	Taradona	North		X				2	2	
22 Jan	Um Baru	North		X				2	0	
22 Jan	Girgera	North		X				2	0	
24 Jan	Saraf Umru	North		X				1	3	Armed robbery
24 Jan	Sirba	West		X				0	2	
29 Jan	Tur	South		X				0	2	Possible Border Guard
30 Jan	Gireida	South		X				1	5	
31 Jan	Saadoun	South		X				0	4	
31 Jan	Malagat Ward	North		X				1	1	

<sup>1</sup> These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity where possible. The data does not necessarily include un-reported incidents of armed violence, but does indicate the magnitude of the issue. The data is included as it is 'reported' and therefore may not necessarily be totally accurate.

<sup>2</sup> These forces are not necessarily the Militia as defined in Annex A. They were reported as such by witnesses and were certainly uniformed and armed.

<sup>3</sup> P = Perpetrator. X = Target. NK = Not Known. TBC = To Be Confirmed.

<sup>4</sup> The dashed lines on this, and all subsequent, tables indicate the commencement of the mandate period or end of reporting quarters.



Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
01 Feb	Abuteriza	South		X				1	0	
02 Feb	Kutum	North		X				1	0	At Militia Toll
04 Feb	Mursal	North		X				0	0	Village burnt
05 Feb	Um Siyala	North		X				0	1	Village burnt
05 Feb	Rijil Kubri	West		X				2	5	Domestic
06 Feb	Khor Tawani	South		X				0	1	
07 Feb	Giaybey	North		X				2	0	Rustling
08 Feb	Tabarat	North		X				2	4	Rustling
08 Feb	Marguba	North		X				0	1	Rustling
09 Feb	Mellit	North			X			1	2	Police station
09 Feb	Dhaka	South		X				0	4	
12 Feb	Mellit	North			X			0	1	
12 Feb	Um Haraz	North		X				5	5	Attack at water point
14 Feb	Dabanera	North		X				1	0	
19 Feb	Um Thojak	West		X				0	1	
20 Feb	Zalingei	Central		X				0	1	Armed robbery
21 Feb	Girfa	East		X				3	4	
22 Feb	Umlayouna	South		X				1	0	Possible CRP
22 Feb	Abu Selala	South		X				2	0	Armed robbery
24 Feb	Kabkabiya	North			X			0	1	GoS MI Officer
25 Feb	Kuma	North		X				1	1	
26 Feb	Oyur	Central		X				2	1	
02 Mar	Hamidiya	West		X				0	1	
02 Mar	Abdul Shakur	North		X				NK	NK	Attackers from Guba against Chinese Gold Mining Company
03 Mar	Hamidiya	West		X				1	1	
04 Mar	Kerenek	West			X			0	4	
04 Mar	El Fasher	North		X				1	3	
05 Mar	Omkhair	Central		X	X			4	8	Rescue of one militiaman from police station
09 Mar	Marshang	South		X				2	0	
09 Mar	Zalingei	Central			X			0	1	

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
10 Mar	Abu Shouk	North		X				1	3	Market place attack
11 Mar	Zalingei	Central		X				0	1	
14 Mar	Ed Daein	Central			X			0	1	Armed robbery of GoS water fees collector
15 Mar	Dankuj	Central		X				1	0	
15 Mar	Duma West IDP	South		X				1	0	
15 Mar	Nyala Kass Road	South		X				2	0	
16 Mar	Zalingei	Central			X			0	1	Attempted carjack of Minister of Education
21 Mar	Tawilla	North		X				2	2	Shooting in market
22 Mar	Kamfa	North		X				0	1	
22 Mar	Kebkabiya	North		X				0	1	
22 Mar	Adarr, El Geneina	West		X				0	2	
24 Mar	Wadi Salih, Koubga	Central			X			0	1	Armed car-jacking from BG
25 Mar	Um Jalpakh	North		X				6	2	
26 Mar	Khazan Tunjar	North		X				1	0	Generator theft
27 Mar	Jebel Kosa	North		X				6	2	
27 Mar	Biljango	North		X				1	0	
28 Mar	El Fasher	North			X			1	0	CRP fatality
30 Mar	Ottash IDP	South		X				1	0	
30 Mar	Abu Sufyan	North		X				0	1	Ambush of vehicle
30 Mar	Allab Bashir	North			X			1	0	CRP fatality
01 Apr	Mellit Locality	North		X				41	7	Began on 30 March involving 4 villages
01 Apr	Abyad, Gireida	South		X	X			0	3	
01 Apr	Sani Efando, Yassin	East		X				1	0	
01 Apr	Yassin	East		X				1	1	
06 Apr	Tofai Jebel	North		X				2	0	
07 Apr	Sheq Jorab	East		X				5	7	
08 Apr	Hillat Ali	East		X				5	9	
09 Apr	Kutum	North		X				1	0	Shot in market
09 Apr	Foro Baranga	West		X				1	0	Armed bike-jacking
11 Apr	El Geneinia	West			X			0	1	Armed carjacking

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
11 Apr	Otask IDP, Nyala	South		X				1	0	
11 Apr	El Geneinia	East			X			1	0	Armed robbery
14 Apr	65km East El Geneinia	West		X				0	1	Armed robbery
16 Apr	El Fasher	North		X				0	0	Attempted armed robbery
17 Apr	Karari	South		X				0	1	Attempted car-jacking
20 Apr	El Fasher	North		X				0	1	Armed robbery
21 Apr	Nyala	South			X			1	0	Attempted car-jacking
21 Apr	Nertiti	Central	X					1	0	SLA/AW fatality
22 Apr	Korma IDP	North		X				0	0	Armed assault
22 Apr	Ghaba	North			X			0	2	CRP casualty, Midob tribal based.
26 Apr	Abu Shouk	North		X				0	4	Armed robbery
26 Apr	Mellit	North		X				1	0	
27 Apr	Nertiti	Central		X				1	0	Pregnant women killed for NK reason.
27 Apr	El Fasher	North		X				0	1	Attempted car-jacking
28 Apr	Al Fadul	East			X			2	10	Maliyya attacked CRP
29 Apr	Medan Al Kheil	North		X				1	0	
01 May	Zalingei	Central		X				1	0	
01 May	Al Jeer, Nyala	South		X				1	0	
02 May	Um Labana	North		X				1	2	Armed robbery
02 May	Graida	South			X			1	0	SAF killed for reason NK
02 May	Korma	North		X				4	4	Armed robbery of convoy
04 May	Kassab IDP	North		X				0	1	
04 May	Kalam Basanan, Bindisi	Central		X				1	0	
06 May	Bielel	South		X				1	1	
06 May	Niteaga	South		X				1	0	
07 May	El Geneina	West		X				2	0	Armed robbery
07 May	Dali, Dawa and Masalit	North		X				0	5	Villages pillaged
09 May	El Gasour	North		X				1	0	
10 May	Asarti	West		X				1	0	
13 May	Rahat Tara	North		X				0	1	
18 May	Kass	South		X				0	1	Armed robbery
19 May	Mukjar	Central			X			0	1	Armed robbery of weapon


Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
20 May	Shakshaku	North		X				0	1	
20 May	Abu Shouk	North		X				0	1	
21 May	El Salam	South		X				1	0	Attempted armed robbery
23 May	El Fasher	North			X			1	0	Murder of SAF soldier
24 May	Zalingei	Central		X				1	0	UNAMID local staff
25 May	Kutum	North		X				0	1	Rape
26 May	Zalingei	Central		X				1	0	Armed robbery
27 May	Dorti, El Geneina	West		X				1	0	Attempted armed robbery
28 May	Bileil	South		X				1	7	Rape
28 May	Otash	South		X				1	1	
29 May	Mawashi	North		X	X			1	2	Armed robbery of weapon
30 May	Abata	Central		X				1	0	
30 May	Nyala	South		X				1	0	Armed robbery
01 Jun	Kalma, Bielel	South		X				1	0	
01 Jun	Kampode, Kutum	North			X			0	1	Attempted armed robbery
01 Jun	Kerenek	West		X				0	0	Armed robbery
03 Jun	Kutum	North		X				0	0	Armed abduction
06 Jun	Dereog, Nyala	South		X				1	5	
06 Jun	El Wadi, Nyala	South		X				1	0	
07 Jun	Foro Baranga	West					X	1	0	
07 Jun	Shakshaku, Tawila	North		X				1	0	
08 Jun	Al Mumalla	South		X				1	0	
09 Jun	Omshalan	Central		X				0	1	Armed robbery of motorbike
11 Jun	Zalingei	Central			X			0	1	Armed robbery of weapons
12 Jun	Yassin	East		X				0	1	Armed robbery
14 Jun	Tha Alba	North			X			1	5	
14 Jun	Nyala	South			X			2	0	Attempted armed robbery
16 Jun	Kafod	North				X		0	0	Armed car-jacking ICRC
17 Jun	Orchi	North			X			2	0	
18 Jun	Nyala	South				X		0	0	Armed car-jacking UNHCR
22 Jun	El Geneina	West		X				1	2	
23 Jun	Murai, Kass	South		X				1	0	

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
23 Jun	Murai, Kass	South		X				0	1	Attempted bike-jacking
25 Jun	Nereig, Nyala	South		X				0	1	
26 Jun	Nierteti	Central		X				1	0	
29 Jun	Rijil Kubri	West		X				0	1	Armed robbery
30 Jun	Nima	North		X				1	0	Armed robbery
02 Jul	Kulu, Dolo, Kortinga, Jebel Tayeb and Tina	North		X				4	5	Armed robbery
02 Jul	Kabkabiya	North		X				0	0	Armed robbery of market
02 Jul	El Geneinia	West		X				0	1	Armed robbery
03 Jul	Martal, Kulu and Fanga	North		X				6	3	Attack over three days
04 Jul	Donkey Abiad	South		X				0	1	
06 Jul	El Daein	East		X				1	1	
08 Jul	Abuleha	North		X				0	1	Abduction
09 Jul	Kasingi	South		X				1	0	Defending women from rape
10 Jul	Gokar	West			X			0	0	Assassination attempt on Head of Masalit Native Administration
12 Jul	Momo	Central		X				1	2	Car-jacking
12 Jul	El Fasher	North				X		0	1	Attempted car-jacking
12 Jul	Kafalo	North		X				1	0	Cattle rustling
13 Jul	Umassal	South		X				1	0	Armed robbery
13 Jul	Al-Dakir	South		X				1	0	Armed robbery
14 Jul	Kafout	North		X				2	1	Mourners at funeral of PDF men
15 Jul	Sisi	West		X				0	1	
16 Jul	Jagomak	West		X				0	1	Armed robbery
18 Jul	Gertobak	South		X				1	0	
19 Jul	Muhajiriye	South		X				1	1	
21 Jul	Shegeg Karo	North		X				0	1	Attempted cattle rustling
22 Jul	Anka	North		X				9	2	Attack on village
23 Jul	Niteaga	South		X				1	5	
23 Jul	Endur	South		X				0	1	Bus ambush
25 Jul	Abu Danga	East		X				0	1	Attempted armed robbery
27 Jul	Kassab	North		X				0	1	

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
27 Jul	El Neem	East		X				0	1	
28 Jul	Hillat Ali Sanusi	East		X				0	3	
29 Jul	Kassab	North		X				0	1	Armed robbery
29 Jul	Beer Madena	West		X				0	2	Massalit farmers attacked
30 Jul	Um Dukhan	Central			X			0	4	Militia attacked SAF
30 Jul	Near Masteri	West		X				0	1	Armed robbery
31 Jul	Mukjar	Central			X			0	1	CRP injured while robbery target
2 Aug	El Geneina	West		X				0	1	Armed robbery
3 Aug	Mukjar	Central		X				1	0	
5 Aug	Timtim	North		X				1	1	Armed robbery
6 Aug	Kondobe	West		X				0	1	Land dispute
8 Aug	Dembow Kabdy	Central		X				0	2	
10 Aug	Wadi Rimela	South		X				1	0	
12 Aug	Um Baloula	South		X				1	0	Cattle rustling related
13 Aug	Hamidiya	Central		X				0	2	
19 Aug	Donkey El Khair	South		X				3	2	Armed ambush of convoy
28 Aug	Shagarga	North		X				0	0	Attempted armed robbery
29 Aug	Nyala	South		X				1	2	Armed robbery
29 Aug	Otash IDP	South		X				1	0	
31 Aug	Bobay Sigili	North		X				1	0	Cattle rustling
01 Sep	El Fasher	North		X				1	0	Armed robbery
01 Sep	Duma East IDP	South		X				1	0	Armed robbery
07 Sep	Um Marawik	North			X			0	0	
07 Sep	Otash	South		X				0	1	Armed robbery
08 Sep	Kerenek	West			X	X		2	0	Ministry of Health victims
10 Sep	Daba Tuga	North		X				1	2	
10 Sep	Nertiti	Central		X				0	2	Armed robbery
12 Sep	Mukjar	Central			X			0	1	Armed robbery
15 Sep	Otash IDP	South		X				1	2	Armed robbery
15 Sep	Berley	South		X				1	0	Protecting against rape
17 Sep	El Geneina	West			X			0	0	Wali's vehicle was target
18 Sep	Umray	North		X				4	3	Possibly Border Guards

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location (Town)</i>	<i>Sector</i>	<i>Target</i>					<i>Fatal</i>	<i>Injured</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
			<i>AOG</i>	<i>Civilian</i>	<i>GoS</i>	<i>NGO</i>	<i>TAG</i>			
18 Sep	Habad West	Central		X				0	0	
20 Sep	Mornei	West		X				1	0	Attempted robbery of motorcycle
21 Sep	Nemra	North		X				7	10	Suspected GoS Border Guards
22 Sep	Korofsata	Central		X				1	1	Resisting rape
24 Sep	Fata Borno	North		X				1	0	
28 Sep	Sisi IDP	West		X	X			0	2	
30 Sep	Atia	West		X				0	1	Armed robbery of M/C
30 Sep	El Geneina	West		X				0	1	Armed robbery of M/C
30 Sep	Kabkabiya	North		X				1	0	Armed car-jacking

Figure 12.1  
Reported 'Militia', 'Arab Militia' or 'Unidentified' initiated armed violence  
(Quarterly Analysis 2014-2015)





**Annex 13****Examples of ‘reported’ criminal acts (armed robbery) (01 January-30 September 2015)<sup>1 2</sup>**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location (Town)</i>	<i>Sector</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Stolen Items</i>						<i>Remarks</i>
				<i>Cash (SDG)</i>	<i>Livestock</i>	<i>Vehicles</i>	<i>Wpns</i>	<i>Food (Bags)</i>	<i>Goods</i>	
01 Jan	Labado	East	Armed NK						Fuel and personal effects	
03 Jan	Abu Zerga	North	Armed NK		300 Sheep			Significant		
07 Jan	Saraf Omra	North	Armed NK							
07 Jan	Tawilla	North	RSF		88 Sheep and Goats					
07 Jan	Golo	North	Armed NK		800 Sheep					
11 Jan	Hayakima Sharif	North	Armed NK	NK <sup>3</sup>	45 Goats				Gold jewellery	
13 Jan	El Fasher	North	Armed NK			1 x 4X4				OCHA
14 Jan	Zamzam	North	Armed NK		247 Cattle					
15 Jan	Al Zaiafa	East	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
19 Jan	Nertiti	Central	Armed NK		28 Goats					
20 Jan	Malaga	North	Armed NK		83 Goats and 23 Sheep					
20 Jan	Deley	North	Armed NK			1 x 4X4				Local NGO
22 Jan	Debaneira	North	Armed NK		150 Sheep and Goats					
23 Jan	Tawilla	North	Armed NK			1 x 4X4				
23 Jan	Tukumari	North	Armed NK		85 Cows					
25 Jan	Um Zaifa	East	Armed NK						Personal belongings	

<sup>1</sup> The dashed lines on this, and all subsequent, tables indicate the commencement of the mandate period or end of reporting quarters.

<sup>2</sup> These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity where possible. The data does not necessarily include un-reported incidents of armed violence, but does indicate the magnitude of the issue. The data is included as it is ‘reported’ and therefore may not necessarily be totally accurate.

<sup>3</sup> NK means that assets were stolen but the quantity is Not Known.

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Responsible	Stolen Items						Remarks
				Cash (SDG)	Livestock	Vehicles	Wpns	Food (Bags)	Goods	
26 Jan	Dabanera	North	Armed NK		150 Goats and Sheep					
31 Jan	Malagat Ward	North	Armed NK		25 Cattle					
02 Feb	Keli Keli	East	Armed NK		60 Livestock					
04 Feb	Nyala	South	Armed NK						Market goods	9 stores robbed in market
05 Feb	Hawara	North	Armed NK			1 x Minivan				OCHA
07 Feb	Mashrou Abu Zeid	North	SRF						Personal belongings	
10 Feb	Graida	South	Fallata						57 x Personal belongings	
12 Feb	Um Haraz	North	Armed NK		150 Cattle					
22 Feb	Krinding	West	Armed NK							GoS successfully defended attack
22 Feb	El Fasher	North	Armed NK			1 x 4X4				WFP
23 Feb	Goz Bala Furash	West	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
01 Mar	Korma	North	Armed NK		70 Sheep					
02 Mar	Hamidiya	Central	Armed NK			1 x M/C <sup>4</sup>				
07 Mar	Habilu	West	Armed NK			1 x 4X4				Recovered later by GoS
07 Mar	Wadi Dileba	South	Armed NK		2 Donkey				Personal belongings	
07 Mar	Kosho	South	Armed NK		1 Donkey				Personal belongings	
07 Mar	Um Kheir	Central	Armed NK			8 x Water Engines				
07 Mar	Kutum	North	Armed NK	SDG 6,000					Cell Phones	
07 Mar	Sawani	East	Armed NK	SDG 15,000					Cell Phones	
08 Mar	Beja	Central	Armed NK			1 x Truck				

<sup>4</sup> Motorcycle.

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Responsible	Stolen Items						Remarks
				Cash (SDG)	Livestock	Vehicles	Wpns	Food (Bags)	Goods	
10 Mar	Kebkabiya	North	Armed NK	SDG 213K	11 Goats					Teacher's salaries stolen
13 Mar	Hillabeda	Central	Armed NK			1 x 4X4			Personal belongings	UNAMID ODO Contractor
13 Mar	Mellit	North	Armed NK			1 x Ambulance				
14 Mar	Ed Daein	Central	Armed NK	TBC						GoS Water Fees
15 Mar	Yassin, Labado	Central	Armed NK							
15 Mar	El Fasher	North	Armed NK						130 Sacks Tobacco	
17 Mar	Jurab	North	Armed NK						Personal belongings work SDG50K	
23 Mar	Al Bayd	North	Armed NK			1 x 4X4			Personal belongings	Bus Hi-jack
24 Mar	Wadi Salih	Central	Armed NK			1 x 4X4				BG Vehicle
24 Mar	Mukjar Bindisi	Central	Armed NK	TBC					Radios	
25 Mar	Um Kadada	North	Armed NK						Commercial goods	
25 Mar	Um Kadada	North	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
25 Mar	Kass	South	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
28 Mar	El Genenia	West	Armed NK							Attempted bank robbery
28 Mar	El Fasher	North	Armed NK			1 x M/C				
30 Mar	Aby Sufyan	North	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
03 Apr	Nyala	South	Armed NK			1 x 4X4				
04 Apr	El Madris	West	Criminal			1 x M/C				
06 Apr	Nyala	South	Armed NK			1 x Car				
06 Apr	Nyala	South	Armed NK	SDG 3,400					Cell phone and personal belongings	Local HAC Commissioner

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Responsible	Stolen Items						Remarks
				Cash (SDG)	Livestock	Vehicles	Wpns	Food (Bags)	Goods	
06 Apr	Wadi Murra	North	Armed NK	NK					Cell phone and personal belongings	Bus robbery
07 Apr	Wali Murra	North	Armed NK						Cell phone and personal belongings	Bus robbery
07 Apr	Mournei	West	Armed NK				1		14 Solar Panels	
07 Apr	Kereinik	West	Armed NK					50 cartons biscuits		
08 Apr	Balisareif	North	Armed NK		NK Livestock					
09 Apr	Ardamata IDP	West	Armed NK						3 cell phones	
09 Apr	Foro Baranga	West	Armed NK			1 x M/C				
16 Apr	Tabit	North	Armed NK			1 x Vehicle			Ballot boxes	
18 Apr	Kebkabiya	North	Criminal						Personal belongings	
20 Apr	El Fasher	North	Criminal						Nothing	
26 Apr	Nina	North	Armed NK						Abduction	
27 Apr	Nertiti	Central	Criminal			1 x M/C				
27 Apr	Birikat Sera	North	Criminal			1 x Fuel Tanker				
29 Apr	Mukjar	Central	Criminal			1 x 4X4			HAC Vehicle	
30 Apr	Khor Abeche	South	Criminal						Copper cable to UNAMID Water Point <sup>5</sup>	
01 May	Zalingei	Central	Criminal	NK					Personal belongings	
02 May	Labado	South	Armed NK		3 Cattle					
02 May	Ailliet	North	Armed NK	SDG 400K						
03 May	Jaloof	North	Armed NK			1 x 4X4	1		Personal belongings	CRP Weapon stolen
03 May	Beer Kolo, Tawila	North	Armed NK		180 Cattle					

<sup>5</sup> Water Point.

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Responsible	Stolen Items						Remarks
				Cash (SDG)	Livestock	Vehicles	Wpns	Food (Bags)	Goods	
04 May	Birkat Seira, Saraf Umra	North	Armed NK		20+ Goats					
05 May	Kullu	North	Armed Nomads		150 Cattle					
08 May	Hillat Hagger	North	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
11 May	El Daein	East	Armed NK			1 x Taxi				
12 May	Um Dukhan	Central	Armed NK			1 x Car				WFP Vehicle
13 May	Tukumare	North	Armed NK		400 Animals					Recovered by SAF
14 May	El Daein	East	Armed NK						3 x Laptops	Local NGO
17 May	Labado	East	Armed NK			4 x 4X4				UNAMID escorted
17 May	Kudmel	East	Armed NK		2 Donkeys					
18 May	Grindling	West	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
19 May	Zalingei	Central	Armed NK			2 x Trucks				ICRC vehicles
23 May	El Fasher	North	Armed NK			1 x Truck				Sudan TV vehicle
23 May	Gogoma Shargiya	Central	Armed NK			2 x Trucks				
24 May	Dembow Kabdy	Central	Armed NK			1 x Truck				
24 May	El Fasher	Central	Armed NK	NK					Cell phone	
25 May	Tawilla	North	Armed NK		200 Sheep and 50 Goats					
26 May	Kafod	North	Armed NK			1 x Truck				
28 May	Anu Karinka	East	Armed NK	NK		1 x Vehicle	NK		Cell Phone	Local NISS Director was victim
31 May	Fajkara, Kereink	West	Armed NK			1 x Generator				
09 Jun	Zalingei	South	Armed NK			1 x Vehicle				GoS vehicle
09 Jun	El Geneina	West	Armed NK			1 x Vehicle				
10 Jun	Debenaira IDP	North	Armed NK		1 x Donkey				Personal belongings	
14 Jun	Amtaheel	North	Armed NK					280 Bags Sorghum		

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location (Town)</i>	<i>Sector</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Stolen Items</i>						<i>Remarks</i>
				<i>Cash (SDG)</i>	<i>Livestock</i>	<i>Vehicles</i>	<i>Wpns</i>	<i>Food (Bags)</i>	<i>Goods</i>	
16 Jun	Kafod	North	Armed NK	SDG 2,160	35 x Goats	2 x ICRC Vehicles				
21 Jun	Dali IDP	North	Armed NK							
22 Jun	Mangrasa	West	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
24 Jun	El Fasher	North	Armed NK			1 x WFP Car				
26 Jun	El Sireaf	North	Armed NK						6 x Cell phones	
27 Jun	El Fasher	North	Armed NK		85 Sheep and Goats	1 x Car			2 x cell phones	
27 Jun	Zalingie	Central	Armed NK							GoS Prosecutor vehicle
27 Jun	El Geneina	West	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
27 Jan	Hashaba	North	Armed NK							
29 Jun	Sandi Koro	West	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
30 Jun	Jabal Kulo	North	Armed NK		300 x Cattle					
01 Jul	Azum	Central	Armed NK	NK	? x Donkeys 1100 x Sheep	1x 4X4		Rations		
01 Jul	El Sereif > Saraf Umra	North	Armed NK			2 x Trucks				
02 Jul	El Fasher	North	Armed NK			2x 4X4 1 x Minibus			IT Equipment	
03 Jul	Tawila IDP	North	Armed NK							
04 Jul	Goz Leben	North	Armed NK							
04 Jul	Nyala	South	Armed NK			1 x 4X4				
05 Jul	Shakshuka	North	Armed NK			3 x Trucks				
05 Jul	El Daein	East	Armed NK						Cell phone	
05 Jul	Debenaira IDP	North	Armed NK			2 x Vehicles				

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Responsible	Stolen Items						Remarks
				Cash (SDG)	Livestock	Vehicles	Wpns	Food (Bags)	Goods	
07 Jul	Dereige IDP	South	Armed NK	NK					Personal belongings	
08 Jul	Nifasha	North	Armed NK		40 x Goats					
13 Jul	El Daein	East	Armed NK			1 x 4X4				
16 Jul	Wata Narr	South	Armed NK	NK					Personal belongings	
19 Jul	Mornei	West	Armed NK			1 x Taxi				
19 Jul	Shanga	South	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
19 Jul	Graida	South	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
20 Jul	El Genina	West	Armed NK			1 x 4X4				
24 Jul	Kheir Waji	North	Armed NK	NK						
25 Jul	Hilat Nuga	West	Armed NK			1 x Taxi				
30 Jul	Labado	East	Armed NK						1 x Cell Phone	
31 Jul	Nertiti	Central	SLA/AW		85 x Livestock					
1 Aug	Hemada	North	Armed NK		NK					
2 Aug	El Ednaback	North	Pro GoS	150K (Not Paid)						
5 Aug	Ali Giber	Central	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
11 Aug	Deleba Bowa	North	Armed NK			1 x Vehicle				
13 Aug	Ed El Fursan	South	Armed NK	NK					2 x Cell Phone	
20 Aug	Thur East	Central	Armed NK	NK						
21 Aug	Zalkingei	Central	Armed NK	NK					Personal belongings	
25 Aug	Kutum	North	Armed NK						NK	
29 Aug	Otash IDP	South	Armed NK	200					Cell phone	
06 Sep	Nr Mellit	North	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
06 Sep	Nr Mellit	North	Armed NK						Personal belongings	

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location (Town)</i>	<i>Sector</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Stolen Items</i>						<i>Remarks</i>
				<i>Cash (SDG)</i>	<i>Livestock</i>	<i>Vehicles</i>	<i>Wpns</i>	<i>Food (Bags)</i>	<i>Goods</i>	
06 Sep	Nr Mellit	North	Armed NK			1 x Vehicle			Personal belongings	
06 Sep	Fazi	North	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
07 Sep	Um Marawik	North	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
10 Sep	Abu Shouk	North	Armed NK	NK					2 x Cell phones	
10 Sep	Nertiti	Central	Armed NK						Personal belongings	
12 Sep	Kabkabiya	North	Armed NK						Documents	
16 Sep	GarsilA IDP	Central	Armed NK	160						
22 Sep	Kereinik	West	Armed NK			1 x M/C				



## Annex 14

### Summary of UNAMID weapons losses identified by the Panel (2010-2015)<sup>1</sup>

<i>Date</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Calibre</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Lost to</i>
March 2010			66	Darbat	SLA/AW
5 August 2011			2	Dema	NK
21 January 2012	MG <sup>2</sup>	7.62mm	3	El Daein	
26 June 2013	MG	7.62mm	2	Khor Abeche <sup>3</sup>	
28 June 2013	Karnov MG	12.7mm	1	Khor Abeche	
	Belgium MG	7.62mm	1		
	RPG <sup>4</sup> -7	40mm	1		
13 July 2013	Assault Rifles	7.62mm	24	Khor Abeche	
	MG		2		
	RPG		1		
12 August 2013			15	El Daein <sup>5</sup>	
13 October 2013	M16A2 Assault Rifle	5.56mm	4	El Geneina	
TBC 2013	LMG <sup>6</sup>	7.62mm	1	Zalingei	
	MG	7.62mm	1		
8 February 2014	R4 Rifles	5.56mm	37	Near Mellit and	Group “Suleiman
	LMG	7.62mm	4	Kutum	Murjan”
	RPG-7	40mm	1		
28 August 2014	R4 Rifle	5.56mm	1	Kutum <sup>7</sup>	NK
16 November 2014	AK-47 <sup>8</sup> variant	7.62mm	2	Korma <sup>10</sup>	
	PKM <sup>9</sup> LMG	7.62mm	1		
6 January 2015	AK-47 variant	7.62mm	7	Habila <sup>11</sup>	
	LMG	7.62mm	1		
23 April 2015	AK-47 variant	7.62mm	1	Kass	
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>175</b>		

<sup>1</sup> Data from UNAMID and *Under Attack and Above Scrutiny, Arms and Ammunition Diversion from Peacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan 2002-2014*, Small Arms Survey, July 2015. (ISBN 978-2-940548-11-8).

<sup>2</sup> Machine Gun.

<sup>3</sup> Latitude 12° 38' 49"N, Longitude 25° 16' 13"E.

<sup>4</sup> *Ruchnoy Protivotankovyy Granatomyot*. (Rocket Propelled Grenade).

<sup>5</sup> Latitude 11° 25' 35"N, Longitude 26° 08' 58"E.

<sup>6</sup> Light Machine Gun.

<sup>7</sup> Latitude 14° 12' 59"N, Longitude 24° 39' 42"E.

<sup>8</sup> *Avtomatik Kalashnikov* (Assault Rifle).

<sup>9</sup> *Pulemyot Kalashnikova (Modernised)*. (Light Machine Gun).

<sup>10</sup> Latitude 13° 51' 08"N, Longitude 24° 45' 17"E.

<sup>11</sup> Latitude 12° 40' 49"N, Longitude 22° 33' 43"E.

**Annex 15**  
**Streit TYPHOON supply documentation**

Documentation relating to the supply of TYPHOON armoured vehicles from Streit Armoured Cars FZE, through the broker Ramaz International Trading FZE, to the Sudanese Police follows in appendices 1 to 7.

# **Appendix 1 to Annex 15** **Streit/Kamaz Sales Agreement (Extract) (2 July 2012)**

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APC/12/280601

## **ARMORED PROTECTION CARS FZE** **Armored Vehicles Manufacturer**

SALES AGREEMENT REFERENCE NO. APC/12/280601

Date : July 2<sup>nd</sup>

ARMORED PROTECTION CARS FZE, P.O. Box: 54513, Technology Park FTZ, Ras Al Khaimah, UAE (hereinafter referred to as APC/or a Seller) and KAMAZ INT'L TRADING FZE, P.O.Box:54609, Technology Park FTZ, Ras Al Khaimah, UAE (hereinafter referred to as a Buyer) have concluded the present Contract whereby the Seller has sold and the Buyer has bought the Products on the following terms and conditions, agreed and signed by the parties:

### **PRODUCTS DESCRIPTION**

#### **Kamaz Typhoon GS 300**

#### **1. Vehicle Specification**

Model	2012, 4x4
Engine	KAMAZ V8 four stroke turbo charged intercooled diesel 740.55-300
Displacement	10,76L
Horsepower	300 hp @ 2200 rpm
Torque	1177 Nm @ 1400 rpm
Transmission	9S gearbox with 9 stages forward and one reverse
Steering	power-assisted
Overall length	6,823 mm
Overall width	2,434 mm
Overall height (unladen)	3,258 mm (laden)
Curb weight	13,000 kg
Payload	2,000 kg
GVM	15,000 kg
Wheel base	3,775 mm
Turning radius	9,100 mm
Ground clearance	774 mm under transfer case (unladen)
Suspension	Semi elliptical leaf springs, sway bars FR and RR
Tire Size	390/95 R20 with central tire inflation system controlled from the cabin
Brakes	400 mm drums, pneumatically operated main, parking, reserve and auxiliary systems
Climbing gradient	60%
Tire/Slope	30%
Fording depth	1,500 mm
Max speed	100 km/h
Operating range	1,000 km
Occupancy	9 passengers + 1 driver



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- The cost of miscellaneous materials that are used during factory Acceptance shall be borne by SELLER.

## 12. Payment and delivery terms

VEHICLE ORDER	Production LOCATION	Production START DATE	COMPLETION DATE
30	UAE	Upon 100% payment	By Seller

- The Buyer shall make the payments by check (UAE only) or Electronic Funds Transfer. Cash payments shall not be accepted.
- 100% advance payment to be paid by the Buyer after signing of this Contract to place the order.
- APC will issue and submit to the Buyer the bank Advanced Payment Guarantee for a full amount of the deposit paid. This Guarantee to be irrevocable and payable to the Buyer on first demand, if the Seller fails to supply the Products to the Buyer, on the terms of this contract, completely or partially. The Guarantee should be returned to the Seller after the Products Acceptance Certificate signing by the parties.
- The product shipping from the factory shall commence within 5 working days from receipt of the final payment.
- The End-User Statement is required from the Buyer for the export clearance of the vehicle. The format for the End-User Statement will be supplied by Kamaz Int and agreed by APC.
- The End User is Kamaz International Trading FZE as the sole usage.
- UAE will be the final destination for Kamaz International trading FZE as the end user.
- The destination and delivery terms are Ex Factory RAK Free Zone, Technology Park, Ras Al Khaimah, UAE. Transfer of ownership in Free Zone.
- From transferring the units ownership date the buyer will be sole legally responsible for addresses sold units' destinations and end users if any without any liability and obligations over APC FZE as a manufacturer inside or outside UAE.
- Kamaz International Trading FZE will comply with all UAE Law and will held responsible for any illegal act after transfer of ownership to Kamaz Int. Trading FZE name.
- IF the buyer undertakes to export the vehicle (FCA delivery, Incoterms 2000), a refundable Customs Export Deposit in the amount of 5% of the total contract value is payable to APC before the shipment. The Buyer is responsible to provide APC with the Export Documentation properly filled out and stamped. APC shall apply for the refund of the 5% deposit, and will return the funds to the Buyer upon receipt of the funds back from the Customs.
- If APC, for reasons other than Force Majeure, fails to deliver the Products according to the delivery schedule given in this Contract, a penalty for late delivery shall be applied to APC after a grace period of 1 (one) week at a rate of 0.1% of the non-delivered items cost per day but no more than 5% of the total Contract value.

## 13. Products price and total contract cost

Quantity	Armored Vehicle Description	Unit Price, USD	Total Amount, USD
30	Armored Personnel Carrier, APC, EX Factory Ras Al Khaimah	200,000.00	6,000,000.00
	Optional Equipment		
	Not Applicable		
Total Contract Value, EX Factory RAK, UAE USD			6,000,000.00

## 14. Settlement of disputes

- The parties agree to settle amicably any dispute, which may arise during the performance and in connection with this Contract. However, should the Parties fail to settle amicably such a dispute



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within a 30 (thirty) days period of time from the date of the written claim of one Party to the other one, they agree to have it finally settled under the rules of the courts of Dubai. The court decision shall be final, binding and enforceable upon the Parties herein.

- This Contract shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the substantive laws of the UAE.

#### 15. Other conditions

This Contract is executed in English language, in two original copies.

- This Contract shall become effective after the signature of both of the PARTIES and is valid until the full implementation.

Any amendments, conditions or supplements to the Contract shall be considered valid only as the integral parts of this Contract, if duly signed and stamped by the authorized representatives of the parties.

- The copies of the Contract transmitted by the fax or e-mail to be considered valid until the presentation of the originals.

#### 16. Acknowledgement / Acceptance

By mutually signing this agreement both parties consider the present contract supersedes any other verbal or written mails, faxes and agreements. Both parties have read and understood the terms and conditions contained herein, and accept this contract terms and conditions.

**Seller:**  
ARMORED PROTECTION CARS FZE  
PO Box: 54513  
Technology Park FTZ  
Ras Al Khaimah, UAE


**Buyer:**  
KAMAZ INT'L TRADING FZE  
PO Box: 54609  
Technology Park FTZ  
Ras Al Khaimah, UAE

Per:



02.07.12  
(Authorized Signature)  
Bulat Gilmutdinov, APC Director

Per:




(Authorized Signature)

A. Hochmy  
Manager

Witness

Date: July 11, 2012

Date: 11/07/12

  
Ahmed Raza  
Chief Financial Officer



5

7/11/2012

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APC/12/280601

**Appendix A:****DELIVERABLE ITEMS LIST**

Vehicles to be delivered:

No	Unit No	Chassis No	Year	Make/Model	Color	Eng./Trans	Engine
1	A026	RDTK30324CR020027	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636713
2	A027	RDTK30324CR020028	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636714
3	A028	RDTK30324CR020029	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636720
4	A029	RDTK30324CR020030	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636721
5	A030	RDTK30325CR020031	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636901
6	A031	RDTK30327CR020032	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636730
7	A032	RDTK30329CR020033	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636725
8	A033	RDTK30325CR020034	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82830723
9	A034	RDTK30327CR020035	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636133
10	A035	RDTK30329CR020036	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636878
11	A036	RDTK30326CR020037	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636716
12	A037	RDTK30328CR020038	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636739
13	A038	RDTK30324CR020039	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636650
14	A039	RDTK30327CR020040	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636737
15	A040	RDTK30325CR020041	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636734
16	A041	RDTK30325CR020042	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636709
17	A042	RDTK30327CR020043	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636717
18	A043	RDTK30325CR020044	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636861
19	A044	RDTK30325CR020045	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636710
20	A045	RDTK30327CR020046	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636736
21	A046	RDTK30324CR020047	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636902
22	A047	RDTK30326CR020048	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636742
23	A048	RDTK30328CR020049	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636735
24	A049	RDTK30324CR020050	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636741
25	A050	RDTK30321CR020051	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636738
26	A051	RDTK30324CR020052	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636740
27	A052	RDTK30325CR020053	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636724
28	A053	RDTK30325CR020054	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636738
29	A054	RDTK30323CR020055	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636898
30	A055	RDTK30325CR020056	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	11.8L D/M	82636714




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**Appendix 2 to Annex 15**  
**Streit sales invoice (9 July 2012) to Kamaz**

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# ARMORED PROTECTION CARS FZE

Ref No: APC0012121301

B/S To

KARAZ INT-TRADING FZE  
P.O. Box 54513, Dubai

United Arab Emirates

Invoice/Proforma Bill No  
Date  
Via

Ship To

KARAZ INT-TRADING FZE  
P.O. Box 54513, Dubai  
KARAZ FZE  
P.O. Box 54513, Dubai  
United Arab Emirates

509924  
3-5-12  
RAC

ITEM DESCRIPTION HS CODE: 87033300	QUANTITY	UNIT PRICE (AED)	TOTAL PRICE (AED)
<p>Typical GS560</p> <p>Model Year: 2012</p> <p>Armored Level: STANAG 4566 Level 2</p> <p>Color: Silver</p> <p>Country of Origin: UAE</p>	30	200,000.00	6,000,000.00
<p>A026: 801K0326C0000001</p> <p>A027: 801K0326C0000002</p> <p>A028: 801K0326C0000003</p> <p>A029: 801K0326C0000004</p> <p>A030: 801K0326C0000005</p> <p>A031: 801K0326C0000006</p> <p>A032: 801K0326C0000007</p> <p>A033: 801K0326C0000008</p> <p>A034: 801K0326C0000009</p> <p>A035: 801K0326C0000010</p> <p>A036: 801K0326C0000011</p> <p>A037: 801K0326C0000012</p> <p>A038: 801K0326C0000013</p> <p>A039: 801K0326C0000014</p> <p>A040: 801K0326C0000015</p> <p>A041: 801K0326C0000016</p> <p>A042: 801K0326C0000017</p> <p>A043: 801K0326C0000018</p> <p>A044: 801K0326C0000019</p> <p>A045: 801K0326C0000020</p> <p>A046: 801K0326C0000021</p> <p>A047: 801K0326C0000022</p> <p>A048: 801K0326C0000023</p> <p>A049: 801K0326C0000024</p> <p>A050: 801K0326C0000025</p> <p>A051: 801K0326C0000026</p> <p>A052: 801K0326C0000027</p> <p>A053: 801K0326C0000028</p> <p>A054: 801K0326C0000029</p> <p>A055: 801K0326C0000030</p>			

Exit Point: RAK FZ

Destination: RAK FZ

Total Weight: 350,000 KGS

**Banking Details**

Beneficiary Name: STREET GROUP FZE

Account #: 01-877432-C-1 (USD)

Account #: 01-877432-C-1 (AED)


Bank: Standard Chartered Bank

Branch: PO Box 599, Jumeirah Al Ras

Country: UAE

SWIFT CODE: ARAB000

**TOTAL AED: 6,000,000.00**



# Appendix 3 to Annex 15 Kamaz sales invoice (4 July 2012) to Sudan Police

24/07/2014 13:53 +072330233

CUSTOMS RAK

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## **KAMAZ INTERNATIONAL TRADING**

FREE ZONE ESTABLISHMENT

P.O.Box:54608, Ras Al Khaymah, UAE  
GENERAL DISTRIBUTOR OF KAMAZ INC.  
FOR MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

### **Commercial Invoice**

Date: 4<sup>th</sup> July 2012

Invoice No. SG08042012-2

Customer:  
Sudan Police  
Ministry of Interior  
Sudan

Ship to:  
Sudan Police  
Ministry of Interior  
Port Sudan

Model	Year	VIN No.	Engine /Transmission	Colour	Engine No.	Price (USD)
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z8CR020023	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636713	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3ZXCR020024	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636876	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z1CR020025	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636728	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z3CR020026	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636726	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z5CR020027	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636901	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z7CR020028	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636739	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z9CR020029	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636725	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z5CR020030	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636723	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z7CR020031	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636133	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z9CR020032	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636878	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z6CR030033	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636716	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z8CR030034	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636719	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3ZXCR030035	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636660	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z1CR030036	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636737	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z3CR030037	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636734	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z5CR030038	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636709	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z7CR030039	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636717	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z3CR030040	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636661	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z5CR030041	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636710	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z7CR030042	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636736	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z4CR040043	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636902	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z6CR040044	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636742	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z8CR040045	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636735	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3ZXCR040046	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636741	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z1CR040047	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636708	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z3CR040048	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636740	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z5CR040049	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636724	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z1CR040050	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636738	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z3CR040051	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636899	\$200,000
Typhoon GS 300	2012	RDTK3D3Z5CR040052	11.8L DIM	Beige	B2636714	\$200,000
Exit point: HAMRIYA FZE						
Destination: Port Sudan						
Total weight 360,000 KGS						
Value for customs purposes only						\$6,000,000
Country of origin United Arab Emirates						





# Appendix 4 to Annex 15 UAE Export Certificate (8 April 2012)

United Arab Emirates  
COMMITTEE FOR GOODS & MATERIALS  
SUBJECT TO IMPORT & EXPORT  
CONTROL/ EXECUTIVE OFFICE

(الإمارات العربية المتحدة)  
لجنة السلع و المواد  
الخاضعة لرقابة الاستيراد و التصدير  
المكتب التنفيذي

تصريح استيراد / تصدير  
Date: 08-Apr-2012 التاريخ: Schedule ( ) الجدول ( 198 ) استمارة رقم:

Material's Name	30 Armored Typhoon	اسم المادة
Quantity/KG	30 Armored Typhoon	الكمية / الكيلوجرام
Chemical Structure	N/A	الصيغة الجزيئية
Specification	Armored Truck Stanag 4569 Level 2	مواصفات المادة
Used for	Safe transport	استعمال المادة
HS Code	87033300	رقم النظام المنسق
CAS No.	N/A	رقم التسجيل الكيميائي
Item life span	10 Years	العمر الافتراضي
Manufacturer Name	Streit Security Vehicles	الشركة المصنعة
End User	Sudan Police	المستخدم النهائي
Importing company	Sudan Police	الشركة المستوردة
Carriers	Streit Security Vehicles	الشركات الناقلة
Invoice No.	SG08042012-2	رقم الفاتورة
Shipping route	Rak to Sudan	خط سير الشحنة من - الى
Country of origin	Japan	بلد المنشأ
Arrival date	N/A	تاريخ وصول المادة
Exporting company	Streit Security Vehicles	الشركة المصدرة

\*\* EXECUTIVE OFFICE should be notified about the real quantity of the chemical substance imported, exported or terminated according to amount maintained in permit given  
\*\* يجب لمكتب المكتب التنفيذي في حالة إلغاء أو تغيير الكمية المستوردة أو المصدرة المذكورة بالطلب أو تجزئتها على دفعات

Denied ☐ Approved ☒

EXECUTIVE OFFICE Stamp / ختم المكتب التنفيذي  
Signature / التوقيع  
Company's Person in charge / الشخص المسؤول في الشركة  
Name: / الاسم:  
Tel Number: / رقم الهاتف:

150 DH 59037176 1202330549  
22/04/2012  
مستند رقم 1202330549  
تاريخ 22/04/2012  
مكتب اللجنة التنفيذية  
مكتب السلع و المواد  
الخاضعة لرقابة الاستيراد و التصدير

من بريد: 3785 دبي الإمارات العربية المتحدة \* هاتف: +97144040040 \* فاكس: +97143574499 \* بريد إلكتروني: info@uaeiec.gov.ae  
P.O. Box 3785 Dubai, United Arab Emirates \* Tel: +97144040040 \* Fax: +97143574499 \* Email: info@uaeiec.gov.ae

## 16-16350



United Arab Emirates  
COMMITTEE FOR GOODS & MATERIALS  
SUBJECTED TO IMPORT & EXPORT  
CONTROL EXECUTIVE OFFICE

الإمارات العربية المتحدة  
لجنة السلع والمواد  
الخاضعة لإجراءات الاستيراد والتصدير  
المكتب التنفيذي

تصريح استيراد / تصدير

Date: 03-Jul-2012 التاريخ: Schedule ( ) الجدول

استمارة رقم: ( 198 )

Material's Name	30 Armored Typhoon	اسم المادة
Quantity/KG	30 Armored Typhoon	الكمية / الكيلوجرام
Chemical Structure	N/A	الصيغة الجزيئية
Specification	Armored Truck Stanag 4569 Level 2	مواصفات المادة
Used for	Safe transport	استعمال المادة
HS Code	87033300	رقم النظام المنسق
CAS No.	N/A	رقم التسجيل الكيميائي
Item life span	10 Years	العمر الافتراضي
Manufacturer Name	Streit Security Vehicles	الشركة المصنعة
End User	Sudan Police	المستخدم النهائي
Importing company	Sudan Police	الشركة المستوردة
Carriers	Wadi Alneel Clearing& Forwrding LLC	الشركات الناقلة
Invoice No.	SG08042012-2	رقم الفاتورة
Shipping route	Rak FZE to Hamriya FZE to Port Sudan	خط سير الشحنة من - الى
Country of origin	United Arab Emirates	بلد المنشأ
Arrival date	N/A	تاريخ وصول المادة
Exporting company	Kamaz Int'l Trading FZE	الشركة المصدرة

**\*\* EXECUTIVE OFFICE should be notified about the real quantity of the chemical substance imported, exported or terminated according to amount maintained in permit given**

**\*\* يجب إخطار المكتب التنفيذي في حالة إلغاء أو تغيير الكمية المستوردة أو المصدرة المذكورة بالطلب أو تميزتها على فواتير**

159 DM  
1202262632  
04/07/2012  
تم استلام كوراز أو تصدير كوراز  
بموجب تصريح رقم 198  
تاريخ 03/07/2012  
مكتب السلع والمواد الخاضعة  
لإجراءات الاستيراد والتصدير  
الإمارات العربية المتحدة

  
**EXECUTIVE OFFICE Stamp**

ختم المكتب التنفيذي

  
**KAMAZ Int'l Trading FZE**  
 Company Stamp / ختم الشركة

Signature

التوقيع

Signature

التوقيع

الشخص المسؤول في الشركة

Company's Person in charge

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ الاسم: \_\_\_\_\_

Tel Number: \_\_\_\_\_ رقم الهاتف: \_\_\_\_\_

التاريخ

Approved

☒

ملاحظة: 3785 - رقم الإحداثيات العربية المتحدة \* هاتف: +97144040040 \* فاكس: +97143574499 \* بريد إلكتروني: info@uaeexec.gov.ae

**Appendix 6 to Annex 15**  
**Kamaz Letter to Panel (16 October 2014)**



**KAMAZ INT'L TRADING FZE**

Ras Al Khaymah, UAE  
 GENERAL DISTRIBUTOR OF KAMAZ INC.  
 FOR MIDDLE EAST&AFRICA  
 Office: +971505960080

Email: [info@kamazexport.com](mailto:info@kamazexport.com) [www.kamazexport.com](http://www.kamazexport.com)

Date: 15/10/2014

To: UNITED NATIONS

Attn: [REDACTED]

Secretary

Tel: (212) 963-[REDACTED] E-mail: [REDACTED]@un.org

Fax : 212-963-[REDACTED]

Tel: (917) 367-[REDACTED]

E-mail: [REDACTED]@un.org

Referring to your letter ref.no S/AC.47/2014/PE/OC.142 dd. 15 September 2014

Dear Sir,

It's a honor to write to you, and after compliments, I would like to confirm that only one time we have been involved into the supply of 30 Typhoon vehicles, as a commercial agent.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that there is quite big number of Typhoon armored vehicles supplied to Sudan, without any relation to us, and not necessary that 30 units has attracted your attention, it could be others.

Meanwhile in 2012 we have been involved to the supply of 30 armored personal carriers Typhoon from STREIT plant to the Sudan Police. We got a chance to be involved to this commercial deal because we proposed to credit manufacturer for the auto components till receiving the money from the buyer, and because we are professional enough to find a cost effective shipment.

The End User from Sudan was a Sudan Police, which is a legal organization of the official Sudan Government.

The supplied cars were police version, B6 cars, with no run-flats, which are used for military, with no any arms or weapons of course.

As per request of the manufacturer and local export regulations, the Buyer has provided the approval of the UAE export control body, approved as well by the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the UAE.

We, being UAE legal entity, has strictly followed UAE Law and regulations in that supply.

We have never supplied these vehicles to any forbidden organizations and destinations. It was delivered to Port Sudan, to official government police.

By the way, we have never claimed that we will use these vehicles ourselves and never issued such End User Certificate.

We are small trading company, professional in the automobiles and spare parts supplies. Our main clients are construction, transport and oil field services companies. And it will be very illogical if we issue such certificate.

The payment to us for the vehicles on behalf of the End User was made by the cash cheques from the UAE company. The cheques were in UAE dirhams.

The shipment was done when I was on summer vacations out of country, and now no one of my previous staff, who was working that time is in my company anymore. Our few personal, consisting of commercial manager, finance manager and logistics manager has been changed few times already since 2012. Therefore I'm ready to show you any related documents which I can find since that time, and please excuse if any details are missing.

I will enclose here the copies of the permits which we received from the buyer, there you can see name of Sudan Police. We didn't receive Receipt copies from Sudan, as it was not required by any of parties.

I hope that our response will be helpful.

Best regards,

Timur Khayrutdinov  
General Director  
KAMAZ INT'L TRADING FZE





**Appendix 7 to Annex 15**  
**Kamaz End User Certificate to Streit (10 July 2012)**

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# **KAMAZ INTERNATIONAL TRADING**

## **FREE ZONE ESTABLISHMENT**

P.O. Box 54509, Ras Al Khaymah, UAE  
 GENERAL DISTRIBUTOR OF KAMAZ INC.  
 FOR MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA  
 END - USER CERTIFICATE

1. In accordance with the regulations of United Arab Emirates, which state that granting of an invoice is subject to the following conditions: the person who is granted the invoice must ensure that the goods supply by:

a. Name of Vendor: ARMORED PROTECTION CARS FZE  
 b. Address of Vendor: PO Box 54513, RAK Free Trade Zone, RAK, UAE  
 c. Country of Production/Manufacturer: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  
 d. Description of the goods (as Attached): AS PER ATTACHED  
 e. Quantity and Weight (According to attached list)  
 Words: AS PER ATTACHED Figure: \_\_\_\_\_  
 f. Value: \$ ( AS PER ATTACHED ) or £ ( \_\_\_\_\_ )  
 or € ( \_\_\_\_\_ )

2. The goods are intended for use in United Arab Emirates, the country of final destination

3. The items are intended for:

a. Purpose: FOR SOLE USAGE  
 b. By (organization): KAMAZ INTERNATIONAL TRADING FZE

4. I certify that, the vehicles as per attached (Kamaz Typhoon GS300) are being purchased from Armored Protection Cars FZE for the sole usage of Kamaz International Trading FZE ONLY following the Rules and Regulations of United Arab Emirates (UAE) with no obligations and liabilities over Armored Protection Cars FZE if any inside or outside UAE.

Place: RAK, UAE  
 Date: 10th July, 2012

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

State/Official Seal: \_\_\_\_\_



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## End User Certificate

UNIT #	VIN #	ENGINE #	YEAR	MAKE/MODEL	COLOR	Interior	ENG/TRANS
A027	RDYK3D329CR020027	B2636723	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A028	RDYK3D3271CR020025	B2636728	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A029	RDYK3D3273CR020026	B2636726	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A030	RDYK3D325CR020027	B2636901	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A031	RDYK3D327CR020028	B2636739	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A032	RDYK3D329CR020029	B2636725	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A033	RDYK3D325CR020030	B2636723	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A034	RDYK3D327CR020031	B2636733	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A035	RDYK3D329CR020032	B2636878	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A036	RDYK3D326CR030033	B2636716	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A037	RDYK3D328CR030034	B2636719	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A038	RDYK3D32XCR030035	B2636660	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A039	RDYK3D321CR030036	B2636727	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A040	RDYK3D323CR030037	B2636734	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A041	RDYK3D325CR030038	B2636709	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A042	RDYK3D327CR030039	B2636717	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A043	RDYK3D323CR030040	B2636661	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A044	RDYK3D325CR030041	B2636710	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A045	RDYK3D327CR030042	B2636736	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A046	RDYK3D324CR040043	B2636902	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A047	RDYK3D326CR040044	B2636742	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A048	RDYK3D328CR040045	B2636735	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A049	RDYK3D32XCR040046	B2636741	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A050	RDYK3D321CR040047	B2636708	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A051	RDYK3D323CR040048	B2636740	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A052	RDYK3D325CR040049	B2636724	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A053	RDYK3D321CR040050	B2636738	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A054	RDYK3D323CR040051	B2636899	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual
A055	RDYK3D325CR040052	B2636714	2012	Kamaz Typhoon GS300	Beige	Grey & Black Rubber	11.8L Diesel/Manual

Vehicle Type: Armored Personnel CarrierDestination: United Arab Emirates

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Received Time Sep. 15, 2014 4:15AM No. 9962

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مجلس دبي وزارة العدل (المعتمد رقم 2011)  
Accredited by Ministry of Justice (Reg. No. 250)  
مجلس دبي - الإنجليزي - عربي  
Dubai - English - Arabic

**الأوائل للترجمة القانونية**  
**AL AWAEEL LEGAL TRANSLATION**

ترجمة شهادة مستخدم باللغة الإنجليزية  
Arabic translation of End-User Cert. issued in English

كمار المتداول للفونداال شريف بيلسم م.م

1. طبقاً للتوائح المعمول بها في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة والتي تنص على أن منح رخصة مستخدم فردية خاصة فتوقف على تقديم شهادة للمستخدم النهائي ، بموجب هذا لشهد بشأن البضاعة موردة من قبل :

أ. اسم البائع : إرمورد بروكتشن كاريس م.م ج  
ب. عنوان البائع : ص.ب. 54513 المنطقة الحرة رأس الخيمة ١٠ ع.م  
ج. بلد الإنتاج / البضاعة : الإمارات العربية المتحدة  
د. وصف البضاعة : حسب المرفق  
هـ. الكمية واللون : حسب المرفق  
و. القيمة : حسب المرفق

2. من المقرر أن البضاعة يتم استخدامها بدولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة

3. من المقرر أن :  
أ. يتم استخدام الأصناف بصفة حصرية  
ب. من قبل كمار المتداول للفونداال شريف بيلسم م.م ج

4. بهذا أتعهد بأن المركبات المشمولة بالبيان المرفق ( كمار شيفون جي إس 300 ) يتم شراؤها من إرمورد بروكتشن كاريس م.م ج ، للاستخدام الحصري من قبل كمار المتداول للفونداال شريف بيلسم م.م ج ، بالتواريخ والأنظمة المتبعة في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة دون مسؤولية أو التزام على إرمورد بروكتشن كاريس م.م ج ، إن وجدت سواء داخل أو خارج دولة الإمارات.

أ. صلاحية هذا الترجمة  
11-7-2012

المكان : رأس الخيمة ، ا.ع.م.  
التاريخ : 2012/07/10

( يوجد توقيع وختم كمار المتداول للفونداال شريف بيلسم م.م ج )

الكتيب العدل : لولاء ناصر المهيري  
Notary Public - Laila Amer Al-Mehiri

7. The legal translation has been made and sworn by the Ministry of Justice, so that the certified translation is correct to the best of the translator's belief.

أشهد أن الترجمة القانونية المرفقة والمصدق من قبل وزارة العدل بأن الترجمة مترجمة صحيحة حسب الحقائق ما أوثقت من علم واعتقاد

Tel: 07-2332168 Fax: 07-2332160 Mob: 050-3721160 P.O.Box: 31757 - Ras Al Khaimah - U.A.E.  
Received Time: Sep. 15, 2014 4:15AM No. 9962  
E-mail: alawaeel\_translation@hotmail.com

## Annex 16

### Case study - Hacking Team S.r.l.

#### Summary of communication process between the Panel and Hacking Team S.r.l.

The Panel made initial requests to Hacking Team S.r.l. for information<sup>1</sup> about the supply of this intrusion software to the Government of Sudan, but the company ignored these requests. The Panel then requested the cooperation of the Permanent Mission of Italy in obtaining information from the company.<sup>2</sup> The Hacking Team S.r.l. initial response to this Panel enquiry, contained within a letter from the Permanent Mission of Italy,<sup>3</sup> was that the company did not consider the RCS system to be a weapon, and that there were no dual use regulations for the supply of such a system in place until the entry into force of EU Regulation 1382/2014<sup>4</sup> on 31 December 2014. Their rationale being that the RCS system only then fell under the category of “*intrusion software*” within the new Regulation.<sup>5</sup> Hacking Team S.r.l. also categorically stated “*that there are currently no business relationships or agreements of any kind that would allow the Sudan or any other entity within its territory to use the Remote Control System software*”.

Notwithstanding the position of Hacking Team S.r.l. that it was the entry into force of EU Regulation 1382/2014 that placed their RCS software into the category of dual-use controlled items, the Panel notes that Article 2 (1) to the predecessor EU Regulation 428/2009<sup>6</sup> also clearly states that “*dual-use items shall mean, items, including software and technology, which can be used for both civil and military purposes ...*”.

Hacking Team S.r.l. were almost certainly aware of the extant EU legislation surrounding the export of, and support to, the RCS software to Sudan between 2012 and 2014.

The Panel requested further clarification<sup>7</sup> from Hacking Team S.r.l., through the auspices of the Permanent Mission of Italy, as to “*any previous business relationships or agreements in terms of the use of this technology in the Sudan that may have elapsed or expired*”. The response of Hacking Team S.r.l.<sup>8</sup> was disingenuous in that it ignored the specific Panel question about business arrangements prior to 31 December 2014 and repeated its position that “*it does not have any business relations with the Sudan*”. The Panel therefore twice<sup>9</sup> repeated its request for this specific information, but received no response.

<sup>1</sup> Panel letters to Hacking Team S.r.l. of 4 June 2014 and 5 August 2014.

<sup>2</sup> Panel letters to the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations of 16 September 2014 and 23 December 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Permanent Mission of Italy letter to the Panel of 16 January 2015.

<sup>4</sup> EU Council Regulation 1382/2014 of 22 October 2014 amending Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfers, brokering and transit of dual-use goods. Entered into force on 31 December 2014.

<sup>5</sup> Category 4.D.004. “*Software*” specially designed or modified for the generation, operation or delivery of, or communication with, “*intrusion software*”.

<sup>6</sup> EU Council Regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfers, brokering and transit of dual-use goods.

<sup>7</sup> Panel letter to the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations of 23 January 2015.

<sup>8</sup> Permanent Mission of Italy letter to the Panel of 13 March 2015.

<sup>9</sup> Panel letters to the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations of 18 March and 14 May 2015.



During the weekend of 4/5 July 2015 the Hacking Team S.r.l. computer system was itself hacked, and information relating to the sale of the RCS software to Sudan, and maintenance support for the system, became available in the public domain.<sup>10</sup> This included:

(a) An invoice (116/12) dated 5 September 2012 from Hacking Team S.r.l. to NISS for the second payment of US\$ 480,000 for the RCS software;<sup>11</sup>

(b) An extract from a client list that stated that as at 31 December 2014 the NISS RCS software “*was not officially supported*”;<sup>12</sup>

(c) An EXCEL spreadsheet<sup>13</sup> listing all clients, contract values and maintenance costs as at 31 December 2014. For Sudan this showed client revenue from NISS for US\$ 960,000 and a 2014 maintenance contract for US\$ 76,000. It also contained the number “240” under a column labelled “*Total#Targets*”;

(d) An EXCEL spreadsheet<sup>14</sup> listing all clients, contract values and maintenance costs as at 03 June 2015. For Sudan this showed the 2014 data, and the word “*YES*” under a column labelled “*Exploit*”; and

(e) A number of internal company E Mails discussing the Panel’s investigation and how they should respond.

The Panel sent a further request<sup>15</sup> for confirmation of elements of the information that had been placed in the public domain and received a response<sup>16</sup> on 14 August 2015. This stated: 1) that “*business relations before 31 December 2014 were conducted according to regular free trade*”; 2) “*the goods produced and marketed by HT were, in effect, not found to fall in the category of “weapons”, nor were they considered to be subject to the sanctions regime imposed by the United Nations on the Sudan under UNSCR 1591 (2005)*”; and 3) “*on the basis of the technical data received, no exact answer can be given to the questions asked by the Panel of Experts regarding possible business relations between HT and the national Intelligence Service of Sudan (NISS), or on the authenticity of the company’s recently published invoices*”. This response again failed to provide the specific information that the Panel had requested.

The Panel notes that the use of intrusion software systems such as the Galileo RCS system for intelligence gathering is not prohibited under international humanitarian law. Although there is, as yet, no international treaty covering cyber operations, best guidance is contained within the ‘Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare’,<sup>17</sup> which was developed by a group of independent experts acting in their personal capacity. Rule 66(a) of the Tallinn Manual states that “*Cyber espionage and other forms of information gathering directed at an*

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/>. Note that the information relating to Sudan was just one small piece of the overall data released.

<sup>11</sup> Appendix 1.

<sup>12</sup> Appendix 2.

<sup>13</sup> Available for inspection from the Panel archives.

<sup>14</sup> Available for inspection from the Panel archives.

<sup>15</sup> Panel letter to the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations of 15 July 2015.

<sup>16</sup> Permanent Mission of Italy letter to the Panel of 14 August 2015.

<sup>17</sup> <https://ccdcoe.org/research.html>.

*adversary during an armed conflict do not violate the law of armed conflict*". The system has no cyber attack capability.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Defined as "any action taken to undermine the functions of a computer network for a political or national security purpose" in The Law of Cyber Attack, Hathaway O.A et al, California Law Review 2012. <http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cglc/LawOfCyberAttack.pdf>.

## Appendix 1 to Annex 16 Hacking Team S.r.l. Invoice to NISS

### HT S.r.l.

Sede legale e operativa: Via della Moscova, 13 – 20121 Milano – Tel: +39.02.29.06.06.03  
e-mail: [info@hackingteam.it](mailto:info@hackingteam.it) – web: <http://www.hackingteam.it> – Fax: +39.02.63118946  
P.IVA: 03924730967 – Capitale Sociale: € 223.572,00 i.v.  
N° Reg. Imprese / CF 03924730967 – N° R.E.A. 1712545

NISS - National Intelligence and Security Services  
Arkweet 61/354  
Abaed Khatim St.  
Kartoum  
Sudan

Registration number 352/07

Milan, September 5th, 2012

Invoice no. 116/2012  
Ref. Our Offer no. 20120601.088-1.MM  
Ref. Contract signed on June 29th, 2012

Remote Control System - Second payment 50%	480,000.00
--	------------

<b>Total Amount</b>	<b>480,000.00</b>
---------------------	-------------------

VAT does not apply in accordance with Italian Presidential Decree 633/72, art. 7

Terms of payment:  
15 days invoice date

By wire bank transfer to:  
HT S.r.l. - Deutsche Bank via S. Prospero 2, 20121 Milan, Italy IBAN IT50P0310401600000000825132 BIC/  
SWIFT Code: DEUTITMM


## Appendix 2 to Annex 16

### Hacking Team S.r.l. Invoice Client List Extract

1.	PMR	Poland	President Security Office	2/31/2014	Expired
2.	KVANT	Russia	Intelligence Kvant Research	11/30/2014	Not officially supported
3.	GIP	Saudi Arabia	General Intelligence Presidency	12/31/2015	Active
4.	MOD	Saudi Arabia	Minister of Defence	7/15/2015	Active
5.	TCC-GID	Saudi Arabia	General Intelligence Directorate	6/1/2015	Active
6.	IDA-PROD	Singapore	Infocomm Development Agency	2/28/2015	Active
7.	SKA	South Korea	The Army South Korea	12/31/2014	Active
8.	NISS-01	Sudan	National Intelligence Security Service	12/31/2014	Not officially supported
9.	THDOC	Thailand	Thai Police - Dep. Of Correction	7/31/2014	Expired
10.	ATI	Tunisia	Tunisia (demo)	7/3/2011	Expired

## Annex 17

### Map of JEM training or logistic bases in South Sudan (2014-2015)



## Annex 18

Summary of reported<sup>1</sup> air attacks in Darfur (01 January-30 September 2015)<sup>2 3</sup>

Date	Location	Sector	Attack Type				Aircraft Type				Ordnance Type	“Target”	Casualties	
			A/C Bomb	AGM <sup>4</sup>	IM <sup>5</sup>	NK <sup>6</sup>	Mi-24	Su-25	Antonov	NK			Fatal	Injured
07 Jan	Abu Leha	North				6				X		Village <sup>7</sup>	NK	NK
22 Jan	Katur	North				X				X		Village	NK	NK
22 Jan	Dubo El Madrasa	North				X				X		Village	NK	NK
22 Jan	Barara	North				X				X		Village	NK	NK
22 Jan	Wadi Lei Gina	North				X				X		Village	NK	NK
22 Jan	Usajanga	North				X				X		Village	NK	NK
24 Jan	Golo	Central				X			X			Village	NK	NK
24 Jan	Fanga	North				X			X			Village	NK	NK
26 Jan	Arra	Central				X				X		Village	NK	NK
26 Jan	Kirro	Central				X				X		Village	NK	NK
26 Jan	Koron	Central				X				X		Village	NK	NK
26 Jan	Bar Arie	Central				X				X		Village	NK	NK
26 Jan	Tala	Central				X				X		Village	NK	NK
26 Jan	Noni	Central				X				X		Village	NK	NK
26 Jan	Dorsa	Central				X				X		Village	NK	NK
01 Feb	Sarrong	Central				X				X		Village	1	0
01 Feb	Killing	Central				X				X		Village	0	0
04 Feb	Tima	North				X				X		Village	NK	NK
15 Feb	Sorenq	Central				9			X			Village	1	0
19 Feb	Sorenq	Central				X			X			Village	2	0
21 Feb	Tora	Central				X				X		Village	2	0

<sup>1</sup> These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity. The data does not necessarily include un-reported incidents of armed violence, but does indicate the magnitude of the issue.

<sup>2</sup> P = Perpetrator. X = Target. NK = Not Known. TBC = To Be Confirmed.

<sup>3</sup> The dashed lines on this, and all subsequent, tables indicate the commencement of the mandate period or end of reporting quarters.

<sup>4</sup> Air to Ground Missile or Rocket. (e.g. S-8).

<sup>5</sup> Improvised Munition.

<sup>6</sup> Not Known.

<sup>7</sup> The term “village” does not necessarily preclude the fact that a non-signatory armed group may have been present in the village.

Date	Location	Sector	Attack Type				Aircraft Type				Ordnance Type	“Target”	Casualties	
			A/C Bomb	AGM <sup>4</sup>	IM <sup>5</sup>	NK <sup>6</sup>	Mi-24	Su-25	Antonov	NK			Fatal	Injured
02 Mar	Abu Zerega	North				X			X			Village	0	0
22 Mar	Debbat Naira	Central				4			X			Village	0	0
01 Apr	Rowata, Saraf Omra	North				10				X		Village	14	18
02 Apr	Rofita, Rokoro	Central				19				X		Village	5	0
06 Apr	Near Rofita, Rokoro	Central				5				X		Village	NK	NK
15 Apr	Fanga	North				NK			X			Village	0	0
25 Apr	El Tomat	South				2				X		Village	17	18
06 May	North of Fanga	North				8				X		Village	2	0
07 May	Kaguro	North				3				X		Village	0	0
13 May	Um Sidir	North				13				X		Village	1	0
21 May	Arshin and Menyo	North				NK				X		Village	16	90
24 May	North of Fanga	North				NK				X		Village	3	0
26 May	Near Kakego	North				12			X			Village	7	NK
28 May	North of Fanga	North				NK				X		Village	2	0
07 Jun	Burgo and Targe	North				NK				X		Village	NK	NK
08 Jun	Savanga	North				X				X		SLA/AW	NK	NK
09 Jun	Tabra	North			7				X			Villages	0	0
11 Jun	Solo and Dalo	North			16				X			Villages	3	0
17 Jun	Dar el Aman, Kara and Solo	North				X				X		Villages	NK	NK
20 Jun	Ruvata	North				X				X		SLA/AW	1	4
23 Jun	Ruvata	North			9				X			Villages	1	0
27 Jun	Fanga	North			7				X			Village	0	0
17 Sep	Fanga	North				12			X			Village	2	0

## Annex 19

Summary of SAirF military aviation assets (historical and new violations in Darfur)  
(01 January-30 September 2015)

Aircraft Type	Tactical Number	Delivered to SAirF <sup>1</sup>	Positively Identified in Khartoum	Positively Identified in Darfur	Panel Violation Reference	Operational in Darfur 2015	Remarks
A-5 <i>Fantan</i> <sup>2</sup>	402	Before 2005		March 2007	2007 Report		▪ Based at Nyala FOB.
	403	Before 2005		March 2007	2007 Report		▪ Based at Nyala FOB.
	407	Before 2005		2008	2008 Report		▪ Based at Nyala FOB.
	410	Before 2005		March 2007	2007 Report		▪ Based at Nyala FOB.
	482	Before 2005		2008	2008 Report		▪ Based at Nyala FOB.
Su-25 <sup>3</sup>	201	2008		2010	2010 Report		▪ Returned to El Fasher in Dec2013.
	203	2008		2009	2009 Report		▪
	204	2008		2009	2009 Report		▪ <b>Certainly</b> written-off; being cannibalized at El Fahser
	205 <sup>4</sup>	2008		December 2011	2014 Report		▪ Observed in 2011, but never reported.
							▪ In El Fasher in May 2014.
	206	2008		2009	2009 Report		▪
	207	2008		2010	2010 Report		▪ In El Fasher in May, Sep and Oct 2014.
	208	2008		2013	2010 Report		▪ <b>Most likely</b> misreported as TN 209 by the Panel in 2010; In El Fasher in May, Sep and Oct 2014.
	(209)	-		2010	2010 Report		▪ Not delivered by Member State.

<sup>1</sup> For Su-25. Data from ae Permanent Mission of Belarus to the United Nations Letter to the Panel of Experts dated 13 August 2010.

<sup>2</sup> Official name: Nanchang Q-5; *Fantan* is a reporting name.

<sup>3</sup> Su-25 Fighter Ground Attack (FGA) Aircraft; Aircraft marked with Tactical Numbers 201 – 214 are of the first generation single seat version; NATO reporting name *Frogfoot-A*. All Sukhoi Su-25 aircraft in service with the SAirF are marked with a Tactical Number in the 200-series. The last known TN delivered to Sudan is 217.

<sup>4</sup> Use of bold type indicates aircraft seen by the Panel in 2014.



Aircraft Type	Tactical Number	Delivered to SAirF <sup>1</sup>	Positively Identified in Khartoum	Positively Identified in Darfur	Panel Violation Reference	Operational in Darfur 2015	Remarks
	210	2008		2010	2010 Report		▪ In El Fasher in Oct 2014.
	211	2009		2010	2010 Report		▪ El Fasher (May 2013), Nyala (Jun 2013). ▪ Still in Darfur in Sep2013.
	212	2009		2010	2010 Report		▪ <b>Certainly</b> written-off; being cannibalized at El Fasher.
	214	2009		December 2011	2013 Report		▪ <b>Almost certainly</b> in El Fasher until May 2014.
Su-25UB <sup>5</sup>	215	2008		2012	2012 Report		▪ <b>Probably</b> based at Wadi Sayyidna
Mi-17/Mi-171Sh <sup>6</sup>	525			July 2009	2009 Report		▪ Mi-17; No further details available.
	527			July 2009	2009 Report		▪ No further details available.
	528			2007	2007 Report		▪ Mi-171Sh; Two-tone colour scheme (c/s) (light olive/dark green).
	529			2008	2008 Report		▪ Mi-17V-5.
	533			2007	2007 Report		▪ Mi-17V-5; Two-tone c/s (light olive/dark green).
	534			2007	2007 Report		▪ Mi-17; Two-tone c/s (khaki/dark olive); observed with external hard points mounted.
	537			2010	2010 Report	YES	▪ Mi-17; Also at Nyala in Jun 2015 with new two-tone c/s (sand/dark green); observed without external hard points mounted.
	543			2014	TBC		▪ Mi-171Sh; three tone c/s (sand/dark olive/brown); in Nyala in May 2014.

<sup>5</sup> Training version of Su-25 Ground Attack Aircraft, able to carry armament; Aircraft marked with TN 215 – 217 are of the first generation dual seat version; NATO reporting name *Frogfoot-B*.

<sup>6</sup> Transport Helicopter of which Attack Helicopter versions exist with 2x2 or 2x3 external hard points and a machine gun attached in the nose; All Mi-17 and Mi-171 types are derivatives of the Mil Mi-8 helicopter; Many versions are around, and SAirF has various types in service; A more recent development includes: a little nose, large loading ramp in the back and enlarged sliding doors on either sides of the fuselage. NATO reporting name is *Hip*, followed by a suffix letter to indicate the exact subversion (like *Hip-A* or *Hip-H*). All Mi-8/Mi-17/Mi-171Sh helicopters in SAirF service are marked with a TN in the 500-series.

Aircraft Type	Tactical Number	Delivered to SAirF <sup>1</sup>	Positively Identified in Khartoum	Positively Identified in Darfur	Panel Violation Reference	Operational in Darfur 2015	Remarks
	544			2014	TBC		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-171Sh; three tone c/s (sand/dark olive/brown); in El Fasher in Sep 2014</li> </ul>
	546			2013	TBC		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-171Sh; three tone c/s (sand/dark olive/brown); in Nyala in May 2014 and in El Fasher in Oct 2014</li> </ul>
Mi-24P/Mi-24V <sup>7</sup>	913			2006	2006 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24P; Two-tone c/s (light olive/dark green).</li> <li>▪ No details available.</li> </ul>
	916			July 2009	2009 Report		
	918			2006	2006 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24V; Light olive/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	922			2006	2006 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24V; No details available.</li> </ul>
	923			August 2009	2009 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24P; Light olive/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	925			August 2009	2009 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24V; Light olive/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	926			August 2009	2009 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24V; No further details available.</li> </ul>
	928			2010	2010 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24V; Light olive/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	929			July 2009	2009 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24P; Light olive/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	933			2010	2010 Report	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24V; Light olive/dark green c/s; in Nyala in Oct 2015.</li> </ul>
	937			July 2009	2009 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24P; Light olive/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	938			2010	2010 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24V; Light olive/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	939			July 2009	2009 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24V; Light olive/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	941			July 2009	2009 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24P; Light olive/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>

<sup>7</sup> Attack Helicopter, which can carry up to 8 troops. More recent versions are designated as 'Mi-25' et 'Mi-35'; The SAirF employs two versions: Mi-24P with a fixed double barrel machine gun at the starboard side of the cockpit and the Mi-24V with a flexible four-barrel gun attached under the nose; the Mi-24V in Sudanese service is also designated as 'Mi-35'; NATO reporting name is *Hind*; The Mi-24P is indicated as *Hind-F* and the Mi-24V (Mi-35) as *Hind-E*. All Mi-24 helicopters in SAirF service are marked with a TN in the 900-series; the last known TN delivered is 960.

Aircraft Type	Tactical Number	Delivered to SAirF <sup>1</sup>	Positively Identified in Khartoum	Positively Identified in Darfur	Panel Violation Reference	Operational in Darfur 2015	Remarks
An-26 <sup>8 9</sup>	942	NK		July 2009	2009 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Light olive/dark green c/s.</li> <li>▪ Crashed in April 2011.</li> </ul>
	943			July 2009	2009 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-35; Light olive/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	945			July 2009	2009 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-35; Khaki/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	946			July 2009	2009 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-35; Khaki/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	947			July 2009	2009 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24P; No details available.</li> </ul>
	948			2010	2010 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-35; Light olive/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	950			2012	2012 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-35; Khaki/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	951			2012	2012 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24P; Khaki/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	952			2012	2012 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-35; Khaki/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	955			May 2013	2013 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-35; Khaki/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	956			August 2013	2013 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24P; Khaki/dark green c/s.</li> </ul>
	965			Sep, Oct 2015	2015 Report	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24P; Sand/olive c/s; based at Nyala FOB.</li> </ul>
	966			Sep, Oct 2015	2015 Report	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mi-24P; Sand/olive c/s; based at Nyala FOB.</li> </ul>
	7705			August 2006	2006 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Marked (UN-) 26563. All white colour scheme, no further markings; also observed in 2007 and 2008 by the Panel.</li> </ul>

<sup>8</sup> Transport Aircraft, with the SAirF also in use as Reconnaissance/Observation Aircraft; NATO reporting name *Curl*; All An-26 and related An-30 and An-32 aircraft in SAirF service are normally marked with a TN in the 7700-series.

<sup>9</sup> The use of these aircraft is only a violation of the arms embargo if used in an offensive aerial bombing role. The Panel is investigating.

Aircraft Type	Tactical Number	Delivered to SAirF <sup>1</sup>	Positively Identified in Khartoum	Positively Identified in Darfur	Panel Violation Reference	Operational in Darfur 2015	Remarks
	7706	Under Investigation		August 2013	2013 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initially 'registered' ST-ZZZ (2) (2006-2007); MSN 10404; white fuselage with red/white/red line along fuselage; In El Fasher in Sep 2014.</li> </ul>
	7715	Nov 2009		May 2014	2014 Report	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>White fuselage with red/white/red line along fuselage; observed in Darfur in 2011; also in El Fasher in May, Oct 2014 and Sep, Oct 2015.</li> </ul>
	7717	Jan 2010		July 2013	2013 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>White/grey colour scheme; in Darfur in 2014 on supply flights.</li> </ul>
	7718			September 2013	2013 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All white colour scheme, no nationality markings except TN; only supply flights</li> </ul>
	7719	Under Investigation		June 2015	2013 Report	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All white colour scheme, no nationality markings; in Darfur in 2013, 2014 on supply flights; based at El Fasher FOB in Jun 2015.</li> </ul>
	7777			2008	2008 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All white colour scheme, no markings except TN.</li> </ul>
	ST-ZZZ (1)			August 2006	2006 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All white colour scheme, no markings except (fake) registration; MSN 10407; crash-landed at El Fasher on 07 Aug 2006. Hull seen until May 2014, but in Jun or Jul 2014 removed.</li> </ul>

Aircraft Type	Tactical Number	Delivered to SAirF <sup>1</sup>	Positively Identified in Khartoum	Positively Identified in Darfur	Panel Violation Reference	Operational in Darfur 2015	Remarks
	ST-ZZZ (2)			2007	2007 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ All white colour scheme, no markings except (fake) registration; MSN 10404; Became 7706 during 2007 or 2008.</li> </ul>
	ST-ZZZ (3)		2007		2007 Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ No markings, no further details available.</li> </ul>
An-32 <sup>10</sup>	7710/ ST-ALM			September 2014	TBC	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Double marked with military TN and civil registration.</li> </ul>
	7720			May 2014	2014 Report	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Observed in Darfur by the Panel in May 2014 fitted with BDZ-34 external hard-points.<sup>11</sup></li> </ul>
	7721			May 2014	TBC	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ White fuselage with blue port engine cowling.</li> </ul>
MiG-29SEh	6** TBC			April 2015	2015 Report	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Present in Nyala throughout Apr 2015.</li> </ul>
	6** TBC			April 2015	2015 Report	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Present in Nyala throughout Apr 2015.</li> </ul>

<sup>10</sup> The use of these aircraft is only a violation of the arms embargo if used in an offensive aerial bombing role. The Panel continues its investigation.

<sup>11</sup> Refer to S/2014/87, para. 116.

## **Annex 20**

### **Images of Sudanese military and military-ruled aircraft (source: Panel of Experts)**

Figure 1

**Antonov An-26 with tactical number 7715 observed in Darfur in 2015 in the light bomber role**



Figure 2

**Antonov An-26 with tactical number 7719 observed in Darfur in 2015 in the light bomber role**



Figure 3

**Antonov An-12 ST-KNT and tactical number 9988, used for SAF supply flights to El Geniena in October 2015**



Figure 4

**Ilyushin Il-76TD with markings removed (top) and the same Il-76TD with registration ST-APS and logo and titles of Kush Aviation**




Figure 5

**Ilyushin Il-76TD with markings removed (top) and the same Il-76TD with registration ST-AZZ**




Figure 6

**Unmarked Antonov An-12 that flew to Nyala in the first half of 2015**






Figure 7

**Antonov An-74 with registration ST-BDT that flew to Darfur throughout 2015**



Figure 8

**Antonov An-74 with registration ST-GFF that flew to Darfur throughout 2015**



Figure 9

**Ilyushin Il-76TD with registration ST-EWX that flew to Darfur throughout 2015**



Figure 10

**MiG-29 aircraft and air delivered ordnance at Nyala FOB (4, 12, 16, 23 and 26 April 2015)<sup>1,2</sup>**



Figure 11

**Mi-24P with tactical number 965 as observed at Nyala FOB in October 2015**



Figure 12

**Mi-24P with tactical number 966 as observed at Nyala FOB in October 2015**



<sup>1</sup> In the white squares, from left to right: two MiG-29 combat aircraft at Nyala FOB on 4, 12, 16, 23 and 26 April 2015. In the white ellipses: crates containing air delivered ordnance, photographed on 16, 23 and 26 April 2015.

<sup>2</sup> Google Earth.

Figure 13

**Mikoyan MiG-29SEh with similar camouflage pattern as present in Darfur in December 2011**



Figure 14

**Mi-17 multi-role helicopter with tactical number 537 sighted at Nyala FOB**



**Annex 21**  
**Antonov aircraft life extension documentation**

Documentation relating to the life extension and delivery of Antonov aircraft from Asterias Commercial S.A to Marble Engineering (Sudan) is contained in appendices 1 to 2.

**Appendix 1 to Annex 21**  
**Invoice 101004/S-01 from Asterias Commercial S.A. to Marble Engineering**

**ASTERIAS  
COMMERCIAL S.A.**

Ref.# 101004/S-01

Date 04 October 2010

**INVOICE**

To: Marble Engineering  
Khartoum, Sudan.

For: Payment according to the Agreement for the prolongation  
calendar life four aircraft An-26 # 14405.

40 000,00 usd

Total amount	40 000,00 USD
Forty thousand USD	

Beneficiary: Asterias Commercial S.A.  
Athens, Greece.

Commercial Director  
ASTERIAS COMMERCIAL S.A.  
Panama

**Appendix 2 to Annex 21**  
**Invoice 090427/S-01 from Asterias Commercial S.A. to Marble Engineering**

**ASTERIAS  
COMMERCIAL S.A.**

Ref.# 090427/S-01

Date 27 April 2009

**INVOICE**

To: Marble Engineering  
Khartum, Sudan.

For: Payment according to the Agreement #AST-081205/S-01  
dd 05/12/2008. For the aircraft An-12BK factory # 8345702.

1 400 000,00 \$

Total amount

1 400 000,00 USD

One million four hundred thousand USD-----

Beneficiary: Asterias Commercial S.A.  
Athens, Greece.

Commercial Director  
ASTERIAS COMMERCIAL S.A.  
Panama

**Annex 22**  
**Antonov An-26 supply documentation**

Documentation relating to the supply of Antonov An-26 aircraft from Asterias Commercial S.A to Sudan Master Technology is contained in appendices 1 to 2.

**Appendix 1 to Annex 22**  
**Contract documentation to contract 080218/S-01 - Asterias**  
**Commercial S.A. and SMT for An-26 with MSN 13307**

к Договору №AST-080218/S-01  
от 18 февраля 2008 г.

to the Agreement №AST-080218/S-01  
from February 18, 2008

**Transmission-reception Act**  
Премо-сдаточный акт

\* 10 \* 11 2009 city (Airport) Kiev  
город (аэропорт) Киев

Transmitting party Commercial Director, [redacted]  
Сдающая сторона (position, name and surname/должность, имя и фамилия)

Receiving party General Director, [redacted]  
Принимающая сторона (position, name and surname/должность, имя и фамилия)

Have concluded the present Act to confirm that based on  
составили настоящий акт посредством которого подтверждается, что на основании  
Agreement №AST-080218/S-01  
(decree, order of the sales contract or other document /  
приказа, распоряжения, договора о передаче или продаже, или другого документа)

dated " 18 " 02 2008 "Sudan Master Technology" Has  
от (receiving party / принимающая сторона) received,  
And «Asterias Commercial S.A.» Has  
в (transmitting party / передающая сторона) transmitted  
aircraft: An-26B  
воздушное судно  
Serial nr. 13307  
серийный №  
National and registration sign UR-CFZ  
Национальный и регистрационный знак  
Built 12.12.1983  
изготовленное

Flight hours: Нолет часов	From the beginning of operation: С момента начала эксплуатации	4041	hours	17	min
	After last Overhaul: после последнего ремонта	0	hours	0	min
Overhaul: Ремонт	Number of Overhaul: количество ремонтов	3			
	Date of last Overhaul: дата последнего ремонта	29.05.2009			



**Appendix 2 to Annex 22**  
**Contract documentation to contract 080218/S-02 — Asterias**  
**Commercial S.A. and SMT for An-26 with MSN 13405**

« Договору №AST-080218/S-02  
от 18 февраля 2008 г. » to the Agreement №AST-080218/S-02  
from February 18, 2008

**Transmission-reception Act**  
Пріємо-світловий акт

« 29 » 12 2009 city (Airport) Kiev  
город (аэропорт) Киев

Transmitting party Commercial Director, [redacted]  
Свідуща сторона (position, name and surname/должность, имя и фамилия)

Receiving party General Director, [redacted]  
Приймаюча сторона (position, name and surname/должность, имя и фамилия)

Have concluded the present Act to confirm that based on  
составили настоящий акт посредством которого подтверждается, что на основании  
Agreement №AST-080218/S-02  
(decree, order of the sales contract or other document /  
приказа, распоряжения, договора о передаче или продаже, или другого документа)

dated « 18 » 02 2008 "Sudan Master Technology" Has received,  
от (receiving party / принимающая сторона) пришло.

And « Asterias Commercial S.A. » Has  
« (transmitting party / передающая сторона) transmitted  
передано

aircraft An-26B  
воздушное судно

Serial nr. 13405  
серийный №

National and registration sign UR-CGA  
Национальный и регистрационный знак

Built 20.01.1984  
изготовлено

Flight hours: 3400 hours 42 min  
Налет часов С момента начала эксплуатации

After last Overhaul: 0 hours 0 min  
после последнего ремонта

Overhaul: 2  
Ремонт: количество ремонтов

Date of last Overhaul: 28.12.2009  
дата последнего ремонта

## **Annex 23**

### **Golo case study**

Between 24 to 27 January 2015, IHL violations were committed in Golo town and surrounding areas, including Bardani, both in Central Darfur. The perpetrators were almost certainly the RSF, armed groups of the region including those originating from Nertiti, Central Darfur, and highly probably Border Guards. (Hereinafter all three groups are called 'Combined Forces' to separate them from the regular SAF forces based in Golo).

On or around 23 January 2014, the SAF ground commander and intelligence personnel, based in Golo, gave advance warning to the civilians of Golo of impending Government operations against SLA/AW in the vicinity of Golo town. They requested that the civilians congregate in Golo town for their protection. Some civilians in the surrounding areas, including Bardani, moved into Golo town with their belongings, but others fled the area. Sources state that the Government request was made with the aim to either: (a) protect civilians; (b) use civilians as a human shield to protect the SAF base in the area from counter attack by SLA/AW; or (3) to ensure that all belongings are gathered in one place to assist in the looting.

In the morning of 24 January 2015, armed men on camels and horses, described as 'Arab militias', entered Golo followed by personnel and vehicles belonging to the RSF and Border Guards. Some sources stated that the men on animals immediately dispersed around the village, collected livestock and pillaged, while the armed personnel in vehicles drove towards the SAF military base and then moved towards Koron to engage in hostilities with SLA/AW elements. The armed personnel returned to Golo town at approximately 10.00 hours. Sources state that RSF suffered heavy losses in the battle.

There was almost certainly continuous pillage, harassments, assaults and sexual violence, committed by the combined forces during the day. At approximately 15.00 hours the SAF instructed that the civilians move towards Golo hospital for their own protection. The SAF cordoned off the hospital, and one military base close to the entrance of Golo town. Civilians, with their belongings, had sheltered in these locations in an attempt to safeguard themselves from the atrocities being committed by the combined forces. Yet, civilian belongings in these areas were also pillaged and people inside the hospital were allegedly subjected to sexual violence and assaults by the combined forces.

Towards the evening of 24 January 2015, one SAF soldier was certainly killed during a clash between himself and elements of the combined forces. Sources report that the SAF soldier was attempting to protect the civilian population when he was killed. Subsequently, the SAF at the military checkpoint requested that all civilians leave the checkpoint, citing the inability of SAF to protect them. It is highly probable that SAF escorted the civilians until they had left Golo town.

Of these, some fled to Bardani, where the next day (25 January 2015) about four men suffered sexual violence, highly probably committed by RSF elements. The men were gathered in a mosque when the RSF attacked the mosque. Some escaped, RSF captured others. Of those captured four men were taken to a nearby house and sexually violated. All were subsequently released.

Also, on or around 25 January 2015, SAF informed civilians still present inside the Golo hospital that they should only leave the hospital, under SAF protection. The SAF then escorted civilians to their homes to salvage whatever belongings they had left in their houses, yet despite this SAF protection, members of the combined forces still attacked them en route and pillaged their belongings. Others, who went without any SAF protection were also assaulted.

Over the next days, men from the combined forces entered the hospital and continued to pillage, assault, harass and sexually assault and rape women inside the hospital. Medical sources confirm that at least 8 rapes of women and girls occurred during those three days. It is not possible to quantify the total number of rapes, which is possibly higher.

On or around the 27 January 2015, SAF informed civilians inside the hospital that the SAF was no longer able to provide protection and that all civilians should leave Golo town for their own protection.

Committing pillage of civilian property, assaults and sexual violence against civilians violate the principles of IHL, as elaborated in annex 40. In the absence of effective measures to prevent these violations or, in the aftermath of the incident, failure to discipline those who violated IHL, may result in a command responsibility for those violations for the ground commanders of the RSF and Border Guards.

The Panel finds that:

- (a) It is almost certain that SLA/AW members in the region had close family links with the civilians in Golo, and it is highly probable that these families provided these groups with supplies;
- (b) It is almost certain that the SAF attempted to ensure the physical protection of civilians in Golo by: (i) congregating them in hospitals and providing protection at the Government military base; and (ii) providing escorts to their houses; and later (iii) highly probably by escorting them out of town;
- (c) It is almost certain that the RSF and armed groups, and highly probable that Border Guards, engaged in IHL violations both in Golo and Bardani, including sexual violence against women and men respectively;
- (d) It is almost certain that the armed groups and the RSF co-operated during the initial attack and that these armed groups operated with the consent, knowledge and authorisation of local RSF commanders in respect of this operation and effectively acted as auxiliary forces;
- (e) The Panel has no information on the Government's funding methods for these armed groups. Further information has been requested from the Government on the roles and responsibilities of these armed groups and the method of compensation; and
- (f) The Panel is almost certain that sexual violence occurred both in Golo and Bardani, including sexual violence against women and men respectively. The Panel is concerned that almost all victims have not received appropriate medical or psychosocial treatment following the sexual violence. In addition, for those displaced, there is actual or perceived intimidation on the victims and their communities against disclosure. This adversely impacts their ability to seek medical and psychosocial treatment. The social stigma surrounding the violations of men are

particularly high and thus act as an impediment for the affected men to seek, at minimum, community and peer support. Those displaced inside the Jebel Marra mountains following this attack reportedly do not have access to any medical treatment.

## **Annex 24**

### **Massala, Sambal and Hiller Hager case study**

On 01 January 2015 armed men in military and civilian attire, described as ‘Arabs’, entered Massala from the direction of Sambal. Armed men were in thirteen vehicles with others riding camels and horses. The armed men and vehicles surrounded the village and dispersed within the village. As they entered the village, one man leading his livestock, who crossed the path of the armed men, was called by name. When he refused to stop, approximately five armed men followed him to his house to allegedly assault him and to commit pillage. Meanwhile, other armed men also pillaged the property of residents, while the residents fled to nearby mountains. The men shortly commenced shooting in the air, in a manner that caused the straw roofs of residences to catch fire and the remaining residents to disperse. This pattern of pillage and burning was also reported in Sambal and Hillar Hager. The armed men allegedly rustled livestock, and pillaged or destroyed civilian food items and household property in these three villages. The armed men shot at and killed one person in Sambal. In Massala, an 80-year old man was burnt to death in his residence due to his inability to escape.

Some victims in Massala and Hillar Hager reported the presence of an identified ‘Arab’ ‘militia’ leader, Badr Abu Kinesh, in an identifiable vehicle and attired in military uniform. In Sambal, sources reported the same vehicle, but could not identify individuals. Abu Kinesh is highly probably a senior officer of the Border Guards, and was also certainly the North Darfur Commissioner for Peace and Security at the time of the incident. This was a civilian appointment made by Osman Kibir, the then Wali of North Darfur.<sup>1</sup>

It is certain that the General Prosecutor for Darfur Crimes and the El Fasher Police were made aware of the involvement of at least three individuals, (Badr Abu Kinesh, Musa Neina and Hadu), in these incidents. Musa Neina and Hadu are often associated with Badr Abu Kinesh, although it is unclear if they too hold official ranks within the Sudanese military. Badr Abu Kinesh has bases in Kutum, Korma and Tawilla localities.

The Panel continues to investigate.

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<sup>1</sup> It is possible that, despite the change of the Wali in North Darfur, Badr Abu Kinesh held the aforementioned post as recently as August 2015.

## **Annex 25**

### **Imagery of Rowata air attack on 1 April 2015**

Figure 1  
**Mass grave of victims at Rowata (1 April 2015)<sup>1</sup>**



Figure 2  
**Injuries to women and children at Rowata (1 April 2015)<sup>2</sup>**



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<sup>1</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



Figure 3  
**Crater at Rowata (1 April 2015)**<sup>3</sup>



Figure 4  
**Fragmentation from IADM used at Rowata (1 April 2015)**<sup>4</sup>



<sup>3</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

## Annex 26


### Analysis of Antonov An-26/IADM bombing technique

The Antonov An-26 is designed as a light tactical military transport aircraft that features a fuselage-wide ramp/door at the fuselage's aft that allows for loading and unloading of objects up to the size of a small jeep.

The aircraft is able to pivot the aft ramp around an axis, as a large door is connected to hinges. But the door also offers a second option to open the door: a sliding movement whereby the entire ramp/door is 'parked' underneath the fuselage of the aircraft. While using this second method, the whole aft of the aircraft is cleared and creates a large opening, almost as large as the aircraft's section.

Figure 1

#### Image of An-26 in IADM bombing role



The second option allows the aircraft to drop paratroopers, food rations, military supplies, and in the case of Sudan for the last 10 years, improvised air delivered munitions (IADM).

The An-26 also features a Perspex half-sphere on the port side just behind the flight deck and close to the navigator. This half-sphere allows for omni-directional views from the left hand side of the fuselage.

It is highly probable that the bomb aimer uses this half-sphere in the Antonovs as a means of target identification in support of ordnance delivery.

Yet, despite a good profile of the world beneath the aircraft, the entire bombing 'technique' applied by the Antonov bombers lacks any precision as:



(a) The bombs are of an IADM type, locally produced using rather simple production methods and almost certainly never properly ballistically or aerodynamically tested for accurate delivery from altitude;


(b) The IADM are loaded and released in a transverse orientation in the hold of the aircraft. This means that they will initially be ballistically unstable during their initial flight due to the vortices created by the aircraft's fuselage and ramp. It will take time for them to achieve ballistic stability during their free fall, hence adding to the inaccuracy;

(c) For non-terminally guided ordnance it is best practice to release into a headwind to reduce errors. In the case of the Antonov, with the ordnance being released from the back of the aircraft, the ordnance is initially affected by tailwind, hence further adding to inaccurate trajectories;

(d) The aircraft in Sudanese service were not primarily manufactured for the light bomber role and it is **possible** that it lacks the instruments and infrastructure necessary for precision bombing. This means that the release point for the ordnance is determined by the technical judgement of the bomb aimer, with the inherent potential for human error to impact on target accuracy.

## Annex 27

## Map showing locations of child soldiers and children associated with JEM



## Annex 28

### Sexual and Gender Based Violence

1. The Panel is aware of allegations of sexual violence committed in Tabit. Yet the environment in Sudan is not conducive to investigate sexual violations against women, particularly in Tabit, due to actual or perceived: (a) threats to and intimidation of women; (b) increased surveillance of women from Tabit; (c) restrictions their freedom of movement; (d) actual lack or limitations of psychosocial services; and (e) lack of witness and victim protections mechanisms on the ground. With this background, and given that the protection of sources is a priority for the Panel, the Panel is not in a position to confirm or deny these allegations. Based on preliminary investigations the Panel concludes there is a credible threat to the safety and security of victims, witnesses and the community.

2. The Panel concludes that sexual violence almost certainly occurred in Golo and Bardani. The perpetrators were identified as belonging to the RSF, Border Guards and their auxiliary forces. In the Golo case study at annex 23, the Panel also highlights specific obstacles encountered by persons who suffered sexual violence in Golo and Bardani.

3. The Panel concludes that there are serious allegations of sexual violence committed by RSF, their auxiliary forces and other armed groups both in the context of military operations and by members acting alone.<sup>1</sup> Yet, effective investigations and prosecutions into these individual violations are almost impossible, due to inter-alia, prevailing power disparities between the victims and perpetrators, and a lack of effective rule of law that contributes to the maintenance of impunity. The Panel finds that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons into Darfur directly contributes to sexual violence on the ground. Local law enforcement authorities are often unable to arrest perpetrators, even if identified, because the perpetrators are more heavily armed than local law enforcement.

4. While the Panel is not able to independently identify perpetrators, the Panel notes that it is the responsibility of the Government to investigate allegations, to bring perpetrators to justice and to take measures to avoid an environment conducive to committing sexual violence with impunity.

5. The Government's public response to allegations of sexual violence have been one of denial and intimidation. On 24 May 2015, the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women issued a statement after her 12-day visit to Sudan. On 25 May 2015, NISS confiscated ten newspapers and suspended four others indefinitely, due to publication of articles covering sexual harassment and rape on buses used by students.<sup>2</sup> The Government also arrested the activist, who raised the issue of child sexual violence at a forum and the organizer of the forum.<sup>3</sup> The activist later apologized saying that these newspapers truncated her remarks and that

<sup>1</sup> Sources include victims, witnesses and communities, published UN documents and confidential sources.

<sup>2</sup> Sudanese security confiscates print runs of 10 newspapers at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55093>, Sudanese security confiscates newspaper over child abuse issue at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55315>.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. It appears that some, if not all, of these the publications carried the statement of the Special Rapporteur in full.

she does not have statistics on sexual harassment cases directed at students.<sup>4</sup> On 11 June 2015, NISS allowed four papers to resume publication after obtaining a written apology for “*publishing what was described as stories that are harmful to the society’s security and values*”.<sup>5</sup> On 12 June 2015, NISS confiscated *Al-Youm Al-Tali* newspaper, allegedly due to the publication of an article in which police acknowledged exposure of children to sexual abuse.<sup>6</sup>

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
<sup>4</sup> Sudanese security reinstates four suspended newspapers after ‘apology’, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55312>.

<sup>5</sup> Sudanese security reinstates four suspended newspapers after ‘apology’ at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55312>.

<sup>6</sup> Sudanese security confiscates newspaper over child abuse issue at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55315>.

## Annex 29

### Map of artisanal gold and areas of influence of armed groups, Darfur, August 2015<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Source data from Panel.

## **Annex 30**

### **Information on Jebel Amir gold mine management**

1. On 14 June 2015, the Panel visited the local administration office in El Sireaf to inform that the Panel would be undertaking a visit to the Jebel Amir gold mines the next day. An official called Sheikh Musa Hilal who then approved the visit of the Panel to the Jebel Amir Mines.

2. The Jebel Amir mines area is a valley surrounded by mountains. Before entering the valley, the Panel convoy had to pass through a checkpoint, controlled by an armed person in a military style uniform with no insignia<sup>1</sup>. After driving one km from the checkpoint, the Panel reached the meeting place, where the Jebel Amir Gold Mines Management Council (JAGMMC) members had gathered. After the customary exchange of greetings with the council members, the Panel explained the purpose of the visit to the Deputy Chairman of the JAGMMC. The council members were disinclined to engage in any discussion, and asked the Panel to leave, expressing their attitude by saying that they do not allow any government personnel or UNAMID officials in the valley, unless they receive the agreement of Sheikh Musa Hilal, Chairman of JAGMMC. Council members were informed that Musa Hilal had agreed to the visit.

3. Council members informed the Panel that the council was formed after a peace agreement was brokered between Sheikh Musa Hilal and the Nazir of the Beni Hussein tribe in September 2014. This included participation from many tribes, though the majority of representatives were from Beni Hussein and Rezeigat tribes. A number of sub-committees, support the work of council.

4. The Panel established that the following are the main sub-committees operating in the Jebel Amir mining area:

(a) Administrative Sub-committee: Responsibilities include investigating all complaints and disputes in the area;

(b) Mines<sup>2</sup> Sub-committee: Responsibilities include the distribution of mines to prospectors;

(c) Planning Sub-committee: Responsibilities include the allocation of shops to gold merchants, who purchase the gold mined by miners;

(d) Security Sub-committee: Responsibilities include ensuring safety and security of people and their property; and

(e) Health Sub-Committee: Responsibilities include maintenance of health and hygiene.

5. The Panel established that the Jebel Amir area is a multicultural and multiethnic environment, where people from various nationalities, including Chad, Niger, Egypt and CAR, work. The administrative sub-committee does not differentiate on the basis of nationality, which has led to an influx of people from neighbouring countries, who work harmoniously in the gold mines. Around 70,000 workers<sup>3</sup> used to mine for gold in the area, but after a measles epidemic many

<sup>1</sup> A member of Security sub-committee of Jebel Amir Gold Mines Management Council.

<sup>2</sup> Mines are in the shape of rectangular well of 4m by 4 m size.

<sup>3</sup> This figure of 70,000 was also confirmed by a very highly placed source in the Government.

miners had left (temporarily) and approximately 45,000 remained who were working. The gold was discovered in April 2012 in Jebel Amir Mines, and that in 2012 more than 125,000 miners were working as it was easier to find gold at lesser depths then.

6. The Panel established that a court functions under the ambit of the council, and that this court resolves all legal and administrative issues. Individuals have a right of appeal to Sheikh Musa Hilal.

7. On being asked about the total number of mines in the area, both dormant and active, the mines sub-committee stated that the total must be around 20,000 but expressed their inability to give an estimate for active mines. After persistent questioning, they estimated the number of active mines to be 4,000-5,000. They also informed the Panel that there are a number of people, mainly Rezeigat, belonging to the Abbala militia, who do not approach the mines sub-committee and start mining without permission or payment of prescribed fees. Thus the mines sub-committee is unable to estimate active mines.<sup>4</sup> Such persons also pay no heed to the council rules and regulations. The reasons for not being in a position to make such people compliant, were not forthcoming. Mine sub-committee members were asked as to why the security sub-committee persons are not called for assistance in controlling the recalcitrants. Apparently there is a strong bond between the security sub-committee members and such persons as they are from the same clan.

8. The main task of the Security Sub-committee is to ensure the safety and security of people and their property. It has 256 members and the Jebel Amir area has been divided into eight sub-areas. The security sub-committee reports to Sheikh Musa Hilal directly.

9. The Panel also established that:

(a) A small piece of land is taken on lease/concession for exploration by a prospector from the tribal management council owning the land, for a one-time fee of 500 SDG;

(b) The prospector arranges for 12-16 mine workers to prospect the leased site;

(c) Many of the mine workers from foreign countries have prior experience in gold mining in other countries. These miners do not face any problems in crossing the extremely porous borders;

(d) Usually, 50% of the profit is retained by the mine prospector, and the remainder is distributed among the other mine workers;

(e) The workers dig wells (mines) until the gold-bearing stratum is reached;

(f) They carve horizontally so as to follow the gold veins; and rocks (hopefully bearing gold) are removed;

(g) The rocks are packed into sacks and manually hoisted to the surface;

(h) Fourteen workers can extract 10 x 50kg sacks of valuable rocks from a mine per day;

<sup>4</sup> On being asked about such mines, being operated by Abbala Militia, without following the norms of council, a rough estimate of 400 - 600 mines was provided by well sub-committee members.

(i) On an average, each sack yields 1-2g of gold, worth 300 to 320 SDG per g in the local gold market at Jebel Amir;

(j) There are also approximately 2,000 vendors, 2,200 shelters and 200 gold merchants in the area;

(k) Approximately 45,000 mine workers were reportedly working in the Jebel Amir gold mining area at the time of visit of Panel in June 2015;

(l) Around 350 crushing machines were present in the area, and that for each crushing machine, an area of 5m by 7m was allocated;

(m) An area of 2.5 m by 2.5 m was allocated for washing.

10. The Panel visited the mines, crushing machine and washing area to understand the various mining processes.

11. The Panel established that there is no requirement for the reporting of the gold produced by a prospector, or for a gold merchant to report on the quantity of gold purchased. JAGMMC members indicated that the gold yield from a mine is a private matter for the prospector.

12. The central Government has some local purchase agents, who are gold merchants in the Jebel Amir area, and they attempt to provide a rough estimate of the gold sold every day. Only this feedback is available to the Government, which uses it to develop a rough estimate of production. No Government officials were present in the Jebel Amir area.

13. The council members indicated their strong preference for the concept that industrial gold mining companies enter Jebel Amir to extract the gold in a safe, secure and efficient manner. They believe that industrialization of mining processes would minimize health hazards, result in a fuller realization of the gold, leading to better revenues for the tribes, and also lesser chances of the plundering of natural resources by unscrupulous elements, who ignore council regulations.

#### **A short note on exploitation history of Jebel Amir Mines**

14. It was April 2012, when gold was discovered in Jebel Amir. In late 2012, more than 125,000 miners were reported to be working in Jebel Amir, which was being administered by the Beni Hussein tribe, to whom the land had traditionally belonged to. They used to administer the mines in an organized manner.<sup>5</sup>

15. On 4 January 2013, fighting broke out between militia drawn from the Aballa, a collection of camel herding nomadic tribes, and the Beni Hussein, following a dispute over access to an artisanal gold mine in Jebel Amir. Two bouts of heavy inter-communal fighting between the Aballa and Beni Hussein militias in the Jebel Amir region, in early January and towards the end of February, resulted in hundreds of deaths and the displacement of an estimated 100,000 people<sup>6</sup>. Due to these clashes, persons displaced from more than ninety Beni Hussein villages are currently living in IDP camps in El Sireaf<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> Panel interviews with prospectors, miners, gold merchants, members from previous management council and Beni Hussein community.

<sup>6</sup> S/2013/225. Para 21-26.

<sup>7</sup> Panel interviews with Beni Hussein community, including its paramount chief.



16. After these clashes, Abbala militias mounted pressure on the Beni Hussein tribe to sign an agreement for shared exploitation of Jebel Amir Mines by closing down vital roads that supplied basic amenities and food items to El Sireaf, the main locality of the Beni Hussein. This caused severe food scarcity and prices of commodities like sugar went up by 3-4 times. The paramount chief of Beni Hussein succumbed to the pressure and signed the peace agreement with Northern Rezeigat Abbala tribes (working together under the aegis of Sheikh Musa Hilal), under duress, as he could not bear the suffering of his people anymore.<sup>8</sup> The current council, namely JAGMMC, came into existence after the signing of the said peace agreement.

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

## Annex 31

### Gold mining financial models data

1. In order to build a financial model, and thus arrive at an annual estimate of the potential revenues, the Panel has assigned values to the following variables, using the most pessimistic estimates obtained during the testimonies. The Panel is almost certain<sup>1</sup> of the accuracy of this data:

(a) Approximately 40,000 mine workers<sup>2</sup> were working in the Jebel Amir gold mining area at the time of the visit of the Panel in June 2015;

(b) On average, a group of 12 to 16 workers work in each mine, in shifts. The Panel has assumed 14 workers per mine for the model;

(c) At this staff level, 10 sacks of rocks are normally extracted from a mine in one day;

(d) On average each sack, weighing around 50 kg, yields 1-2 gram of gold. The Panel has assumed a conservative yield of 1 gram of gold per sack for the model;

(e) There are approximately 2,200 shelters and 200 gold merchants functioning in the Jebel Amir gold mining area;

(f) There are approximately 150 butchers in the mining area, and each butcher slaughters 2 or 3 sheep per day. The Panel has assumed 2 sheep per day for the model; and

(g) The gold merchants present in the area pay 300 to 320 SDG for one gram of mined gold. The Panel assumed 300 SDG per gram;

(h) As on 15 October 2015, the UAE gold price for 22 carat was US\$ 34.93 per gram, and local market price in Jebel Amir area was 29.70 US\$ per gram (300 SDG per gram, converted into US\$, at real exchange rate on the ground, i.e. 1 US\$ = 10.1 SDG). Thus, the margin per gram between UAE price and local price was US\$ 5.22 per gram, or US\$ 5,222 per kg.

2. Based on this data, tables 1, 2 and 3 estimate:

(a) Approximate gold output from Jebel Amir artisanal gold mines;

(b) Annual expenses for a mine prospector; and

(c) Net annual income for a mine prospector and a mine-worker.

<sup>1</sup> These figures were collected during Panel interviews with JAGMMC members, the mine prospectors, mine workers, gold merchants, and other persons, connected to the Jebel Amir gold mines.

<sup>2</sup> A highly placed Government source estimates the number to be 60,000, but the Panel opted for a conservative estimate.

Table 1  
Annual estimate of gold output from Jebel Amir artisanal gold mines

Approximate # workers	Operating mines <sup>3</sup>	Sacks mined per day per mines <sup>4</sup>	Total sacks mined/day	Total sacks mined/year <sup>5</sup>	Average gold yield/sack <sup>6</sup>	Total annual gold yield
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
40,000	2,857	10	28,570	857,1,000	1.0	8,571

3. The Panel collected estimates of gold production from Jebel Amir Mines from interviews with prospectors, merchants, and JAGMMC members. They estimated production at around 14,000 kg to 16,000 kg in 2012 in Jebel Amir. From this model, the gold production figure for 2012, when 125,000 persons worked for seven months<sup>7</sup>, equates to 15,624 kg. This is how the model was validated.

Table 2  
Quantitative summary of annual expenses for a mine prospector

Currency	Crushing and washing <sup>8</sup>	Labour <sup>9</sup>	Levy of SDG 5 per sack <sup>10</sup>	Surrender of one sack every alternate day <sup>11</sup>	Sundry expenses <sup>12</sup>	7% royalty <sup>13</sup>	Total annual expenses
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
SDG	180,000	52,000	15,000	45,000	150,000	63,000	505,000
US\$ <sup>14</sup>	29,557	8,539	2,463	7,389	24,631	10,345	82,923

<sup>3</sup> Assuming 14 workers per well [40,000 divided by 14 = 2857].

<sup>4</sup> On an average, from a mine with 14 workers, 10 sacks (potentially containing valuable gold bearing rocks) are taken out from the mine every day.

<sup>5</sup> Number of sacks mined per day from all operating mines = number of operating mines, multiplied by 10 sacks per mine = 2,857 x 10 = 28,570. Assuming 300 working days in a year, total number of sacks per year = 28,570 x 300 = 8,571,000 g = 8,571 kg.

<sup>6</sup> One sack normally weighs 50 kg. Thus the yield of gold is 0.002 %.

<sup>7</sup> Gold was discovered around April 2012 in Jebel Amir. Effectively prospectors worked w.e.f. June 2015, for seven months.

<sup>8</sup> Crushing expense per sack is 40 SDG, and washing expense per sack is 20 SDG; Daily expenses = 10 x (40+20) = 600 SDG. Annual expenses = 600 SDG x 300 = 180,000 SDG.

<sup>9</sup> Weekly labour expenses for 14 mine-workers is 1,000 SDG; Annual labour expenses would be equal to 52 x 1,000 SDG = 52,000 SDG.

<sup>10</sup> Daily levy = 5 SDG x 10 sack per day = 50 SDG; Annual Levy = 50SDG x 300 days a year = 15,000 SDG.

<sup>11</sup> Assuming the Monetary value of one sack equates to 300 SDG, which corresponds to 1g gold, average yield is 1 g per sack. Daily Levy = value of gold in half sack = 150 SDG; Annual Levy = 150SDG x 300 = 45,000 SDG.

<sup>12</sup> Panel interviews with gold prospectors.

<sup>13</sup> Total sacks mined by a prospector in one day is 10, and thus in one year 3000, assuming 300 days a year. 3000 sacks would give 3,000 g of gold after processing, valued at 3,000 g x 300 SDG/g = 900,000 SDG → 7 % of this is 63,000 SDG.

<sup>14</sup> 1 US\$ = 6.09 SDG (www.xe.com); 15 October 2015.

Table 3  
**Estimate of net annual income for a mine prospector and a mine worker**

<i>Currency</i>	<i>Gross annual income<sup>15</sup></i>	<i>Annual expenses<sup>16</sup></i>	<i>Net Income from operations</i>	<i>Net annual income (Prospector)<sup>17</sup></i>	<i>Net annual income<sup>18</sup> (Worker)</i>	<i>Net daily income (Worker)</i>
<i>(a)</i>	<i>(b)</i>	<i>(c)</i>	<i>(d)=(b)-(c)</i>	<i>(e)=(d)/2</i>	<i>(f)=(e)/14</i>	<i>(g)=(f)/300</i>
SDG	900,000	505,000	395,000	197,500	9,306	31
US\$	147,783	82,923	64,860	32,430	1,528	5.1

<sup>15</sup> See footnote 333.

<sup>16</sup> See column (h) above in table 2.

<sup>17</sup> Income from operations is shared 50-50 between the prospector and the group of mine-workers.

<sup>18</sup> Divide Column (e) figure by 14, as the group of workers has 14 workers.

## Annex 32

### Income streams of AAG

Table 1  
AAG income from direct prospecting of 400 mines (Jebel Amir)

<i>Ser</i>	<i>Net Operating Income</i>	<i>Annually<sup>1</sup></i> <i>(SDG)</i>	<i>Annually</i> <i>(US\$)</i>
1	Income from one well	257,500	42,280
2	Income from 400 wells	103,000,000	<b>16,912,970</b>

Table 2  
Smuggling expenses (US\$) (2 carriers with 15 kg of gold)

<i>Travel</i>	<i>Accommodation</i> <i>(2N/3D)</i>	<i>Sundry</i> <i>expenses</i> <i>[20% of gross</i> <i>margin<sup>2</sup>]</i>	<i>Pay of</i> <i>carriers</i>	<i>5% Loss to</i> <i>seizures<sup>3</sup></i>	<i>Total smuggling</i> <i>expenses per</i> <i>trip</i>	<i>Gold (kg)</i> <i>Smuggled per</i> <i>annum<sup>4</sup></i>	<i>Total smuggling</i> <i>expenses per</i> <i>annum<sup>5</sup></i>
700	400	15,670	1,000	22,280	40,050	3,630 <sup>6</sup>	<b>9,692,100</b>

Table 3  
AAG income from smuggling of gold (22 carat purity) out of Sudan

<i>Site price/g</i>	<i>UAE sale</i> <i>price/g</i>	<i>Gross</i> <i>margin/g</i>	<i>Gross</i> <i>margin/15 kg</i>	<i>Gold smuggled<sup>7</sup></i> <i>per annum</i>	<i>Trips</i> <i>required<sup>8</sup></i>	<i>Gross income</i> <i>per annum</i>	<i>Net income per annum</i> <i>(Gross – Expenses)</i>
<i>(US\$)</i>	<i>(US\$)</i>	<i>(US\$)</i>	<i>(US\$)</i>	<i>(kg)</i>		<i>(US\$)</i>	<i>(US\$)</i>
29.703 <sup>9</sup>	34.925 <sup>10</sup>	5.222	78,330	3,630	242	<b>18,955,860</b>	<b>9,263,760</b>

<sup>1</sup> Assuming 300 working days. This income is higher than that of prospector (refer table 3, annex 31), due to the fact that these persons, being part of AAG, do not have to pay levies to AAG (i.e. 5 SDG per sack and surrender of one sack every alternate day).

<sup>2</sup> Margin for one kg gold is 5,222 US\$, and thus for 15 kg = 78,330 US\$. 20% of this is 15,670 US\$.

<sup>3</sup> On average, one in every 20 consignments gets caught and confiscated, while being smuggled, either at the destination country or departing country. This risk has been monetized and made part of expenses for smuggling. Value of 15 kg gold at local market is 29.7 US\$ per gm x 15,000 gm = 445,544 US\$. 5% of this is 22,280 US\$.

<sup>4</sup> It is assumed that gold from the 400 wells being prospected by AAG members (1,200 kg), and 33% of the rest (0.33 x 8,571 -1,200) = 2,432 kg] gets smuggled out of Jebel Amir. The figure of 33% corresponds to the actual ratio of smuggled quantity to total quantity of gold exported (licit +illicit), over a five year period, i.e. 2010 - 2014.

<sup>5</sup> = (3630/15) x 40,050 = 9,692,100

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> = 3630/15 =242.

<sup>9</sup> Local on-site price of mined gold paid to prospector by the gold merchants, located in Jebel Amir mining area [300 SDG].

<sup>10</sup> International market price of gold in Dubai for 22 carat gold.[www.goldprice.org], as on 15 October 2015.

## Annex 33

### Analysis of gold trade data

Table 1

**Comparison of gold export data reported by Sudan; and gold import data from Sudan, reported by the UAE**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Exports from Sudan<sup>1</sup></i>	<i>Imports into UAE from Sudan<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>Difference (b)-(c)</i>	<i>Approx value of differential quantity in column (d)</i>	<i>Notional loss of export duty (@4%)</i>	<i>Notional loss of royalty (@7%)</i>
	<i>(kg)</i>	<i>(kg)</i>	<i>(kg)</i>	<i>US\$ M</i>	<i>US\$ M</i>	<i>US\$ M</i>
<i>(a)</i>	<i>(b)</i>	<i>(c)</i>	<i>(d)</i>	<i>(e)</i>	<i>(f)</i>	<i>(g)</i>
2010	26,317	42,122	15,805	626	25	44
2011	23,739	45,855	22,116	1121	45	78
2012	46,133	65,000 <sup>3</sup>	18,867	1018	41	71
2013	24,813	45,000 <sup>4</sup>	20,187	999	40	70
2014	30,455	50,365	19,910	814	33	57
Total	80,511	138,342	96,885	4579	183	321

Note: The figures in Column (d) represent apparent quantity of gold smuggled out of Sudan to the UAE.

<sup>1</sup> As per Foreign Trade Statistical Digest of Central Bank of Sudan (CBoS).

<http://www.cbos.gov.sd/en/node/478>.

<sup>2</sup> For commodity selection, HS code 7108 was selected.

<sup>3</sup> UN Comtrade data was not available for 2012 and 2013. This figure is an estimate derived by WTO Secretariat, based on, *inter alia*, the average difference of reported exports of gold by Sudan to the UAE with reported gold imports of the UAE from Sudan from 2010 - 2011, as well as taking into account behaviour of international gold prices from 2012 - 2013.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

## Annex 34<sup>1</sup>

### Lusaka Declaration, Regional Control Mechanism, and ICGLR response

1. The term “*resource curse thesis*” was first used by Richard Auty in 1993 to describe how countries rich in natural resources were witnessing lower economic growth than countries without an abundance of natural resources. The countries situated in Africa’s Great Lakes Region vindicate the resource curse hypothesis. Their abundance of natural resources has not translated into an inclusive socio-economic development. One of the reasons for this is the random and illegal exploitation of natural resources. The gains from natural resources are unequally distributed and often finance armed groups engaged in such exploitation. These armed groups further destroy the stability of region by committing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, while accessing the natural resources and usurping the assets owned by, or allocated to fellow citizens and communities.

2. The “*Protocol on the Fight against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources*”<sup>2</sup>, which was ratified by eleven Heads of States in the Great Lakes Region in Nairobi on 15 December 2006, was the beginning of regional efforts to counter illicit exploitation. On 15 December 2010, the “*Lusaka Declaration of the ICGLR Special Summit to fight illegal exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region*”<sup>3</sup> was signed by eleven Heads of Governments of ICGLR Member States or their duly authorized representatives, including the President of the Republic of the Sudan.

3. The Lusaka Declaration commits Member States of the ICGLR to advance six tools of the Regional Initiative on Natural Resources (RINR). The ICGLR Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR) is a welcome step that would go a long way in curbing the finances flowing to armed groups, stemming from exploitation of natural resources. One of these tools, the Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) has witnessed considerable progress towards implementation, particularly in the DRC and the Republic of Rwanda.

4. Salient excerpts from the Lusaka declaration<sup>4</sup> are reproduced below for ease of reference:

“Fully aware of the endemic conflicts and persistent insecurity caused by armed groups in the Great Lakes Region financed through the illegal exploitation of natural resources and trade in minerals, in particular Gold,.....; and further concerned about the negative impact these armed groups have had on our population in the region including, crimes against humanity, and massive violations of human rights such as, Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV);

<sup>1</sup> The majority of the text in this annex has been directly reproduced from relevant websites and documents under consideration. The idea is to provide a bird’s eye view to the readers, without them going through hundreds of pages.

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/projects/greatlakes/2.%20Democracy%20and%20Good%20Governance/2c.%20Protocols/Protocol.IENR.30.11.%2006%20-%20En,%20final%20revised.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/47143500.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/47143500.pdf>.

Reaffirming our commitment to put in place a Regional Certification Mechanism with the view to fulfilling the regional and international market requirements on transparent mineral trade; Considering our commitment to jointly fight illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Great Lakes Region in line with the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, in particular the Protocol on the Fight against Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources;

Approve the six tools developed to curb illegal exploitation of natural resources, namely: (1) Regional Certification Mechanism; (2) Harmonization of National Legislation; (3) Regional Database on Mineral Flows; (4) Formalization of the Artisanal Mining Sector; (5) Promotion of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) and (6) Whistle Blowing Mechanism;

Direct the relevant institutions in Member States to implement the above six tools, particularly the Regional Certification Mechanism, which has been developed for the monitoring and control of the exploitation and trade of natural resources in the Great Lakes Region;

Commit ourselves to domesticating in our respective countries the Protocol on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region;

Endorse the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict Affected and High Risk areas as crosscutting to the Regional Initiative on the Fight against Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Call upon companies sourcing minerals from the Great Lakes Region to comply with the six tools and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas;"

5. The main tool of RINR, envisaged to break the link between armed conflict and revenues of natural resources, is the regional certification system for gold and 3Ts<sup>5</sup>. A manual<sup>6</sup> for the Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) has been developed and approved by the eleven Heads of State, including Sudan. It provides a practical guide for the implementation of the regional certification mechanism. The RCM Manual has been drafted to ensure that neither the mine site nor trade channels within a country or in the region are in the control of armed groups or criminal networks. The mechanism also contemplates monitoring by an independent mineral chain auditor.

6 As per the Para 4.9 of ICGLR RCM manual, a “*conflict free*” mineral chain is defined to be one that is free from non-state armed groups or public or private security forces who: (a) “*illegally control mine sites or otherwise control transportation routes, points where minerals are traded and upstream actors in the supply chain*”; (b) “*illegally tax or extort money or minerals at points of access to mine sites, along transportation routes or at points where minerals are traded*”; and/or (c) “*illegally tax or extort intermediaries, export companies or international traders*”.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Tantalum, Tin and Tungsten. Actual minerals are: coltan (from which tantalum is derived); cassiterite (tin); and wolframite (tungsten).

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/49111368.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> Based upon OECD Due Diligence Guide for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, Annex II, paragraph 3.



7. For the export of any consignment of gold, the RCM contemplates issuing an ICGLR Certificate, similar to that of the Kimberley Process Certificate for diamonds. This certificate would only be issued to those consignments that can demonstrate 'conflict free' origin, transport and processing. Although the ICGLR certification became obligatory for all gold exports after 15 December 2012, the Government of Sudan has yet to implement it.

8. A Member State seeking to delay the implementation of this provision for the issuance of ICGLR certification was required to ensure that all export shipments mandatorily carry with them an export permit or other government-issued export document, thus indicating the licit nature of export.

9. The RCM further contemplates that Governments shall ensure an annual inspection of all mine sites and classification of the mines in one of three categories; red, green or yellow. The ICGLR Mine Site Inspection and Certification Standards are designed to ensure that designated minerals are sourced only from mine sites that are conflict free and meet minimum social standards. This classification is in line with the procedures and standards of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance. The standards for evaluating mine sites and the steps outlined to foster improvement or else disengage from unacceptable mine sites are in compliance with the procedures and standards found in the OECD Due Diligence Guidance (especially Annex II - Model Supply Chain Policy For A Responsible Global Supply Chain of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas and Annex III - Suggested Measures For Risk Mitigation and Indicators for Measuring Improvement).

10. The ICGLR Chain of Custody Tracking Standards are designed to ensure that designated minerals are fully traceable and conflict-free from the mine site to the point of export. Member State governments are responsible for implementing and supervising the chain of custody tracking system within their own borders. The integrity of Member States' chain of custody systems are verified annually via ICGLR Third Party Audits. Mineral flows are tracked and analysed via an ICGLR Regional Database, using the data on individual shipments collected and transmitted to the ICGLR by each Member States' Chain of Custody system.

11. The Independent Third Party Audit system assures independent verification that the entire mineral chain from mine site to exporter remains in compliance with ICGLR regional standards. The focus is on mineral exporters. The 'Third Party Audit' system complies with the OECD Due Diligence guidelines on independent verification and on-going risk assessment. The scope of the audit runs from the exporter all the way back up the mineral chain to the mine site. Non-compliance by any of the upstream traders or suppliers (up to but not necessarily including mine sites, which are covered by mine site inspections) automatically results in a corresponding level of non-compliance being assessed in relation to the exporter; that is, if the auditor finds that a trader supplying to an exporter is in major non-compliance (Red Flagged) then the exporter itself is also found to be non-compliant (Red-Flagged).

12. Furthermore, a draft model legislation has been developed to facilitate ICGLR Member States to incorporate the provisions of the *"Protocol on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region"*, into their respective national legislation.

13. Inputs received from the ICGLR Secretariat indicate that Sudan attended the 8<sup>th</sup> OECD-ICGLR Forum, held in Kinshasa in November 2014, and indicated its willingness to be an active member of the international responsible mineral trade, and its commitment to formalize the artisanal mining activities, to prevent illegal exploitation.

14. In order to assess the progress of Government of Sudan on the implementation of RCM and other RINR tools, a number of queries were raised to the Government of Sudan. No response to these questions was provided, citing that the request went beyond the mandate of the Panel. The linkage of the relevance of Sudan's implementation of the RINR tools of the Lusaka Declaration to the Panel's mandate is clear. See paragraphs 128 and 149 of the main report.

15. Queries on implementation status of Sudan, raised to ICGLR Secretariat, have been replied to. Relevant facts concerning the status of implementation are:

(a) Sudan is one of the 5 ICGLR member states that have recently made commitment to implement the Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM);

(b) The ICGLR Secretariat is facilitating a peer-learning visit for Sudanese officials to another country in the region to enable them to learn from that country's experience on the implementation process of the ICGLR Mineral certification mechanism;

(c) The ICGLR Secretariat held a Ministers of Justice meeting in August 2015 that came up with an 18-month roadmap for the domestication of ICGLR priority protocols, including the Protocol on the fight against the illegal exploitation of natural resources. Sudan is one of the ICGLR states to domesticate the protocol and harmonize their national legislations; and

(d) The eighth meeting of the Regional Audit Committee of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the fight against illegal exploitation of natural resources was held in Khartoum, Sudan from 10-13 November, 2015. The meeting included a training workshop for the Audit Committee members to assist buildig their capacities to review third party audit reports.

16. The Government of Sudan is thus gearing towards embracing the RCM and other RINR tools. Once mine site inspection commence, all such mines, under the control of armed groups, would be flagged red and there could be no legal export from these mine sites, which would act as a disincentive for mining at such sites.

## **Annex 35**

### **Examination of UAE systemic checks to prevent import of conflict gold**

1. The main body of this report clearly indicates that most of gold mined in Darfur (Sudan), which gets exported illegally, ends up in Dubai. It is mostly hand-carried by air. At UAE international airports, X-ray machines at the arrival area mandatorily screen all hand baggage of an incoming passenger, and thus even the smallest quantity of gold can be easily detected as a dark black patch on the X-ray image. Due to this, and as there is no import duty on gold in the UAE, there is no incentive for not declaring the gold to UAE Customs on arrival. Therefore, the carriers (passengers carrying gold) invariably declare the gold to UAE Customs, though they may not declare it while leaving Sudan to avoid the export duty and export restrictions.

2. The Panel sought specific information from the Government of the UAE in June 2015 concerning:

(a) The procedure for the declaration of gold, when imported into the UAE, as part of unaccompanied baggage;

(b) The reporting requirements for international passengers bringing gold in their accompanied baggage through an international port/airport; and

(c) The identification document, provided by customs authority to a company/person importing gold, which is required at Gold Souk, Dubai, for selling such gold.

3. The Panel received no response to these queries, and no information on these issues was provided during the Panel meeting with officials from various Ministries of the UAE, including from Federal Customs and Dubai Customs, on 6 October 2015. The UAE officials stated that a written response would follow shortly, yet no response has been received by the Panel as of 3 December 2015. There is no open source information available on the Dubai Customs website on the procedures to be followed for hand-carried gold.

4. The Panel visited Dubai during August 2015 and October 2015, and met a number of individuals and entities associated with the gold trade, and established that:

(a) The provenance of hand-carried gold by a passenger is verified by Dubai Customs, by checking the name of the departure country against the Boarding Pass. Thus transit through a third, non-gold producing country, could be used to reduce the risk profile utilised by UAE customs;

(b) Dubai Customs officials do not require a ICGLR certificate in those cases where the departure country is an ICGLR country;

(c) Dubai Customs officials do not seek any document to support the legal import of gold, e.g. export permit or any other government document from the country of origin, to ensure that the gold is not smuggled;

(d) Dubai Customs takes custody of the gold at the Airport, and issues a receipt to that effect to the passenger;

(e) The passenger goes to the gold souk and/or refineries to negotiate a price. Once the passenger finds a buyer, his gold is sent by the UAE authorities to the buyer's place, or to a place decided by the passenger;

(f) If the quantity of gold is relatively low, for example 1 to 2 kg, the carriers sell it to a shop in the gold souk. If the quantity of gold is high, then the gold is normally sold to the refineries;

(g) After the sale is negotiated, the gold is then sent to a test laboratory, where it is melted to check the actual purity, and the final sale price is determined;

(h) Normally, only a passport copy, together with the customs receipt is sufficient documentation for the sale of the gold; and

(i) At the time of sale, most of the artisanal mined Darfur (Sudan) gold is declared as "*scrap or old jewelery scrap gold*", and not as virgin mined gold, to avoid any attention. The mined gold is melted prior to export at small refineries in Khartoum (mostly) to convert it into *dore* bars, ready for smuggling.

## **Annex 36<sup>1</sup>**

### **Information on strengthening border management capacity**

1. This annex is designed to provide information on strengthening the capacity of border management agencies and for enhancing the efficacy of border controls, thus enhancing the implementation of sanctions.
2. Ineffective border controls encourage the smuggling of arms and natural mineral resources, which has the potential of violating the sanctions regime.
3. Borders are typically managed by more than one government agency. The transit of people from one country to another is usually monitored by immigration and police departments. The flow of goods and conveyances across the border are normally overseen by customs departments. For maritime borders, coastguards and marine police are also required to guard the country against the unauthorized infiltration of both goods and people. Similarly, for long land borders, a border security force may be used to protect the borders. The respective border functional responsibilities depend on the organisational structure of the border management system of a country. Very long coastlines and long land borders are often characterized by high levels of porosity, primarily on account of lack of adequate manpower and the absence of appropriate surveillance equipment and scanners. To further compound the problem, border agencies lack coordination between, and among, themselves; often working in isolation.
4. Long land borders are highly vulnerable to threats such as the trafficking of people, drugs, strategic control goods, valuable commodities, natural resources, small arms and light weapons and currency. Smuggling routes, which are normally used to transport restricted and/or high value commodities attracting high rate of customs duty, are always a cause of concern as these very clandestine routes/channels could equally be used to transport any illicit materiel or finance subverting activities. The capacity of most governments in the African continent to control weapons, and to monitor and secure its borders, is perceived to be low.
5. There are at least four international organizations that offer capacity building programmes on cross cutting issues relevant to border management, namely the WCO, INTERPOL, UNODC, and UNODA. Other non-governmental international organizations such as the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and the Geneva Democratization and Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) centre also conduct security sector reform work of relevance in this area. Examples of the type of capacity for some of these organizations follows.

#### **World Customs Organization (WCO)**

6. Terrorism, proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction, trafficking of small arms and explosives, and illicit diversion of dual-use goods pose a serious threat not only to security and safety of people, but also to economic development, political stability and social cohesion of countries across the globe.

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<sup>1</sup> The majority of the text in this annex has been directly reproduced from the relevant websites. The idea is to provide a bird's eye view to the reader, without them going through hundreds of pages.

7. Customs administrations play a critical role at the international border crossings in government efforts to mitigate these threats. Customs manage the cross-border flows of goods, people and means of transport to ensure they comply with law. They detect and prevent trafficking of dangerous, restricted and prohibited goods.

8. The WCO Security Programme<sup>2</sup> concentrates on strengthening customs administrations' capacity to deal with security related issues at the national level and aims at facilitating the global customs community's ability to deal with these threats at the international level. The programme activities are aimed at reaching border security outcomes in five strategic areas. These include: (a) policy setting and foresight; (b) providing guidance and good practices on customs controls in relation to security; (c) coordination of security related customs law enforcement programmes and operations; (d) international cooperation; (e) technology; and (f) technical assistance and capacity-building.

9. At the operational level, the programme has three commodity-based sub-programmes or projects. These include existing initiatives: Global Shield and the STCE Project<sup>3</sup>, and new initiatives: small arms and light weapons, and terrorist financing (currency smuggling). It has also developed a comprehensive passenger control strategy by utilization of API/PNR<sup>4</sup> to identify and curb movements of individuals sanctioned by law including Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs).

10. Additionally, the WCO cooperates on a regular basis with appropriate United Nations (UN) agencies and other international organizations to help its members to better cope with their international obligations stipulated by various UN Security Council resolutions etc.

#### **UNODC - WCO Container Control Programme (CCP)**

11. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and WCO have co-operated in the development and implementation of the UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme<sup>5</sup> (CCP). The CCP has a global reach and aims to fortify the structures and processes which allow for the application of sustainable laws for States and selected ports, so as to minimize the exploitation of maritime containers for the illicit trafficking of drugs, and other transnational organized crime activities.

#### **Global firearms programme of UNODC**

12. The international community has repeatedly expressed its concern with the negative impact of the proliferation of illicit firearms in societies whether at peace or in times of war. The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (COP) urged Member States to ratify and fully implement the Convention and its Protocols, and requested UNODC to assist Member States in this endeavour, inter alia through the provision of legislative advice and legal drafting support, technical assistance, training and capacity

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/activities-and-programmes/security-programme.aspx>.

<sup>3</sup> Strategic Trade Control Enforcement (STCE) Project.

<sup>4</sup> Advance Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record.

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.unodc.org/ropan/en/BorderControl/container-control/ccp.html>.

building activities aimed at strengthening the capacities of States to respond to the challenges and threats posed by transnational organized crime, as well as through the development of specialized legal and operational tools. By its decision 4/6 and resolutions 5/4 and 6/2, the COP further urged States Parties to the Protocol to strengthen their national legislation in a manner consistent with the Protocol, and requested UNODC to support States and facilitate technical assistance for the implementation of the Protocol.

13. To this end, the Implementation Support Section (ISS) of the Organized Crime and Trafficking Branch (OCB), created the *Global Firearms Programme*<sup>6</sup> (GFP) in 2011.

## INTERPOL

14. INTERPOL's capacity building programme<sup>7</sup> assists member countries in improving border security procedures and skills, primarily focused on fighting terrorism and transnational crimes. Training courses on basic security measures and crime-specific skills are consolidated through real-time operations designed to put those skills into practice.

## UNODA

15. The General Assembly established the UNODA Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Asia and the Pacific with a mandate to provide substantive support for initiatives and other efforts of Member States in their respective regions for the implementation of measures of peace and disarmament, including on security sector reform as a contribution to peace and security.

16. UNODA assists Member States in the implementation of the "*UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*" (2002), which includes specific provisions to build the capacity of law enforcement agencies to control small arms and light weapons and generally to improve the delivery of security to populations.<sup>8</sup> UNLIREC<sup>9</sup> has a wide range of training courses and generic SOPs to enhance the capability of border agencies.

## General

17. The focus of capacity building is different for all these organizations, and all of the focus areas are relevant for enhancing the efficacy of border control and thus implementation of sanctions.

18. In order to ensure effective implementation of the sanctions regime, it is imperative to strengthen the capacity of Member States on border control, especially Sudan and the neighbouring States that share challenging borders with Sudan. Border control includes the management of borders associated with seaports and airports. WCO, INTERPOL, UNODC and UNODA would be appropriate organizations to facilitate cooperation and develop a comprehensive capacity

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/gfp.html>.

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Training-and-capacity-building>.

<sup>8</sup> <http://unssr.unlb.org/TaskForceMembers/UNODA.aspx>.

<sup>9</sup> UN Lima Regional Centre of the Office for Disarmament Affairs.

building programme on effective border management that could be then used to strengthen capacity of the relevant border management government agencies in the region. Donors need to come forward to support such programmes, with financial resources, as a priority.



### **Annex 37**

#### **Information on 2015 travel ban violation by Sheikh Musa Hilal Abdallah Alnsiem**

1. The Panel met with Sheikh Musa Hilal Abdallah Alnsiem, a designated individual (ref: SDi.002), on 25 June 2015 in Khartoum. This was the first occasion that a Panel had met Musa Hilal since he was designated in 2006. He was given copies of all relevant Security Council resolutions in the Arabic language and a copy of the narrative summary in English only.

2. When asked about his previous foreign visits since his designation, Mr Hilal stated that:

(a) His trip to Cairo in 2009 was at the invitation of Mr. Suleiman, the then Head of the Egyptian Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat),<sup>1</sup> to advance the cause of peace. He stated that the Egyptian Government was aware of the visit and that he had also met the late JEM Chairman, Khalil Ibrahim, in Cairo;

(b) His visit to Chad in 2011, as a member of the Sudanese delegation, was undertaken to present President Deby his condolences on the demise of his mother, and he had to go there because he enjoys a very good personal relationship with the President of Chad;

(c) In 2013, he visited Dubai for personal and family reasons;

(d) His visit to Chad in 2014 was to attend a peace conference with the knowledge of the Government of Chad; and

(e) He had made no foreign trips in 2015 (as at 25 June 2015).

3. On being asked as to why he had not sought prior permissions for his foreign visits, Mr Hilal stated that although he had heard some rumours, and read in the Sudanese media about a ban on his travel abroad, he had never received any official notice to this effect from either the Government or the United Nations. He further stated that he became aware of the ban only two years ago from officials of UNAMID, with whom he used to interact to discuss local peace issues. He also said that he was unaware of the procedure for seeking prior permission before undertaking foreign visits.

4. The Panel informed him of the exemption provisions in relation to foreign travel, contained in paragraph 3(f) of resolution 1591(2005), read with section 9 of the 1591 Committee Guidelines, and the process of applying for permission to travel abroad. The Panel advised him to seek permission for future foreign trips from the Committee. He reiterated that had he known about the exemption procedure in the past, he would have availed himself of it. He further indicated that in the future he would be willing to apply for permission before travelling abroad.

5. Upon his request, the Panel explained the procedure for seeking delisting. He said that lately he had been playing a very important role as a peacemaker by mediating in various inter-tribal conflicts, and that UNAMID was aware of his role. He further mentioned that he intended to file a request for delisting, as his designation status now interfered with his participation in peace processes; and that

<sup>1</sup> Also known as the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) or General Intelligence Service (GIS).

he would like to present his case to the UN, in person, as part of the delisting process.

6. In spite of these recent efforts made to sensitize the designated individual of his obligations, the Panel is almost certain that Sheikh Musa Hilal travelled to Cairo by air on 15 July 2015; and returned on 27 July 2015.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> (a) <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55768>. Accessed on 21 July 2015; (b) <https://twitter.com/wasilalitaha>. Accessed on 21 July 2015; and (c) Confidential sources.

## **Annex 38**

### **Note on improvement of assets freeze measures**

#### **Background**

1. Resolution 1672 (2006) designated four individuals who met the listing criteria stated in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005), as being subject to travel ban and assets freeze measures.
2. The Panel is aware that, based on the information provided by the Government of Sudan, one of the four designated individuals, namely Major General Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan, has retired and receives a pension from the Government of Sudan. In addition, the Panel had previously found that another designated individual, Sheikh Musa Hilal, used to receive a salary from the Government of Sudan subsequent to his designation in 2006.<sup>1</sup>
3. The Panel had requested information from the Government of Sudan on the status of funds, financial assets and economic resources of all individuals, designated under resolution 1672 (2006).<sup>2</sup> In its response to a Panel request in 2014, the Government set out certain legal challenges it faced in implementing the assets freeze<sup>3</sup>, but did not provide any information on the status of the assets of the individuals.

#### **Sudan's Obligations under Security Council Resolutions 1591 (2005) and 1672 (2006)**

4. Paragraph 1 of resolution 1672 (2006) states "*all States shall implement the measures specified in paragraph 3 of resolution 1591 (2005)*" with respect to the aforementioned four individuals. Paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 1591 (2005) states "*all States shall freeze all funds, financial assets and economic resources that are on their territories... for the benefit of such persons or entities... and shall ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available... within their territories to or for the benefit of such persons or entities;*"
5. The term 'all States' in paragraph 3 (e) includes Sudan. Therefore, Sudan must not only freeze all funds, financial assets and economic resources that are on its territory, owned or controlled by designated persons, but it must also take steps to ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available to the designated persons.

#### **Status of Implementation of Assets Freeze Measures by Sudan**

6. To date, the Government of Sudan has not subjected the said individuals to any assets freeze measures in respect of their funds, financial assets and economic resources within Sudanese jurisdiction. The Panel is almost certain that no administrative, legislative or judicial measures have been taken as yet to identify and freeze the assets of designated individuals.
7. The assets freeze obligation is subject to three exceptions set out in paragraph 3 (g) of resolution 1591 (2005). 'Relevant states', including Sudan, can authorize

<sup>1</sup> S/2013/79, para. 155.

<sup>2</sup> S/2013/79, paras. 152 and 156.

<sup>3</sup> S/2015/31, para. 28.

designated individuals to have access to funds, other financial assets and economic resources to cover specific situations mentioned in paragraph 3 (g), if a relevant State deems it necessary, but only after prior notification of the State's intention to the Committee, and in some instances, after receiving the explicit approval of the Committee.

8. It is possible that the pension and monthly salary, in general, may fall within these exemptions, in particular exemptions provided to meet the basic needs of the designated individuals in paragraph 3(g) (i) of resolution 1591 (2005). The Government of Sudan has not notified the Committee regarding any exemptions, in respect of any of the four designated individuals since 2006<sup>4</sup>.

**International law obligations of the Government of Sudan, in respect of decisions taken by the Security Council**

9. Resolution 1591 (2005), which sets out the designation criteria and the assets freeze measures, and resolution 1672 (2006) which designates four individuals, are both adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus, the Government of Sudan is bound by resolutions 1591 (2005) and 1672 (2006), and it is obliged to comply with asset freeze obligations set forth in paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 1591 (2005)<sup>5</sup>.

**Panel's observations**

10. The Panel notes that certain Member States have implemented the assets freeze measures by adopting a range of legislative and administrative measures that are consistent with their respective constitutions. Some Member States have enacted such legislation, which enables freezing of assets linked to a sanctions regime, purely on the basis of the designation of individuals/entities by the Security Council, without any prerequisite, e.g. need for a domestic judicial order. The Government of Sudan may like to consider identifying and addressing any technical and legal capacity building requirements that it may have in drafting such legislation for implementing the assets freeze measures.

11. The Government of Sudan was urged to provide an implementation report, in accordance with the paragraph 13 of resolution 2200 (2015), within a specified time period, outlining the measures taken to implement its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions relating to the assets freeze on individuals designated under resolution 1672 (2006). The Panel considers that the Government of Sudan could at least consider taking measures to identify the funds, financial assets and economic resources of the individuals designated under resolution 1672 (2006), and submit an implementation report.

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<sup>4</sup> S/2013/788, para. 26.

<sup>5</sup> Article 25 of the UN Charter states that 'The member States of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.'

**Annex 39**  
**Map of tribal conflict areas 2015**



**Annex 40****Summary of violations of resolutions and international humanitarian law**

1. A summary of violations of resolutions and international humanitarian law identified by the Panel during 2015 to date is set out in the below table for ease of reference.

Table 1

**Summary of violations**

<i>Serial</i>	<i>Area</i>	<i>Violation summary</i>	<i>Perpetrator</i>		<i>SC resolution reference/IHL violation</i>
			<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Level of certainty</i>	
1	General	Obstructing the work of the Panel by access to three separate locations.	Government of Sudan	<b>Certain</b>	2200 (2015), para. 21.
2	General	Obstructing the work of the Panel by consistently and deliberately failing to provide the specific information at their disposal on a range of issues, and by denying access to one individual.	Government of Sudan	<b>Certain</b>	2200 (2015), para. 22.
3	Arms	Import of small arms ammunition into Darfur on unknown dates since 29 March 2015.	Not known	<b>Almost certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 7.
4	Arms	Import of Typhoon armoured personnel carrier (APC) into Darfur on an unknown date since 29 March 2005.	Sudanese Police	<b>Certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 7.
5	Arms	Failure to ensure appropriate end use certification was in place for the supply of Typhoon APC to Sudan.	Government of UAE	<b>Highly probable</b>	1945 (2010), para. 10.
6	Arms	Obstructing the work of the Panel by consistently and deliberately failing to provide the specific information at their disposal on the supply of Typhoon APC to Sudan.	Government of UAE	<b>Certain</b>	2200 (2015), para. 22.
7	Arms	Obstructing the work of the Panel by consistently and deliberately failing to provide the specific information at their disposal on the supply of Typhoon APC to Sudan.	Kamaz International Trading FZE, UAE	<b>Certain</b>	2200 (2015), para. 22.

Serial	Area	Violation summary	Perpetrator		SC resolution reference/IHL violation
			Responsible	Level of certainty	
8	Arms	Obstructing the work of the Panel by consistently and deliberately failing to provide the specific information at their disposal on the supply of Typhoon APC to Sudan.	Wadi Al Neel Shipping Company, UAE	<b>Certain</b>	2200 (2015) para. 22.
9	Arms	Obstructing the work of the Panel by consistently and deliberately failing to provide the specific information at their disposal on the supply of dual use software to Sudan.	Hacking Team S.r.l, Italy	<b>Certain</b>	2200 (2015), para. 22.
10	Arms	Failure to prevent technical training on, and provision of weapons to, JEM in South Sudan on or about 2014 to 21 April 2015.	Government of South Sudan	<b>Certain</b>	1556 (2004), para. 8; and 1591 (2005), para. 7.
11	Arms	Import of weapons and ammunition into Darfur on or about 23 April 2015.	JEM	<b>Certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 7.
12	Arms	Failure to prevent supply of weapons and ammunition into Darfur on or about 21 April 2015.	Government of South Sudan	<b>Certain</b>	1556 (2004), para. 7; and 1591 (2005), para. 7.
13	Arms	Import of AM-A Type Fuzes (fitted to improvised air-delivered munitions) into Darfur that were used in aerial attack on Dursa on 9 February 2015, and Rowata on 1 and 6 April 2015.	SAF	<b>Almost certain</b>	1591 (2005), paras. 6-7.
14	Aviation	Deployment of MiG-29 multi-role aircraft (TN NK) into Darfur during April 2015.	SAirF	<b>Certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 7.
15	Aviation	Deployment of An-26 (TN 7715 and 7719) into Darfur in the improvised bomber role.	SAirF	<b>Certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 6-7.
16	Aviation	Deployment of 1 x Mil Mi-17 (TN 537) into Darfur for potential use in the multirole helicopter role.	SAirF	<b>Certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 7.
17	Aviation	Deployment of 1 x Mil Mi-24V (TN 933) into Darfur.	SAirF	<b>Certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 7.

Serial	Area	Violation summary	Perpetrator		SC resolution reference/IHL violation
			Responsible	Level of certainty	
18	Aviation	Deployment of 2 x Mil Mi-24P (TN 965 and 966) into Darfur.	SAirF	<b>Certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 7.
19	Aviation	Deployment of An-12 (TN 9955, 9966 and 9988) into Darfur on SAF resupply flights.	SAirF	<b>Almost certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 7.
20	Aviation	Deployment of An-32 (TN 7710, 7720 and 7721) into Darfur on SAF resupply flights.	SAirF	<b>Almost certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 7.
21	Aviation	Deployment of IL-76TD (2 x Unmarked) into Darfur on covert SAF resupply flights.	SAirF	<b>Almost certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 7.
22	Aviation	Obstructing the work of the Panel by consistently and deliberately failing to provide the specific information at their disposal in reference to a Panel investigation into the supply of An-26 aircraft.	Asterias Commercial S.A., Panama	<b>Certain</b>	2200 (2015), para. 22.
23	Aviation	Obstructing the work of the Panel by consistently and deliberately failing to provide the specific information at their disposal in reference to a Panel investigation into the supply of An-26 aircraft.	Government of Sudan	<b>Certain</b>	2200 (2015), para. 22.
24	Aviation	Deployment of An-12 (Unmarked) into Darfur on RSF resupply flights from Khartoum.	Government of Sudan	<b>Almost certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 7.
25	Aviation	Deployment of An-74 (ST-BDT and ST-GFF) into Darfur on RSF resupply flights.	Government of Sudan	<b>Almost certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 7.
26	Aviation	Deployment of IL-76TD (ST-EWX) into Darfur on RSF resupply flights.	Government of Sudan	<b>Almost certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 7.
27	Aviation	Dursa, 9 February 2015, air attack using An-26 and IADM.	SAirF	<b>Certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 6.
28	Aviation	Rowata, 1 and 6 April 2015, air attack by An-26 and IADM.	SAirF	<b>Certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 6.



<i>Serial</i>	<i>Area</i>	<i>Violation summary</i>	<i>Perpetrator</i>		<i>SC resolution reference/IHL violation</i>
			<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Level of certainty</i>	
29	IHL	Massala, 1 January 2015, attacks on civilian population and objects.	Border Guards Unknown armed groups	<b>Almost certain</b>	Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions;  Protocol II, art. 13 (1), (protection of civilians from dangers arising out of conflict);  Protocol II, art. 13 (2), (prohibition on targeting of civilians and committing acts aimed at spreading of terror amongst civilians);  Protocol II, art. 14, (prohibition of objects indispensable to the civilian population);  Protocol II, art. 17 (2), (prohibition on forced displacement of civilians);  CIHL Rule 2, (spreading terror among the civilian population);  CIHL Rule 6, (protection of civilians);  CIHL Rule 10, (protections of civilians objects);  CIHL Rule 52, (prohibition of pillage);

Serial	Area	Violation summary	Perpetrator		SC resolution reference/IHL violation
			Responsible	Level of certainty	
					CIHL Rule 54, (attacks against objects indispensable to the civilian population); CIHL Rule 89, (prohibition on violations to life); and CIHL Rule 103, (collective violations).
30	IHL	Sambal, 1 January 2015, attacks on civilian population and objects.	Border Guards Unknown armed groups	<b>Almost certain</b>	Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; Protocol II, art. 13 (1) and (2), 14 and 17 (2); and CIHL Rules, 2, 6, 10, 52, 54, 89 and 103.
31	IHL	Hiller Hager, 1 January 2015, attacks on civilian population and objects.	Border Guards Unknown armed groups	<b>Almost certain</b>	Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; Protocol II, art. 13 (1) and (2), 14 and 17 (2); and CIHL Rules, 2, 6, 10, 52, 54 and 103.
32	IHL	Funga Suk, 1 January 2015, attacks on civilian population and objects.	RSF Unknown armed groups	<b>Almost certain</b>	Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; Protocol II, art. 13 (1) and (2), 14 and 17 (2); and CIHL Rules, 2, 6, 10, 52, 54 and 103.

Serial	Area	Violation summary	Perpetrator		SC resolution reference/IHL violation
			Responsible	Level of certainty	
33	IHL	Golo, 24-27 January 2015, attacks on civilian population and objects.	RSF, Border Guards, Unknown armed groups	<b>Almost certain</b>	Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions;  Protocol II, art. 13 (1) and (2), 14 and 17 (2);  CIHL Rules, 2, 6, 10, 52, 54 and 103;  CIHL Rule, 87, (civilians must be treated humanely);  CIHL Rule 93, (prohibition on rape and sexual violence); and  CIHL Rule 148, (countermeasures against civilians are prohibited).
34	IHL	Bardani, 25 January 2015, sexual violence against civilians.	RSF	<b>Almost certain</b>	Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions;  Protocol II, art. 13 (2); and  CIHL Rules, 2, 87 and 93.
35	IHL	Rowata, 1 April 2015, air attack by An-26 and IADM resulting in death and injury to civilian population and damage to civilian property.	SAirF	<b>Certain</b>	Protocol II, art. 13 (1) and (2);  CIHL Rule 1 (principle of distinction between civilians and fighters);  CIHL Rules 2, 6, 10 and 103;  CIHL Rule 7, (distinction between civilian objects and military objectives);  CIHL Rule 11, (indiscriminate attacks against civilians); and

Serial	Area	Violation summary	Perpetrator		SC resolution reference/IHL violation
			Responsible	Level of certainty	
36	IHL	Rowata, 6 April 2015, air attack by An-26 and IADM resulting in minor damage to UNAMID vehicle.	SAirF	<b>Certain</b>	<p>CIHL Rules 14-21, (principles of proportionality, targeting and precautionary measures).</p> <p>CIHL Rule 71, (weapons that are indiscriminate)</p> <p>Protocol II, art. 13 (1) and (2);</p> <p>CIHL Rules 1, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 71; and</p> <p>CIHL Rule 33 (protection of peacekeepers).</p>
37	IHL	Recruitment and use of children in hostilities	JEM	<b>Certain</b>	<p>CIHL Rule 22, (precautions against effects of conflict of civilians under the control of the party):</p> <p>CIHL Rule 135, (special protection afforded to children); and</p> <p>CIHL Rule 136, (prohibition on the recruitment of child soldiers); and</p> <p>CIHL Rule 137. (prohibition on the use of children in hostilities).</p>
38	Travel ban	Failure to comply with the travel ban measure in connection with the travel of Musa Hilal to Egypt in July 2015.	Government of Egypt	<b>Almost certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 3 (d).

<i>Serial</i>	<i>Area</i>	<i>Violation summary</i>	<i>Perpetrator</i>		<i>SC resolution reference/IHL violation</i>
			<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Level of certainty</i>	
39	Travel ban	Failure to share the departure information with Egypt for the travel of Musa Hilal in July 2015.	Government of Sudan	<b>Almost certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 3 (d) and 2200 (2015), para. 12.
40	Travel ban	Failure to seek exemption for his travel to Egypt in July 2015, through an appropriate entity.	Musa Hilal	<b>Almost certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 3 (d)
41	Assets Freeze	Failure to identify assets of all designated individuals, in order to implement assets freeze measures on designated individuals.	Government of Sudan	<b>Certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 3 (e)
42	Assets Freeze	Failure to freeze new assets being created by an entity, being directly controlled by a designated individual, namely Sheikh Musa Hilal.	Government of Sudan	<b>Certain</b>	1591 (2005), para. 3 (e)

**Annex 41**  
**Abbreviations**

3T	Tantulum, Titanium and Tungsten
AAG	Abbala Armed Group(s)
A/C	Aircraft
ACRWC	African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
AGM	Air to Ground Missile
AIG	Alshagara Industrial Complex
a.k.a	Also Known As
AK	<i>Avtomatik Kalishnikov</i> (Assault Rifle)
AOG	Armed Opposition Groups
APC	Armoured Personnel Carriers
API	Advanced Passenger Information
AU	African Union
AUHIP	AU High Level Panel
AUPSC	AU Peace and Security Committee
BG	Border Guards
CAAC	Children and Armed Conflict
CAR	Central African Republic
CAS	Close Air Support (Aviation)
CBoS	Central Bank of Sudan
CCP	Container Control Programme
CEP	Circular Error Probability
CEN	Customs Enforcement Network
CIHL	Customary International Humanitarian Law
CMC	Cluster Munition Convention
CRC	Convention on the Rights of Children
CRP	Central Reserve Police
c/s	Colour Scheme (Camouflage)
DCAF	Democraticization and Control of the Armed Forces (Geneva)
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.
DDS	Darfur Development Strategy
DIDC	Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation

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DMCC	Dubai Multi Commodities Centre
DRA	Darfur Regional Authority
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DShK	<i>Degtyaryova-Shpagina Krupnokaliberny</i> (Medium Machine Gun)
EITI	Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
FAB/OFAB	<i>Fugasnaya Aviatsionnaya Bomba</i> (High Explosive Aircraft Bomb)
FaST	Foundational and Short-Term Activities
FGA	Fighter Ground Attack
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FTF	Former Terrorist Fighters
FZE	Free Zone Enterprise
g	Gramme
GCSP	Geneva Centre for Security Policy
GFP	Global Firearms Programme
GID	General Intelligence Directorate (Egypt)
GIS	General Intelligence Service (Egypt)
GPS	Global Positioning System
HMG	Heavy Machine Gun
IADM	Improvised Air Delivered Munition(s)
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDEX	International Defence Exhibition (Abu Dhabi)
IDP	Internally Displaced Person(s)
IFC	International Follow-up Commission
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IM	Improvised Munitions
IMF	International Monetary Fund

ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh)
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance
JAGMMC	Jebel Amir Gold Mines Management Council
JCM	Joint Chief Mediator
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
kg	Kilogramme
km	Kilometre(s)
KPV	<i>Krupnokaliberniy Pulemyot Vladimirova</i> (Heavy Machine Gun)
LBMA	London Bullion Market Association
LFM	Liberation and Freedom Movement
LJM	Liberation and Justice Movement
LMG	Light Machine Gun
MBRL	Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher
MI	Military Intelligence
MIC	Military Industrial Corporation
MIEUX	Migration EU Expertise programme
mm	Millimetre(s)
MG	Machine Gun
MMG	Medium Machine Gun
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSN	Manufacturer's Serial Number
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCC	National Coordination Committee (Sudan)
NCP	National Congress Party
NDC	National Dialogue Committee
NEC (Q)	Net Explosive Content (Quantity)
NFP	National Focal Point (Sudan)
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIBATT44	Nigerian Battalion 44, UNAMID
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service (Sudan)
NK	Not Known
OCB	Organised Crime and Trafficking Branch (INTERPOL)
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
ODO	Ordnance Disposal Office (UNAMID)



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OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPICAC	Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
OFAB/FAB	<i>Fugasnaya Aviatsionnaya Bomba</i> (High Explosive Aircraft Bomb)
PDF	Popular Defence Forces
PKM	<i>Pulemyot Kalashnikova</i> (Modernised). (Light Machine Gun)
PNR	Passenger Name Record
RBK	<i>Razovaya Bombovaya Kasseta</i> (Cluster Bomb)
RCL	Recoilless Rifle
RCM	Regional Certification Mechanism
RCS	Remote Control Software
RINR	Regional Initiative on Natural Resources
RPG	<i>Ruchnoy Protivotankovyy Granatomyot</i> (Shoulder Launched Anti Tank Grenade)
RSF	Rapid Support Force(s)
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SAirF	Sudanese Air Force
SARC	Sudanese Revolutionary Awakening Council
SDG	Sudanese Pounds
SFSCCL	Sudan Financial Services Company Limited
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SLA/AK	Sudan Liberation Army/Ali Karbino
SLA/AW	Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahed Mohamed Nour
SLA/MM	Sudan Liberation Army/Arkou Minni Minnawi
SLF	Sudan Liberation Forces
SLMJ	Sudan Liberation Movement for Justice
SLM/AW	Sudan Liberation Movement/Abdul Wahed Mohamed Nour
SLM/MM	Sudan Liberation Army/Arkou Minni Minnawi
SLM/SR	Sudan Liberation Movement/Second Revolution
SLM/U	Sudan Liberation Movement/Unity
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures
SPLA	Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (South Sudanese Army)
SPLM/N	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/North
SRCAC	Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict (UN)

SRF	Sudanese Revolutionary Front
SMSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
STCE	Strategic Trade Control Enforcement project (WCO)
TAG	Tribal Armed Groups
TBC	To Be Confirmed
TN	Tactical Number
TS	Team Site (UNAMID)
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UDHR	Universal Declaration on Human Rights
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNLIREC	United Nations Lima Regional Centre (UNODA)
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
US\$	United States Dollars
WCO	World Customs Organization
WFP	World Food Programme
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZPU	<i>Zenitnaya Pulemetnaya Ustanovka</i> (Anti Aircraft Gun)
ZU	<i>Zenitnaya Ustanovka</i> (Anti Aircraft Gun)

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